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Abstract 
Inflation targeting has been the central focus of monetary policy since early 1990s as 
more than 60 central banks across the countries target it explicitly, others target it 
implicitly. However, how precisely does the central bank target inflation in practice? 
Does monetary policy always only respond to inflation or does it also react to asset 
prices and open economy variables? This thesis models these aspects of monetary 
policy primarily focusing to the UK inflation targeting regime. 
The empirical results are significant. First, monetary policy in UK is forward looking. It 
responds to deviations of inflation from the target, to the output gap and to asset prices 
misalignments. The policy reaction to inflation is strongest followed by the reaction to 
the output gap, the foreign interest rate, the exchange rate, house prices and share 
prices. Second, monetary policy is nonlinear because (a) it has deflationary bias, (b) it 
responds to asset prices only when asset prices misalignments are high, and (c) it 
responds to the output gap only when it does not respond to inflation and asset price 
misalignments. Third, policy response to exchange rates does not depend on inflation 
regime while the reaction to inflation does depend on the exchange rate regime. 
Fourth, policy response to inflation is asymmetric and it aims to keep inflation within a 
range rather than pursuing a point target of 2.5%. Fifth, neither the exchange rate 
misalignment nor the foreign interest rate alone can capture the open economy effects; 
policy responds to both variables. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 An overview of an inflation targeting regime 
Although a number of central banks have targeted inflation since the early 1990s, the 
idea was suggested for more than a century ago. As discussed in Haldane (1995), 
Alfred Marshall suggested a monetary system that adjusted to fix the purchasing 
power of each unit of currency closely to an absolute standard as early as in 1887 
(Marshall, 1887). Wicksell (1898) advocated an explicit price-level standard for 
monetary policy that was, later on, implemented by Sweden for about three decades in 
the beginning of the I 9th century (see also Fisher, 1922). 
Historically, monetary policy had various objectives across countries until Bretton 
Woods agreement to the exchange rate stability in July 1944. Under this agreement, 
member countries were required to maintain the exchange rate of their currency 
within a fixed value - plus minus one percent - in terms of gold'. Following the 
United States' suspension of convertibility from dollars to gold due to its budget and 
trade deficits, the Bretton Woods agreement collapsed in 1972. 
The objective of monetary policy then gradually refocused to economic stability in 
general and financial stability including price stability in particular through targeting 
monetary aggregates (Friedman, 1977). Although some central banks still target 
monetary aggregates, it did not remain in place for a long time in many countries 
(IFS, 2005). 
Following the failure to stabilize inflation through the exchange rate and monetary 
aggregates, a growing number of central banks adopted inflation targeting in the early 
1990s. There is now a consensus among policyrnakers, economists, and general public 
that low and predictable inflation helps to promote economic efficiency and growth in 
the long run. It is also argued that macroeconomic stability in general and price level 
stability in particular are important preconditions for economic growth (Fisher, 1993). 
It is also accepted that monetary policy can affect only inflation, and not the real 
variables such as output or unemployment in the long run (Bernanke et. al., 1999). 
According to this school of thought, one of the reasons for a high level of inflation 
1 This is an agreement on the exchange rate stability made in the United Nations Monetary and 
Financial conference at Bretton Woods, Washington, in July 1994 by 730 delegates from 44 countries. 
The agreement, later on, was ratified by other member countries of the UN (Bank of Canada, 200 1). 
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during 1970s and 1980s was the outcome of the attempt to manipulate Philips curve 
(Philips, 1958). Moreover, Friedman (1977) argues that there is no long run trade-off 
between inflation and unemployment as expansionary monetary policy results only 
inflation. The recent speeches of the central bankers and economists suggest that 
central banks have no choice other than targeting inflation either implicitly or 
explicitly to keep economy healthier. 
Nowadays, more than 60 central banks, both from developed and emerging 
economies, target inflation explicitly while other targets it implicitly 2 (Mahadeva and 
Sterne, 2002). This framework of monetary policy aims to achieve an ex-post inflation 
rate. However, as pointed out by Masson et al., (1997), the success of inflation 
targeting depends on transparency, the ability of the central bank to carry out an 
independent monetary policy and the absence of a commitment to have another 
nominal anchors like the exchange rate or to economic growth (see also Bernanke et 
al., 1999). 
1.2 Objective 
Although the rate of inflation has remained relatively low and stable in the inflation 
targeting regime, economic stability is largely influenced by foreign economic shocks 
and asset price volatility. The contagion effects of the financial and banking crisis 
during some periods in 1990s, a frequent oil price shocks from the middle-east 
See also ITS 2005 Year Book, IMF. 
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countries, and the development of world financial markets threatened stability. On the 
domestic front, stock prices and house prices in major industrial countries rose to 
record levels during this period. These have generated the following lively debates in 
the literature whether or not monetary policy should and/or does respond to open 
economy effects and asset prices. 
First, the recent literature argues that monetary policy may be nonlinear. This implies 
that policy does not respond to inflation constantly and uniformly all the time; it may 
respond to other variables when it does not have to respond to inflation (see chapter 3 
for more discussion). For example, Martin and Milas (2004) argue that monetary 
policy does not respond to inflation when the expected inflation is close to the target. 
Dolado at el. (2002) argue that policy reaction to the output gap differs between 
positive and negative output gaps. This class of literature, however, does not describe 
as how monetary policy behaves when inflation is close to the target or when policy 
does not have to respond to inflation. Does policy respond to some other variables or 
remain idle? At the same time, we suspect whether nonlinearity is observed in the 
literature due to misspecification in the usual Taylor rule. 
Second, the literature debates whether monetary policy responds to asset prices. 
Some argue that asset prices are an integral part of monetary policy and that policy 
should respond to them in a similar way it responds to inflation and the output gap 
while others believe that asset prices should be taken into account only to the extent 
that they help forecasting inflation (see Chapter 2 for references and more discussion). 
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In either case, the literature, to our knowledge, does not analyze whether policy differ 
between the periods of a large appreciation and depreciation of asset prices. 
Third, there is also a debate on as how monetary policy responds to the open 
economy. Some papers argue that policy responds to the short-term foreign interest 
rate while others argue that it responds to the real exchange rate or the real exchange 
rate misalignment as an alternative to the foreign interest rate (see Chapter 3 and 4 for 
the references and more discussion). 
In this context, we investigate some of these issues discussed above. In particular, the 
main aim of this research is 
(a) to investigate whether monetary policy responds to asset prices. If so, to what 
extent and whether the policy response depends on the state of inflation? 
(b) to assess whether monetary policy targets inflation precisely in a way it is 
announced. In the process we analyze whether policy is forward or backward 
looking, linear or nonlinear, point target vs. range target, symmetric vs. 
asymmetric; and 
(c) to analyze whether monetary policy responds to foreign interest rates and real 
exchange rate misalignments; and whether the policy reaction to them depends 
on the state of inflation. 
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1.3 Major findings 
The analysis begins with an investigation of whether or not monetary policy responds 
to asset prices. We consider two approaches in this regard. We first assess whether 
policy responds to asset prices collectively by responding to the financial condition 
index (FCI) in chapter 2 and we then verify the findings of chapter 2 by estimating an 
asset prices augmented Taylor rule in chapter 3. 
In chapter 2, we construct FCIs, which are a weighted average of the interest rate, the 
exchange rate, share prices and house prices. Instead of using a demand curve for 
obtaining FCls as in the conventional literature, we propose that an open economic 
structural model be used. We provide two alternative weighting procedures, one for a 
strict CPI inflation targeting framework and another for a flexible inflation targeting 
framework. 
We construct FCls for the US and the UK using quarterly data over 1979QI to 
2003Q4 and then estimate a FCI augmented Taylor rule. Our empirical results show 
that FCIs are very useful for describing the monetary policy stance in these two 
countries. 
We then estimate asset price augmented reaction functions in Chapter 3 as an 
alternative to the FCl augmented Taylor rule in Chapter 2. The asset prices we 
consider in this chapter are similar to those of chapter 2 as we use exchange rate 
6 
misalignment, deviations of house prices from trend and deviations of share prices 
from the fundamental. Our results overwhelmingly suggest that the asset price 
augmented Taylor rule outperforms a simple rule. Overall, we obtain a consistent 
conclusion from both chapters (chapter 2 and 3); monetary policy responds to asset 
prices. 
Chapter 3 also aims to investigate whether or not monetary policy is nonlinear and 
whether or not it responds to exchange rate misalignments. It employs various 
nonlinear models including the smooth transition autoregressive (STAR) model to 
asses nonlinearity in monetary policy. Chapter 4 ftirther models UK monetary policy 
using three regimes STAR model. This chapter mainly seeks to analyze whether 
monetary policy responds to foreign monetary policy by responding to the foreign 
short-term interest rates. As we find that the BoE responds to the exchange rate 
misalignment in chapter 3 and to the foreign interest rates in chapter 4, we then 
include both variables in the reaction function in chapter 5 and employ a four regime 
STAR model. The empirical findings can be summarized as follows: 
First, we find that monetary policy is forward looking. The empirical estimates 
throughout this research constantly suggest that one quarter ahead forward looking 
Taylor rule outperfonns any other specification. 
Second, the policy reaction to inflation is strongest followed by the response to the 
output gap, the foreign interest rate, the exchange rate, house prices and share prices. 
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Third, we find that policyrnakers aim to keep inflation within a range rather than 
pursing a point target in practice. 
Fourth, monetary policy does not respond to inflation when the expected inflation is 
less than the lower threshold. On the other hand, the policy response to inflation is 
vigorous when expected inflation exceeds the upper threshold. These imply that 
monetary policy is deflationary bias. Moreover, we find that the upper inflation 
threshold is just slightly higher than the target of 2.5% but the lower threshold is far 
below the target though the BoE has to give a formal clarification to the government 
if inflation deviates for more than 1% in either direction from the target, suggests 
monetary policy is nonlinear and policy response is asymmetric. 
Fifth, monetary policy in the UK considers a separate exchange rate regime together 
with inflation regime. The BoE responds to inflation and exchange rate only when 
they are in their outer regime. More precisely, the Bank responds to the exchange rate 
only if domestic currency under-valuation is greater than 4% or over-valuation 
exceeds 5%. Similarly, policy responds to inflation only when expected inflation is 
less than 1.9% or greater than 2.8%. 
Sixth, the monetary policy response to exchange rate misalignments does not depend 
on inflation regime but the response to inflation does depend on the exchange rate 
regime. 
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Seventh, policyrnakers respond to the output gap only when they do not respond to 
asset prices or inflation, that is, when inflation and the exchange rates are in their 
inner regimes. 
Finally, we find that neither the exchange rate misalignment nor the foreign interest 
rate alone can capture the open economy effects; monetary policy responds to both 
variables. Unlike the policy response to exchange rate misalignments, we find that 
policy reaction to the foreign interest rate is unaffected by the inflation or the 
exchange rate regimes. 
Although we use a standard analytical framework of monetary policy, our findings 
should be taken cautiously while generalizing them for the following reasons: 
First, it is argued that the perfon-nance of inflation targeting depends on the 
institutional framework, operational procedure and the development of money and 
financial markets, (see Bernanke et al., 1999). Therefore, our findings may not be 
generalized to other central banks if the policy environment is different from that of 
the BoE. 
Second, the literature explores various policy rules to be employed to assess monetary 
policy. Following the monetary policy committee (MPQ minutes of the BoE, we rely 
on the interest rate reaction functions and do not attempt to compare them to any other 
9 
alternative policy rules 3 (Taylor, 1993,1999 and Clarida et al, 1998). Our analytical 
framework, therefore, can not be generalized to other countries if the interest rate rule 
is not applicable to them. 
Third, we do not make any argument as to whether or not monetary policy should 
respond to asset prices and the international market as the literature debates this issue. 
Our main focus is to analyze whether or not policy has been responding to them in 
practice. 
Fourth, there are numbers of crucial issues on the topic such as range target vs. point 
target; price level vs. price changes target; impact of institutional autonomy to the 
performance of inflation targeting; the definition of inflation to be considered; and the 
criterion for setting the target range/value. We, however, do not attempt to address 
any of them. We begin our analysis on the assumption that the central bank is free to 
set monetary instruments to achieve the quantitative target which is already well 
defined. 
3 For example, some studies strongly advocate nominal income growth rule and monetary targeting 
rules as an alternative to the interest rate rule (Taylor, 1999). 
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Chapter 2 
Monetary Policy, Asset Prices and Inflation Targeting: 
An Aggregate Approach 
2.1 Introduction 
If the interest rate is the only effective monetary policy instrument in an open and 
liberal economy and if inflation target is the only objective of monetary policy then 
why be the central bank not just follow the Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993,1999) to respond 
inflation? In practice, a number of monetary transmission channels work together 
which may have a direct or indirect impact on inflation with differing magnitudes. 
This implies that a proportional relationship between the interest rate and inflation 
may not hold due to an involvement of other variables, possibly asset prices. For 
instance, if overall economy is growing at above trend pace in a period of low 
inflation, there would be a policy mistake if the interest rate is lowered in response to 
II 
inflation (see also Dudley and Hatzius, 2000; Goodhart and Hofmann, 2001,2003 
among others). 
A large bulk of literature, therefore, argues that the simple Taylor rule is suboptimal in 
an open economy because it does not consider the exchange rate and other asset prices 
in the policy framework (see Ball 1999 and references therein). In fact, monetary 
policy might take account of open economy effects and domestic financial markets by 
responding to exchange rates, property prices and equity prices respectively at least for 
three reasons. First, asset price misalignment may jeopardize financial stability, which 
in turn may distort output and inflation (Goodhart, 2001 and Lowe, 2002). Second, 
asset prices play an important role in the transmission of monetary policy. For instance 
a rising asset price may have a direct impact on aggregate demand because asset prices 
are associated with growing inflationary pressure (Montagnoli and Napolitano, 2005). 
Third, asset prices contain important information regarding the future path of inflation 
and output (Goodhart and Hofmann, 2003, Kontonikas and loannidis, 2005). 
As discussed, there is a consensus in the literature that asset prices play an important 
role in the economy. What is debatable is how and to what extent should monetary 
policy respond to asset prices? There are three different views regarding this. The first 
view is that asset prices should be made an integral part of monetary policy. Policy 
should respond to them in a way it responds to inflation and the output gap (Cecchetti 
et al., 2000). The second view is that asset prices should be considered only to the 
extent that they help in forecasting inflation. As asset prices, in general, are more 
12 
volatile than output and inflation, monetary policy may not be able to control inflation 
if it responds to asset prices (Bernanke and Gertler, 1999). Finally, there is an 
argument that policy should target a broader price index that includes asset prices 
(Goodhart, 1999; Goodhart and Hofmann, 2003). Targeting a broader price index in a 
way of targeting CPI inflation implies that policy responds to both inflation and asset 
prices (Duguay, 1994). 
To construct this broader price index, Freedman (1994), Duguay (1994) and Ball 
(1999) propose a weighted average of the short-term interest rate and the exchange 
rate that we know as the monetary conditions index (MCI). Under this approach, 
policyrnaker attempts to set interest rates in order to keep the MCI in a par level or 
within a range so as to maintain inflation and outpue. However, this index still 
potentially neglects other transmission channels of monetary policy except for interest 
rates and exchange rates. 
In order to include domestic asset prices in the policy framework, Goodhart and 
Hofmann (2001) develop a financial conditions index (FCI). This is a weighted 
average of the short-term real interest rate, the real exchange rate, real house prices 
and real share prices. This index is an extension of the MCI that includes house prices 
and share prices in addition to MCI variables. Keeping the FCI in a specified range or 
Since MCI keeps a strong positive relationship with inflation (Freedman, 1994). 
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at a par level, therefore, implies that the central bank is also responding asset prices in 
order to stabilize the inflation and output (Gauthier et. al., 2004). 
In the light of this discussion, this chapter aims to give a different look regarding the 
aggregate approach of monetary policy by introducing alternative measurements for 
FCL Our motivations are the following. 
First, the existing literature uses only the IS curve to obtain weights of asset prices 
(eg. Goodhart and Hofmann, 2003, Lack, 2003) and excludes the supply side of the 
economy. We argue that the FCl should be obtained from a macroeconomic structural 
model, which combines both the supply and demand factors in the determination of 
inflation and output. 
Second, the conventional literature does not take into account of the direct impact of 
changes in the real exchange rate while determining the FCI weights. We argue that 
import prices may play a role in the determination of inflation in an open economy. 
Third, the literature does not analyze whether the FCl framework is designed to target 
the CPI inflation or other measure of inflation. We argue that the construction of FCI 
weights should reflect the type of inflation that is targeted by the central bank. 
This chapter addresses these issues on both theoretical and empirical grounds. We 
develop two alternative FCI models, one for CPI inflation and another for domestic 
14 
inflation targeting frameworks respectively. Although both of them are obtained from 
a macroeconomic structural model, the main difference between them is the treatment 
of the real exchange rate. The CPI model assumes that the real exchange rate has a 
direct impact on inflation via import prices and indirect effects via pressure on the 
aggregate demand while the latter case considers the indirect impact alone. 
Second, we construct FCls for the UK and the USA using our new methodology and 
compare them with the conventional method. The usefulness of indices is, then, tested 
by estimating the FCI augmented Taylor rule. The empirical results overwhelmingly 
suggest that the FCI contains important information for the monetary policy setting. 
Finally, we find that the FCl augmented Taylor rules outperform the simple rule in 
both countries irrespective to the type of FCls, implies that monetary policy responds 
to asset prices. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the existing 
literature. Section 2.3 presents the theoretical model. Section 2.4 computes MCI/FCls 
for the UK and the USA. Section 2.5 estimates simple and the FCI augmented Taylor 
rules. Finally, section 2.6 concludes the chapter. 
15 
2.2 Literature review 
2.2.1 Monetary transmission channels and asset prices 
Monetary policy affects the real economy via a number of channels. The interest rate 
channel has traditionally been the focus of monetary policy, especially in a closed 
economy. In the case of open economy, however, the conventional Taylor rule is 
considered to be suboptimal since it neglects other transmission channels including the 
exchange rate channel (Ball, 1998). It is argued that the exchange rate has a twin effect 
on inflation - it affects it directly via the import price channel and indirectly via its 
impact on domestic demand (Guender 2001 b, Guender and Matheson, 2002). 
Moreover, recent empirical research on the monetary transmission mechanism 
indicates that property prices and equity prices also play an important role, through the 
wealth channel and the credit channel respectively (eg. Goodhart 2001, Borio and 
Lowe, 2002). The former channel exists when a change in asset prices affects the 
financial wealth of individuals and leads to a change in their consumption decisions 
(eg. Modigliani, 1971). The latter channel appears when a rise in asset prices increases 
the borrowing capacity of individuals and firms by expanding the value of their 
collateral (eg. Bernanke and Gertler 1999). These changes in consumption decisions or 
borrowing capacities affect inflation via its impact on aggregate demand. 
16 
The literature offers various alternative options that asset prices can be included in the 
conduct of monetary policy. Bemanke and Gertler (1999,200 1) argue that movements 
of asset price misalignments contain important information for predicting future 
inflation but there is no feed back role of monetary policy to maintain asset prices 
around their fundamentals. They argue that cost of responding to assets price 
misalign. ments might be higher than the benefits, especially in the bubble period. 
More specifically, Filardo (2001) argues that if the policymaker responds to assets 
prices, they will induce a high volatility in the interest rate which may jeopardize 
inflation targeting. Therefore, they argue that there is almost no role of assets prices in 
the conduct of monetary policy even though they contain important information about 
future inflation and output. 
A seminal work by Alchian and Klein (1973) and later by Goodhart and Hofmann 
(2001) offers a clear argument why the central bank should consider asset prices in the 
conduct of monetary policy. They argue that asset prices reflect current consumption 
and current money prices of future claims as their inclusion in the determination of 
inflation is inevitable. Cecchetti et al. (2000) and Borio and Lowe (2002) further argue 
that policyrnakers concerned of stabilizing inflation are likely to achieve superior 
performance by responding to asset prices along with output and inflation. 
Since exchange rates, house prices and share prices are not policy instruments, the 
monetary authority can only respond to them through the available monetary 
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instrument, i. e. the interest rate. Therefore, the channel through which asset prices 
enter in the monetary policy framework and the way in which policymakers respond to 
them are crucial issues. 
The literature describes two altemative frameworks through which the authority can 
address asset prices in the conduct of monetary policy. The first framework is the 
construction of an open economy Taylor Rule by including all assets prices in the 
reaction ftinction. In this case, the authorities set interest rates in response to deviations 
of inflation from the target, the output gap and deviations of assets prices from their 
fundamental or equilibrium levels 5 (Smets, 1997). 
The second framework is to formulate an FCl augmented policy rule in which case the 
authority responds to the FCI in a way it responds to deviations of inflation from the 
target and the output gap. In this case, policy responds to asset prices collectively by 
responding to FCls (Gauthier et al, 2004, Goodhart and Hofmann (2001,2003). 
2.2.2 The definition and construction of FCI 
As discussed, the literature identifies at least four channels (the interest rate, exchange 
rate, credit and balance sheet channels) through which the effects of monetary policy 
See Section 2.5 for more discussion. 
18 
are transmitted to the real sector (Goodhart, 2001, Goodhart and Hofmann, 2001). The 
FCI combines these transmission channels together. Generally, it can be defined as a 
weighted average of deviations of asset prices from their equilibrium or reference 
period. Therefore, a rise in FCI can be interpreted as contractionary monetary policy 
stance while a fall indicates an expansionary 6 (Lack, 2003). 
Following Goodhart and Hofmann (2001,2003), the FCl can be defined as: 
n 
FCII w, (qi, - qj), 
n 
such that: Wi (2.2) 
Where, q,, is asset price i and t indicates the time period. q, is the long run trend or 
equilibrium value of asset i and w, is the relative weight given to asset i. The 
interpretation of Eq. (2.1) depends on three components - the number and type of asset 
prices, q, definition of the equilibrium price, qj and the weights, w,. The following 
sections describe each of them in a greater deal. 
Assuming a rise in the exchange rate indicates appreciation of national currency vis-A-vis foreign 
currencies. 
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2.2.3 The use of variables in an FCI 
A survey of the literature presented in Table 2.1, shows that the real interest rate and 
the real exchange rate are commonly used in the construction of the MCI. Besides the 
MCI variables, Goodhart and Hofmann (2001,2003) and Mayes and Viren (2001) 
include real house prices and real share prices in the construction of the FCI for 
Europe, USA and Japan. On the other hand, Lack (2003) constructs FCls for 
Switzerland using only three variables - the real interest rate, the real exchange rate 
and the real house price. Gauthier et al. (2004) obtain a broad based FCI for Canada. 
They include long-term interest rates and the corporate bond risk premium in addition 
to the four variables proposed by Goodhart and Hofmann (2001,2003). 
Instead of using house prices and share prices, there is also a practice of using 
alternative financial variables to represent the credit and balance sheet channels. For 
instance Macroeconomic Advisors (1998) use the dividend price ratio and household 
equity wealth. Carmichael (2002) and Goldman and Sachs (2000) include the yield 
curve and the money supply as financial variables in their Ms. 
2.2.4 Defining equilibrium asset prices 
The literature offers two types of interpretations of an FCI depending upon the 
definition of q, . When q, is defined as the value of any reference period of asset i, 
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then q,, - q, measures a deviation of asset price i from that particular reference 
period. In this case FCI can be interpreted as a change in financial stance from a given 
particular time where a positive deviation indicates contractionary while negative 
deviation implies accommodative policy change (see Goodhart and Hofmann, 2003 
and Lack, 2003 among others). 
Alternatively, when q, represents an equilibrium value or the long run trend of asset i, 
then q,, - q, measures a deviation of asset i from equilibrium. In this case, the FCI 
can be interpreted as a deviation of financial stance from the equilibrium. This class of 
FCls can be found in Goodhart and Hofmann (2001), Montagnoli and Napolitano 
(2005) and Degrer (2003). 
More specifically, Goodhart and Hofmann (2001) use the sample mean to represent 
the trend value for the real interest rate, a linear trend for real exchange rates and real 
house prices. They employ Hodrick Prescott trended method to obtain the equilibrium 
value of share prices. Montagnoli and Napolitano (2005) use Kalman Filter while 
Degrer (2003) use a partial equilibrium model to obtain the equilibrium value of asset 
prices for the Swedish FCI- 
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Table 2.1: The comnosition of the FCI in the literature 
Study\Variables Short term Long term Exchange Equity Other 
interest rate interest Rate Market Variables 
rate 
Banque de 3-month I 0-year Real 
France- market rate Govt. effective 
Bond 
Mayes and Viren Real 3- Real Real stock Real house 
(2001) month bilateral Price price 
market rate vs. U. Sa 
Goldman Sachs- Real 3- Real Measure of Yield curve 
month effective stock 
market rate valuation 
Goldman Sachs Real 3- Real A- Real trade Equity 
(1999) month rated weighted market 
LIBOR corporate cap/GDP 
Indexed Ratio 
J. P. Morgan $ Real 3- 1 0-year Nominal Nominal Yield 
month corporate C-6 TSX index curve, MI 
market rate_ spread and M2* 
Macroeconomic Real FED Real 10- Real Dividend/ 
Advisers (1998)- funds rate year Price Ratio, 
Treasury Household 
Yield equity 
wealth* 
Goodhart and Real 3- Real Real stock Real 
Hofmann (2001) month effective price property 
market rate price 
Goodhart and Real short Real Real stock Real 
Hofmann (2003) term interest effective price property 
rate price 
Lack(2002) Real3- Real trade Real 
month weighted property 
LIBOR prices 
Gauthier Real 90-day ReallO- Real C-6 Real S&P Real house 
et. al. (2004) commercial year govt. exchange 500 Stock price, US. 
paper rate bond rate index, High-yield 
risk spread 
Degrer (2003) Real short Real long Trade Real stock Real house 
term term weighted price price 
Montagnoli and Real short Real Real stock Real 
Napolitano term interest effective price property 
(2005) rate price 
Note: - source: Gauthier et. al. (2004). * Alternatively used 
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Contd 
Study\Variables FCI Variables modelled as Sources of FCI Weights 
constructed 
for 
Banque de G-7 Change from a base IMF's and OECD's 
France- countries period Macroeconomic model 
Mayes and Viren 17 countries Level of real interest rate IS curve (single 
(2001) and exchange rate; first equation) 
difference of the rest 
Goldman Sachs- Canada Unknown Simple average 
Goldman Sachs USA Deviations from historic FED macro model 
(1999) mean 
J. P. Morgan $ Canada Deviation from mean Simple average 
divided by variance 
Macroeconomic USA Not specified: referred to Washington University 
Advisers (1998)- as "technical adjustment" Macro model 
Goodhart and G-7 Deviation from trend: 1. reduced form IS and 
Hofmann(2001) countries long run mean for interest Philips curve model. 
rate, linear trend for 2. Impulse functions of a 
exchange rate and house VAR* 
prices; and HP filter for 
stock price 
Lack(2002) Switzerland First difference of Shocks to restricted and 
variables structural macro model* 
Goodhart and USA, UK, Level for real interest rate Single equation IS curve 
Hofmann (2003) Japan, EU and real exchange rates 
and first difference for 
house and share prices 
Gauthier et. al. Canada First difference and HP Single equation (IS 
(2004) filtered* curve), VAR generalized 
impulse response 
function and factor 
analysis" 
Degrer (2003) Sweden Partial estimate of each VAR impulses 
variable 
Montagnoli and USA, UK, Kalman Filter Single equation IS curve 
Napolitano (2005) Canada, EU 
Note: - source: Gauthier et. al. (2004). two scenarios are presented 
S Source: Carmichael (2002) **. - Three scenarios calculated 
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2.2.5 Weigh calibration process 
There are at least five methods to obtain weights for asset prices, w, (see Goodhart 
and Hofmann, 2000 and Gauthier et al. 2004). They are: 
Simulation of a large-scale macroeconomic model 
Small scale macroeconomic models 
Aggregate demand model 
VAR impulses-response function 
Factor analysis 
Large scale macroeconomic models capture the structural features of the entire 
economy. Goldman and Sachs (1999) and Macroeconomic Advisers (1998) use such a 
large-scale model to obtain weights for FCl components. Although a large-scale model 
incorporates all necessary information while predicting weights, the literature argues 
that they are less useftil in practice for two reasons. First, Gauthier et al. (2004) argue 
that stock prices and share prices play a limited role in many large-scale macro models 
currently used by central banks so that weight generation from this process may 
underestimate the actual role play by these variables in the economy. Second, 
Goodhart and Hofmann (2001) believe that a large-scale macro model with an explicit 
role for property price is still unavailable. 
24 
The second option is to employ a small-scale macroeconomic model. A typical small- 
scale macroeconomic model consists of a Philips curve and an IS curve. Following 
Goodhart and Hufffiann (2001) and Gauthier et al. (2004), a simple macroeconomic 
structural model can be written as: 
nn 
k, + ki; r, -, +I j=l 
(2.3) 
mmmmm 
b, + lby, 
-, 
+ 1] a, r, -, + 
Ea,, e, -, + 
lahjh, 
-j+Za, s, +c, 
(2.4) 
-j i=l j=l J=j J=j j=l 
Equation (2.3) is the Philips curve and (2.4) is the IS curve where ;r is inflation, y is 
the output gap, r is the real interest rate, e is the real exchange rate, h is the real house 
price index, and s is the real share price index. The last variable of each equation is 
the error term which is assumed to be mutually uncorrelated with zero mean and 
constant variance and finally other remaining terms are unknown parameters to be 
estimated. 
In this framework, the relative weights, W, , which appear 
in the construction of an 
FCI, can be written as: 
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J]m a 
W, = Im 
J=l y for 1 == {r, e, h, s) (2.5) 
-. 4 
a+ Im a+ J', a,, + fn a J=j ri , J=l ej j= J=l si 
One of the criticisms of this approach is that it assumes the closed economy Philips 
curve that excludes the direct impact of exchange rate on inflation. Ball (1999), 
Guender (2001 a) and Guender and Matheson (2002) argue that changes in the real 
exchange rate should be included in the Philips curve to measure the direct impact of 
exchange rates. 
The third and most commonly used approach is to derive the FCI weights from the IS 
curve, i. e. Eq. (2.4). This approach explicitly believes that inflation solely depends on 
the output gap. Goodhart and Hofmann (2003) and Mayes and Viren (2001) generate 
FCI weights while Duguay (1994), Mayes and Viren (2000), among others, compute 
MCI weights based on this approach. It is, however, argued that FCI weights obtain 
from this model may not reflect the economic conditions as it potentially neglects the 
supply side of economy (eg. Guender and Matheson, 2002). 
The fourth method given in the literature is the vector auto-regression (VAR) 
estimation. Initially, Goodhart and Hofmann (2001) and later on Gauthier et al. (2004) 
explore the reduced-form approach to a VAR technique. Under this method, they 
obtain alternative weights of all asset prices based on the impulse responses of 
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inflation to asset price shocks in an identified VAR. They identify the shocks using a 
standard Cholesky factorization with ordering output gap, inflation, real house prices, 
real exchange rate, real interest rate and real share prices. 
Finally, the other option in developing an FCl is a liner weighted combination of 
financial variables through the factor analysis. It extracts weighted liner factor from a 
numbers of variables which is suppose to detect common structure and remove 'noise' 
created by irregular movements. Watson (1999) and Gauthier et al. (2004) use this 
technique as an alternative to VAR impulse and the reduced form models. 
2.2.6 The use of the FCI in monetary policy 
The FCI can be used in a number of different ways. Goldman and Sachs (1999) and 
Macroeconomic Advisers (1998) use it to predict inflation and output growth several 
quarters ahead and to predict the future course of monetary policy. Goodhart and 
Hofmann (2001,2003) find that the FCl can be used as a leading indicator to predict 
inflation and output as it contains useful information about future inflation. Gauthier et 
al. (2004) argue that when there are shocks to the economy, changes in the FCI may 
provide an indication of the markets' reactions and expectations regarding ftiture 
monetary policy. They further write "the FCI can be used as a synthetic measure of the 
financial conditions that economic agents face and thus constitutes a broad assessment 
of the financial stance. " 
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More specifically, the FCI can be used in two different ways in the conduct of 
monetary policy - as an important informative variable or as an operational target. 
Under the first approach, the FCI enters in a monetary policy reaction function so that 
central bank not only responds to deviations of inflation from the target and to the 
output gap but also to the FCI. This approach can be found in Montagnoli and 
Napolitano (2005) who find that FCI-augmented Taylor Rule outperforms the simple 
Taylor rule. 
The FCI can also be used as a policy rule. Goodhart and Hofmann (2001,2003) argue 
that the optimal monetary policy reaction function is such that the interest rate should 
not only react to inflation and output gap but also to the real exchange rate, real house 
prices and real share price. Under this option, policyrnakers aim to keep FCI at a par 
by changing short-term interest rates in order to minimise adverse effects of asset 
prices to the output gap and inflation. This framework is similar to the MCI rule that 
has been used by the Bank of Canada, with a few other central banks, as intermediate 
target since early 1990s (Freedman, 1994, Duggay, 1994). 
The FCI is, however, a recently developed approach to deal with a broader view of 
monetary policy but never been tested as an operational target or any type of policy 
rule by the central banks. Although it contains important information for predicting 
inflation and output, it has been criticised on two grounds. Firstly, it is model 
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dependent and robust estimation including the issues of parameter inconsistency, 
dynamism, and non-exogeneity never been conducted properly, which limits the scope 
of applicability (Eika et al. 1996, Ericsson et al. 1996 and Gerlach and Smets 2000). 
Secondly, Bernanke and Gertler (1999) and Gertler et al. (1999) oppose using the FCl 
as a policy variable. They argue that monetary policy would be more volatile if central 
banks use FCI as a policy variable due to uncertainty and a high volatility contained in 
share prices and house prices. 
2.3 Financial conditions index: a theoretical formulation 
In this section, we propose a theoretical framework where the FCI weights can be 
obtained from a macroeconomic structural model. The model consists of an open 
economy Philips curve, an open economy IS curve and the UIP. After formulating the 
structural model, we then define two types of inflation targeting framework, strict CPI 
inflation and domestic inflation targeting, as an objective of monetary policy. Finally, 
we combine each policy objective with the structural model to obtain an optimal 
monetary policy reaction function with appearing an FCI. 
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2.3.1 Structural model 
We use a small scale macroeconomic model to obtain the optimal monetary policy 
reaction function. This model assumes an open economy where the exchange rate is 
assumed to be flexible. 
The structural model consists of three equations, a Philips curve, an IS curve and the 
UIP as: 
g, = (e, -, - e, -2 
)+ 17, 
YI -ß r, -, -'52e, -, +, ý2y, -, - 
0, z, -, 
rt --.,: rf - (E, e,,, - e, )+p, 
(2.6) 
(2.7) 
(2.8) 
Where, ; r, is the CPI inflation, y, is the output gap (i. e the difference between actual 
and potential output), e, is the real effective exchange rate (REER)7, z,, is the 
financial variable, r, is the domestic real interest rate, rf is the foreign real interest 
rate, and E, e, +, 
is the expectation formed at time t for the real exchange rate at time 
t+1 . 
an increase in e, denotes an appreciation of home currency vis-a-vis foreign currencies. 
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q, and c, are random shocks to inflation and output respectively. They are assumed to 
be mutually uncorrelated with zero mean and constant variances. Finally, p, is defined 
as the time varying premium. For simplicity, constants are normalized to zero and all 
variables except interest rate are measured in logs. 
Eq. (2.6) is a standard open-economy Phillips curve as used by many authors (for 
instance Ball, 1998 and Guender and Matheson, 2002 amongst others). It describes 
that changes in current inflation depends on its own lag, the output gap, lagged 
changes in the real exchange rate as well as a supply shock. 
Following Ball (1998), Goodhart and Hofmann (2003), we define an open economy IS 
curve in Eq. (2.7) where the output gap depends on lags of the real interest rate, lags of 
the real exchange rate, its own lag, lags of financial variables and a demand shock. 
Depending upon the state of the economy and the effectiveness of monetary policy, 
financial variables can be any combinations of equity and property prices as proposed 
by Goodhart and Hofmann (2003) or the long term interest rate and financial ratios as 
proposed by Kennedy and Riet (1995). 
We introduce uncovered interest parity (UIP) in Eq. (2.8). Following Ball (1998) we 
believe that the UIP condition does not hold perfectly so that a time varying 
premium, p, , plays a role 
in the model. 
31 
2.3.2 Inflation targeting 
Following Taylor (1993), a large bulk of literature assumes that policyrnakers aim to 
minimize the variability of inflation and the variability of real output from their 
respective targets. This type of policy setting provides a trade off between inflation 
and output. 
We consider a special case of this framework where inflation targeting is considered to 
be the only objective of monetary policy (Guender and Matheson, 2002 and Ball, 
1998). Further, we specify the role of the real exchange rate within the inflation 
targeting framework as it has twin effects on inflation. It affects directly through the 
import price channel and indirectly through the effects on aggregate demand (see 
Bernanke et al., 1999 and Ball 1999 for more discussion). 
In order to address this issue in the conduct of monetary policy, we consider two types 
of inflation targeting frameworks, namely, strict CPI inflation targeting and domestic 
inflation targeting. In the former case, imported inflation is included in the 
measurement of the CPI, implies that the monetary authority does not consider the 
direct effects of the REER separately. In the latter case, however, the authority 
considers the domestic inflation and the import price separately. 
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We first derive an optimal monetary policy reaction ftinction for the CPI inflation 
targeting and then consider the domestic inflation targeting. Under both frameworks, 
we obtain the optimal monetary policy reaction function in terms of the FCl- 
2.3. Z 1. Strict CPI inflation targetingframework 
Following Guender (2001a, 2001b), Guender and Matheson (2002) and Ball (1998) 
among others, we assume that policyrnakers announce a strict target for CPI inflation 
for the two periods ahead: 
; r*= 
Elgt+2 ýo (2.9) 
Where, ; T* is the inflation targeted rate, E, 7rt+2 is the expectation formed at time t of 
CPI inflation at time t+2. 
To construct the optimal reaction function, we update Eq. (2.6) by two periods and 
take conditional expectations; yields, 
EIZI+2 
,,,: E, irt+l + 2,1 E, y, +j - (51 
(E, e, +, - 
substituting Eq. (2.10) into (2.9) and rearranging the terms results in: 
(2.10) 
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E, e, +, -e, =I 
(E, 7r, +, +, 
ý, jEly, l) 91 
Now, replacing Eq. (2.11) into (2.8), we get: 
(51 (rf - r, )=E, 7r,,, + 11 E, y, +1 + p, 
(2.12) 
Again, updating and taking expectations in Eq. (2.6) and (2.7) results in: 
EI 7r, +, : -- 71 +ýy, - 
9, (e, - e, -, 
) (2.13) 
EtYI+l = -ß r, -'52e, +'ý2Y, - OZI (2.14) 
Substituting Eq. (2.13) and (2.14) into (2.12) and re-arranging terms with 
appearing r, , e, and z, on 
left hand side, yields: 
'U, r, + lU2e, + ZDr3Z, = 7r, +(5, e, -, +. 
ý, (1 +'ý2)yl - Olfif + Pt (2.15) 
where, 
lul = 46 -. 51 (2.16) 
ZU2 = 'ý t52 + t5l (2.17) 
ZU3 = 'ýlo (2.18) 
34 
Eq. (2.15) is the optimal monetary policy reaction function with an FCl components (r, 
e, and z) on the left hand side where mr, (for i= I to3) are coefficients of the real interest 
rate, the real exchange rate and the financial variable respectively. 
89 Finally, we rescale v7i by dividing /ý 
(, 6+62+0) 
, we get, 
vyi (for i=I to 3) 
21 (18 + 452 + 0) 
Where, Wi is the relative weight of asset i 
As stated, our model is flexible in nature as we can add or remove any asset prices in 
the FCI framework depending on their relevancy to the economy. On the other hand, if 
we exclude asset prices from the model, i. e. when z=O, the model reduces to the MCI, 
which can be written as 
V, r, +V2e, = 7r, +i5, e, -, 
+'ý, (1 + A2)YI - 131fif +A 
where, 
V, = 48 - . 51 
V2 :- 'ý t52 + 451 
8 The reason for re-scaling coefficients is given in section 2. 
Which is the sum of the coefficients of asst prices, i. e. r17, + 02 + 173 
(2.20) 
(2.21) 
(2.22) 
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(for i=I to 2) (2.23) 
'ýl (18 + '52 ) 
Eq. (2.20) is an optimal reaction function with appearing an MCI on the left hand side 
leaving right hand side unchanged. 
2.3. ZZ Domestic inflation targetingframework 
In the CPI inflation targeting framework, the condition 1ý, 8 > . 5, must be satisfied in 
Eq. (2.16) and (2.2 1) in order to get a valid interpretation of the model. Any violation 
produces a paradoxical result and the model becomes unstable. 
This situation may arise if there is a heavy pressure of import prices on CPI. In this 
context, we argue that policyrnaker should consider the domestic inflation and the 
imported inflation (i. e. exchange rate) separately in order to identify this problem. 
Therefore, following Ball (1999) and Guender and Matheson (2002) we modify the 
objective function as given by Eq. (2.9) as follows: 
z*= El'71+2 + 91 (E, e, - e, ) =O (2.24) 
Eq. (2.24) depicts the domestic inflation targeting framework where the term E, 7r, +2 
is 
the expectation formed at time t of domestic inflation at time t+2. The parameter 5, is 
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an escalating factor which measures the direct impact of expected change in the real 
exchange rate on inflation. 
In the extreme case, when i5l =0, there would be no difference between the CPI 
inflation targeting and domestic inflation targeting frameworks, indicating that there is 
no direct role of the change in the real exchange rate on inflation. On the other 
extreme, when 15, =1, there would be a proportional relationship between the change in 
the real exchange rate and inflation, indicating that the inflation is overwhelmingly 
determined by the exchange rate. We consider 51 such that 0<, 5, <1. 
In the process of formulating the optimal reaction function, we substitute Eq. (2.24) 
into (2.10), which results in: 
El; rl+l + /ý E, y,,, = (2.25) 
Now, inserting Eq. (2.13) and (2.14) into (2.25) and rearranging the terms we obtain 
the optimal monetary policy reaction function with appearing an FCl on the left hand 
side as: 
0), r, + 0)2e, + (t)3 Z, = '7, +9, e, -, 
+ /ý 
(1 + A2 )yt 
where w, = 21,8 
0)2 = 'ý (52 + 451 
(2.26) 
(2.27) 
(2.28) 
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And, relative weights can be calculated as: 
zu, (for i=I to 3) 
'ýl (18 + 452 + 0) + t5l 
(2.29) 
(2.30) 
As in the previous case, we can now obtain the optimal monetary reaction function 
with appearing an MCI on the left hand side by excluding financial variable, z, from 
Eq. (2.26). In doing so, yields; 
V, r, + V2 e, = 7r, +15, e, -, 
+ 21 (1 + 'ý2 
)YI 
where, v, = ýjflj 
V2 'ýl 
62 + 151 
And, weights for MCI appears as 
VI 
(18 +52) +'51 
(for i=I to 2) 
(2.31) 
(2.32) 
(2.33) 
(2.34) 
Table 2.2 surnmarises the measurement of the FCI and the MCI weights. The Panel A 
gives the weighting structure for the strict CPI targeting framework as abstracted from 
Eq. (2.15) and (2.20) respectively. Similarly, the Panel B summarises the FCI and the 
MCI weights for the domestic inflation targeting framework as obtained from Eq. 
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(2.26) and (2.31). The panel C is the classical FCI and MCI weights abstracted from 
the existing literature. 
Table 2.2: Comparison of FCI/MCIs weights 
Type/Weights on Real interest rate ---- T REER T Financial Variable Panel A: CPI inflation targeting framework 
FCI ý1)6 - t5l /ý 452 + 451 
0 
2168 + 62 + 0) 'ýl 68 + 452 + 0) 'ýl (18 + '52 
+0) 
MCI 21)6 -15, 
'ýl 
G8 + '52 
ý1 t52 + 61 
ý1 (16 + 452 
Panel B: Domestic inflation targeting framework 
FCI 46 'ýl 452 + 461 210 
'ýl 
(8 + 452 + 0) + 461 'ýl 
0+ 452 + 0) + 451 'ýl 
(18 + 452 + 0) + 451 
MCI ý, 61 'ý 62 + '51 
Al (6 + t52) + (51 66 + t52) + (51 - 
Panel C: Conventional measurement 
FCI P 
+ (52 +0 
(52 
)6+t52 +0 
0 
)6+(52 +0 
MCI 
-J6 P+ t52 
152 
16+(52 
Note: Panel A and panel B are based on our own jormulation as given in section 2.3 
while panel C is abstractedftom the literature. The FCI weights given in Panel C can 
be found in Lack (2003), Mayes and Viren (2001), Goodhart and Hofmann (2001). 
Similarly, the source of the conventional MCI weights are Korhonen (2002), Gerlach 
and Smets (2000), Lin (1999), Siklos (2000), Dennis (1997), Duguay (1994), 
Kesriyeli(I 999, ) Gottschalk (2001), Nadal et al. (1996). 
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Comparing panel A and B with panel C, we can observe that our indices are 
improvement over the existing literatures for two reasons. Firstly, in our framework, 
the relative weights of asset prices are obtained from a structural model which 
combines both the IS and the Philips curve as compared to the IS curve alone on the 
existing literature. 
Secondly, our FCI weights take an account of both the direct and indirect effects of the 
changes in the real exchange rates where the direct effect transmits through S, and 
indirect effect through 82 . The existing literature, on the other hand, excludes 9, in the 
FCI weights. 
2.4 Empirical estimates of the financial conditions index 
2.4.1 Data generating process and unit root test 
We consider two open economies, the UK and the USA, for our empirical analysis. 
As monthly GDP series is not available, we use quarterly time series data for both 
countries. The sample period covers from 1979QI to 2003Q4. Following Goodhart 
(2001) we use the real interest rate, r, the real effective exchange rate, e, real house 
40 
prices, h, and real share prices, s, in the construction of Ms. We use logs of all 
variables except for the interest rate' 0 
We use real GDP as the measure of output and employ the Hodrick-Prescott filter with 
smoothing parameter set at 1600 to obtain potential output. The output gap, y, is then 
measured by subtracting potential output from the actual. The real interest rate, r, is 
obtained by subtracting inflation, 7r, from the nominal interest rate , R. 71 is calculated 
as the percentage change in the consumer price index over the same quarter of the 
previous year. We use the real effective exchange rate (REER) as a measure of the 
exchange rate, where an increase indicates appreciation of home currency vis-A-vis 
foreign currencies. The sources and definitions of variables are given in Appendix 2.1. 
We next run the augmented Dickey-Fuller (Dickey and Fuller, 1979) and Phillip and 
Perron (1988) tests to test the stationary of our variables (See Appendix 2.2 for the 
detailed methodology). Both tests the null hypothesis of a unit root but the procedure 
is a little different. While the fon-ner test makes a parametric correction for higher- 
order correlation by assuming that the series follows an auto-regressive process with 
order ar(p) and adjusts the test methodology by adding lags of independent variables, 
10 However, the distribution of the US and the UK interest rate are asymmetric around their mean 
because the skewness for the US and UK interest rates are found to be 0.90 and 0.26 respectively. On 
the other hand, the US interest rate is peaked whereas the UK interest rate is flat relative to the normal 
as the kurtosis of the US and UK interest rates are recorded to be 3.74 and 1.88 respectively. 
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the PP method tests the unit root through a non-parametric correction procedure 
(Banerjee et al., 1993). 
Table 2.3: ADF test (1979Q1 to 2003Q4) 
Variables Y, g/ -; T 
T R, e, SI h, 
Panel A: UK 
Level -1.01 -3.52* -2.91 -2.17 -0.97 -2.38 
First Difference -4.08* -5.21 * -3.58* -4.12* 
Deviations from the 
equilibrium# 
-3.96* -5.17* -4.98* -4.68* 
Panel B: USA 
Level -0.14 -3.88* -3.01** -1.13 -0.14 -0.12 
First Difference -3.18* -3.98* -4.42* -3.01 ** 
Deviations from the 
equilibrium# 
-3.88* -5.61 -3.77* -3.53* 
Note: 1. Mackinnon critical valuesfor the rejection of the null hypothesis at 1%, 5% 
and 10% are -3.49, -2.89 and -2.59 respectively. 
2. # Equilibrium values are obtained using the Hodrick-Prescott (1977)filter. 
3. Data source and definition of variables are given in Appendix 2.1 
4. * and ** indicate significant at I% and 5% respectively. 
Table 2.3 shows the test results. We find similar results from both the ADF and PP 
tests so we only report the ADF test to save space. We find inflation, output gap and 
the real interest rate to be 1(0) while house price, share price and the real exchange rate 
indices to be l(l) process. 
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2.4.2 Estimation and interpretation 
In this section, we first estimate the structural model given by section 2.3.1 and then 
compute the FCI and MCI using the formulae given in Table 2.2. 
Table 2.4 reports the OLS estimates of the open economy Philips curve, that is Eq. 
(2.6), for the UK and the USA. The lag length is chosen using a general to specific 
approach starting from 9 lags, but the best estimate is obtained when using up to five 
lags of the dependent variable for both countries. 
Both estimates are well specified. The DW statistics reject the null of a unit root whilst 
Godfrey's (1988) Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test suggests that there is no 
autocorrelation in the residuals. Moreover, no functional form misspecification is 
detected by the Ramsey's (1969) RESET test and the non-normality of the estimate is 
rejected by Jarque-Bera's (1980) test. Evidence of homoscadesticiy is clearly 
established. Also, no signal of auto regressive conditional heteroscadesticity appears 
both from the first order and up to fourth order condition. Finally, our estimates pass 
CUSUM and CUSUMQ tests, indicating that the estimates are stable. 
Our results are in line with the existing empirical findings for both countries as 
inflation has a positive relationship with the output gap and an inverse relationship 
with the REER. The effect of the real exchange rate on inflation in UK is higher than 
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that of the USA. The change in the oil price is also found to be significant at 5% for 
both countries. 
Table 2.4: Philips curve estimates 
[Model: ir, = ; rl-I + /ý y, -, 
+ 5, Ae, 
-, 
+ 77,1 
Estimated Parameters \ Country 
(lag length of the dependent variable) 
UK 
(1-5) 
USA 
(1-5) 
0.250 (0.039)* 0.171 (0.056)* 
(51 -0.027 (0.009)* -0.013 (0.005)** 
AOP 0.015(0.008)** 0.017(0.007)** 
Diagnostic statistics/tests 
Adjusted R' 0.94 0.95 
Durbin-Watson statistics 1.74 1.72 
Standard error of regression 0.43 0.56 
Jarque-Bera statistics for normality test 3.01 [0.18] 4.29 [0.12] 
Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation LM(l) 0.98 [0.32] 2.15 [0.14] 
Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation LM(4) 1.26 [0.29] 1.47 [0.23] 
ARCH 1 0.04 [0.83] 1.56 [0.21] 
ARCH 4 1.72 [0.15] 2.01 [0.11] 
White's heteroskedasticity test 1.73 [0.13] 2.09 [0.06] 
Ramsey's RESET test 1.49 [0.33] 1.03 [0.30] 
Chow's breakpoint test 1.16 [0.34] 2.12 [0.10] 
Note: 
(a) AOP is the coefficient of the change in the oil price. Notice that this variable 
is not included in (2.5) to make the model simpler but included in the 
empirical estimations to get more robust results (see Goodhart and 
Hofmann, 2003for the similar experiment). 
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(b) Sample periodfor UK and USA are 1980QI-2003Q3 and 1979Q3-2003Q4 
respectively. 
(c) Constant and lags of dependent are also included in the estimates but is not 
reported to save space, is available on request. 
(d) is the standard error and [] is the probability of the test statistics. 
(e) ** and *** indicate significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Chow's breakpoint is 1992. Q4 and 1987. Q3 for the UK and USA 
respectively. 
Next, we estimate the IS curve for the UK and the USA, that is Eq. (2.7). Table 2.5 
reports the empirical estimates. We find that the real interest rate and the REER have a 
negative impact while real house prices and real share prices have a positive impact on 
the output gap. The size of the estimated coefficients show that the real interest rate 
has a greater impact on the output gap in USA followed by real house prices, share 
prices and the REER. However, the REER and real house prices have a similar impact 
on the output gap in UK after the real interest rate. 
Using the methodology given in Table 2.2 and the estimated coefficients from Tables 
2.4 and 2.5, we now obtain the weights on real interest rates, REER, real house prices 
and real share prices for the construction of FCI. Notice that the financial variable, z, 
as discussed in our theoretical model comprises real house prices and real share prices 
in our empirical analysis. Therefore, we replace 0 by 01 and 02 in Table 2.2 in order to 
get separate weights of these variables. 
45 
Table 2.5: IS curve estimates 
[Model: Y, 'ý2YI-I +)6 r, -, 
+ 152e, -, 
+ Olhp, 
-, + 
02sp, 
_, 
+ c, 
Estimated Parameters \Country 
(lag length of the dependent variable) 
UK 
(1-3) 
USA 
(1-5) 
18 -0.140 
(0.058)** -0.105 (0.022)* 
(52 -0.027 (0.013)** -0.016 (0.009)*** 
01 0.027 (0.005)* 0.081 (0.025)* 
02 0.012 (0.005)** 0.063 (0.016)* 
Diagnostic statistics/tests 
Adjusted R2 0.88 0.86 
Durbin-Watson statistics 2.11 1.89 
Standard error of regression 0.39 0.50 
Jarque-Bera normality test 3.66 [0.16] 2.32 [0.31] 
Breusch-Godfrey LM(l) 2.56 [0.11] 0.24 [0.62] 
Breusch-Godfrey LM(3) 0.95 [0.43] 1.20 [0.31] 
ARCH 1 0.09 [0.761 3.10 [0.13] 
ARCH 3 0.08 [0.981 1.47 [0.21] 
White's heteroskedasticity 0.62 [0.78] 1.51 [0.101 
Ramsey's RESET test 0.41 [0.511 0.13 [0.71] 
Chow's breakpoint test 1.16 [0.331 1.24 [0.27] 
Note: (a) Sample periodfor UK and USA are 1980QI-2003Q3 and 1979Q3-2003Q4 
respectively. 
Constant and lags of dependent are also included in the estimates but is not 
reported to save space, is available on request. 
is the standard error and [] is the probability of the test statistics. 
and *** indicate significant at I Yo, 5% and 10% respectively. 
(e) Chow's breakpoint is 1992. Q4 and 198 7. Q3 for the UK and USA respectively. 
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Table 2.6 gives the weights of variables under various specifications. The second 
column reports the weighting structure for the FCl when the authority targets CPI 
inflation while the third column gives the FCI weights when the policy objective is 
domestic inflation targeting. Finally, the last column is based on the conventional 
methodology. 
The FCI weights generated from conventional methodology is comparable with the 
literature for both countries. This justifies our estimating procedure and quality of data 
set (see Goodhart, 2001,2003). This framework reveals that the real interest rate is the 
most influential variable followed by the REER, real house prices and real share 
prices. 
Under the CPI inflation targeting framework, on the other hand, the REER carries 
overwhelming share followed by the real interest rate, real house prices and real share 
prices in UK. In the case of USA, however, the real interest rate takes the smallest 
share after the REER, real house prices and real share prices. The stability condition, 
1ýfl >, 5,, is not violated in either countries. 
The FCI weights for the domestic inflation targeting framework are close to the 
conventional measurement for both countries where the real interest rate takes the 
highest share. The REER, real house prices and real share prices come at second, third 
and fourth ranking respectively. 
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Table 2.6: FCI weights 
Variables 
CPI inflation 
targeting framework 
(FCI_I) 
Domestic inflation 
targeting framework 
(FCI_2) 
Conventional 
measurement 
(FCI_3) 
Panel A: UK 
Real interest rate 0.154 0.443 0.673 
REER 0.659 0.434 0.139 
Real house prices 0.130 0.085 0.130 
Real share prices 0.058 
1 
0.038 0.058 
Panel B: USA 
Real interest rate 0.108 0.307 0.395 
REER 0.348 0.270 0.060 
Real house prices 0.306 0.238 0.306 
Real share prices 0.238 0.185 0.238 
Note: See Table 2.2for the methodology and Table 2.4 and 2.5for the estimated 
coefficients. 
Although the focus of this chapter is to estimate the FCI, we also compute the MCI 
weights for the comparison purpose (Appendix 2.2). Not surprisingly, we get the same 
message regarding the relative importance of the real interest rate and the REER in the 
conduct of monetary policy for both countries (Appendix 2.3 and 2.4) 
Figure 2.1 and 2.2 plots the FCls for the UK and the USA. The indices are based on 
the computed weights as shown in Table 2.6 and historical time series beginning from 
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1979QI to 2003Q4. The reference period is assumed to be 2000QI for all 
specifications and countries. We emerge the following conclusions from these figures. 
First, the UK and USA tightened monetary policy during the 1980s as we find that 
both FCI-2 and FIC-3 exceeded the par level. One of the reasons for tightening 
monetary policy could be the response to a high level of inflation resulted from the oil 
price shocks and relatively a higher level of budget deficits during this period. Not 
surprisingly, the FCI-I, however, shows a contradict result for this period which is 
less likely to be justified. It is because, as discussed earlier, the FCI-I does not 
provide a realistic policy stance when the foreign shocks have a greater impact on 
Philips curve. This has been a case for the USA during 1980s (Goldman Sachs, 1999). 
Second, policy may have responded to the Asian financial crises in 1997 as the FCl 
exceeded the par level. Third, monetary policy has been more accommodative since 
the beginning of this century as all indices are below the par level. Fourth, FCIs and 
MCls are stable for the ongoing inflation targeting period (post Oct 1992) in UK and 
the Greenspan period in the USA, implies that monetary policy has been successftil to 
stabilize the inflation. 
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Figure 2.1 
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2.5 Monetary policy reaction function and the use of FCI 
As discussed earlier, the simple Taylor rule is suboptimal in an open economy and 
efforts have been made to improve the reaction function in different ways by including 
asst prices, exchange rates or foreign interest rates (see Clarida et al., 1998 and Chadha 
et al. 2004 and references therein). In this section, we estimate the FCI augmented 
Taylor rule to analyse whether monetary policy responds to asset prices collectively by 
responding to the FCI. In this context, we first formulate the baseline reaction function 
and then discuss the FCI augmented reaction function. 
2.5.1 Basic Taylor rule 
The monetary policy reaction ftinction that we consider assumes forward looking 
behaviour and allows gradual adjustments of nominal interest rates in response to 
deviations of inflation from the target and output gap. Following Clarida et al. (1998, 
2000), we consider the following reaction ftinction. 
T)+a *)] + V, R, = aRl-I + (I - a) * [C + a, (ir,.,, -; r , 
(Y, - Y, (2.35) 
The set of orthogonality conditions implied by the above model is: 
E, (R, - aR, -, -0- 
C9) * IC + az (7rt+n - 7r 
T)+a 
Y(Y, -Y, 
*)])Iol=O (2.36) 
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Where, R, is the short term nominal interest rate, 7r,,,, is inflation at time t+n, 7r T is 
targeted level of inflation, y, is actual GDP. y, . is HP trended GDP (calculated by 
passing real GDP through the Hodrick Prescott filter with the smoothness parameter 
set at 1600). v, is white nose. a, and aY are parameters assigned to inflation and 
output respectively. a is the degree of interest rate smoothening and assumed to be 
O< a <1 ". Q, is the information set available for policyrnakers while setting R,. 
This framework allows a gradual adjustment of the interest rate towards its targeted 
level and is found to be superior for the policy purpose for at least two reasons. First, 
Goodfriend (1991,1997) argues that the interest rate inertia allows the central bank to 
communicate its policy more clearly so that financial instability due arising from 
uncertainty could be minimized. 
" In the extreme cases, when 13 =0 the Taylor rule does not allow to smooth changes in the interest 
rate, indicating that the central bank has a perfect control over short term interest rates. In this case the 
model describes a situation that policyrnakers adjust short term interest rates to the desired level as and 
when required. The recent literature strongly oppose this case and argues that policy inertia operates in 
practice (Clarida et al., 1998, Castelnuovo, 2003, Svensson, 1997 and Orphanides (2002). On the other 
extreme when 13 =1 policy does not respond to inflation and output but follows the autoregressive trend 
which is again not true in practice. 
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Second, Goodhart (1999), Woodford (2001), Orphanides (2001), Judd and Rudebusch 
(1998) and Clarida et. al. (1988), among others, find that this type of framework 
makes future path of policy change more predictable and helps to increase policy 
effectiveness. More specifically, as pointed out by Goodhart (1999), a gradual 
adjustment policy framework avoids a frequent policy reversal which is very important 
in the conduct of monetary policy because a frequent policy reversal reflects an 
incapability of policymakers. 
2.5.2 Augmented Taylor rule 
Although forward looking monetary policy inertia as discussed above is found to be 
superior over conventional Taylor Rule, it has some limitations. First, as pointed out 
by Kerr and King (1995), Bemanke and Woodford (1997) and Clarida et al. (1998), 
the policy feedback rule itself may be a source of instability if the coefficient of 
deviations of inflation from the target (aj is below unity. Second, even if the 
coefficient is valid, the policy feedback rule may not capture the market phenomenon 
due to the exclusion of other important assets prices like share prices and house prices. 
Recent contributions show that share price and assets price help to predict interest rate 
more accurately (eg. Montagnoli and Napolitano, 2005). 
More specifically, Kristen (2004) argues that the Taylor rule is less important for 
policy purpose if financial variables are excluded from the reaction function. He 
expands the Taylor rule by including financial market conditions as proxied by 
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difference between the short term Treasury bill rate and the long term risky bond and 
finds robust estimation for the US (see also Mehra 12 , 1999). Gerlach and Schnabel 
(2000) and Clarida et al. (1998) modify the forward looking Taylor rule by including 
monetary growth and exchange rate separately and find that these variables contains an 
important source in the interest rate setting. They, however, recognized the role of 
other assets prices in the feed back rule but do not address them. 
Smets (1997), on the other hand, includes the nominal trade-weighed exchange rate, a 
ten-year nominal bond yield and a broad stock market index in the augmented Taylor 
rule for Canada and Australia but does not give any role to house prices. Goodhart and 
Hofmann (2001,2003) find that the FCI contains useftil information in the prediction 
of the output and inflation. 
In this context, we propose an FCI augmented Taylor rule in which case policy 
responds to the FCI as an alternative to each asset prices separately. The augmented 
reaction function we consider takes the following form: 
R, = c9R, -, 
+ (I _ 
a) * [C +az(; 71+1 _, 7 
T) +a 
, 
(Y, 
- Yl: 
) + L9A, iFcIt, i I+ VI (2.37) 
and the orthogonality conditions is given by: 
12 He use only long term bond rate in his augmented Taylor rule for US. 
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E, (R, -aR, -(I-a)* 
[C + 
aT (7rt+,? T+a 
__O -1 1 
(Y' 
_Y1 _OA, iFC, 1, i 
Dlot 7- (2.38) 
Where, subscript i (for i=I to 3) indicates three scenarios of FCls as defined in the 
previous section and aA,, are corresponding parameters to be estimated. 
2.5.3 Estimation procedure 
We first estimate the basic Taylor rule as given by Eq. (2.35) and then estimate the 
augmented model as given by Eq. (2.37) using Generalised Method of Moments 
(GMM) for the UK and the USA. The instruments, 0, are a constant and up to five 
lags of the nominal short-term interest rate, inflation, output gap and FCls. Since the 
number of instruments are greater than parameters to be estimated, we test for the over 
13 identifying restrictions by using Hansen (1982) j-statistics for all estimations . In this 
context, the test of the over identifying restriction is very important. A rejection of the 
null hypothesis that the over identifying restriction is satisfied implies that instruments 
are not orthogonal to the error term. This suggests that the model is mis-specified. 
We use quarterly data over the period 1979Q2 to 2003Q4 for UK when controlling 
inflation became a clear policy objective and 1979Q3 to 2003Q4 for USA when 
Volcker, the then Governor of Fed, signalled his intention to reign in inflation (Clarida 
et al., 1998). A full sample estimate is less useful because policy has changed 
13 Interpretation of over identifying restriction can be found in Clarida et al. (1998) 
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significantly during this period. For instance, UK has adopted inflation targeting since 
October 1992. On the other hand, Fed does not target inflation explicitly but it is 
argued that it has targeting implicitly in a way of explicit targeting since the beginning 
of Greenspan tenure (1987Q3 - 2005Q4). In this context, we split the full sample into 
two periods taking 1992Q4 and 1987Q3 as a reference period for the UK and the USA 
respectively. 
2.5.4 Empirical findings 
Table 2.7 reports GMM estimates of the baseline reaction function, Eq. (2.35), for UK. 
The Panel A reports estimates for the pre inflation targeting period while Panel B 
reports the estimates for the inflation targeting era. Both estimates are quite consistent 
with the existing literature as we find policy gives a more weight to inflation and less 
to the output gap in the ongoing inflation targeting regime (since 1992) compared to 
pre-inflation targeting era (Martin and Milas, 2004). 
The estimates of the benchmark model indicate that the nominal interest rate increases 
by 1.187 percentage point in response to aI percentage point excess of inflation over 
the targeted rate in post 1992 compare to as low as 0.35 percentage point increase in 
the previous era. Consequently, the coefficient of output gap found to be as low as 
0.50 in the inflation targeting period compare to 1.46 in the pre inflation targeting 
period. These results support the exiting empirical literature that the Bank of England 
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has been more aggressive to control inflation since late 1992 compared to the previous 
era (see also Clarida et al., 1998). 
Table 2.7: UK Taylor rule: GMM estimates 
[Model: R, = aRt-I + (I - a) * [C + a, (7r f+I - 7r 
T)+a 
1(y, -yl*)+aAFCIII+Vll 
Estimated C a, ay aA J-P S. E 
Parameters N 
Panel A: Pre Inflation Targeting Period (I 979Q2-1992Q3) 
Benchmark 0.708 2.584 0.353 1.459 - 0.17 0.99 
Model (0.060)* (0.957)* (0.171)* (0.548)* 0.01 
Adding: FCI-I 0.593 3.296 0.496 0.838 0.349 0.14 0.85 
(0.064)* (0.856)* (0.172)* (0.293)* (0.025)* 0.17 
FCI-2 0.628 2.986 0.503 0.849 1.140 0.13 0.86 
(0.053)* (0.867)* (0.215)* (0.333)* (0.323)* 0.16 
FCI-3 0.639 2.887 0.501 0.867 0.751 0.12 0.86 
(0.062)* (0.870)* (0.194)* (0.291)* 
L 
0.277)* 0.15 
Panel B: Inflation Týgeting Period (199264-2003Q3 ) 
Benchmark 0.426 3.559 1.187 0.500 - 0.08 0.63 
Model (0.141)* (0.996)* (0.331)* (0.122)* 0.08 
Adding: FCI-l 0.398 2.887 1.276 0.435 0.231 0.20 0.49 
(0.143)* (0.984)* (0.199)* (0.166)* (0.017)* 0.10 
FCI-2 0.386 3.583 1.595 0.564 0.656 0.15 0.61 
(0.133)* (0.955)* (0.261)* (0.195)* (0.163)* 0.09 
FCI-3 0.399 3.461 1.433 0.584 0.250 0.13 0.63 
(0.120)* (1.051)* (0.233)* (0.216)* (0.033)* 0.07 
Note: 
1. HAC standard errors are employed in the estimates. 
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2. Instruments used are a constant, 2 to 5 lags of the dependent variable, and I to 5 
lags of inflation, output gap and FCls. The interest rate, deviations of inflation 
ftom the target and the output gap are considered to be endogenous variables. 
3. Numbers in parentheses are the standard errors of the estimates, N is the 
probability value of the normality test, J-P denotes the test statisticsfor over 
identi ed restrictions. ff, 
4. Figures in parenthesis are standard error and *, ** and *** indicate level of 
significance at I Yo, 5% and 10% respectively. 
We, next, estimate augmented models (Eq. 2.37) by including FCI_I, FCI-2 and 
FCl-3 alternatively for UK. As reported in Table 2.7, we find a positive sign of the 
FCI coefficients for all specifications. The estimated FCI parameters ranged from 0.23 
to 1.14 and are found to be significant at I%. It implies that monetary policy in UK 
responds to asset prices collectively by responding to the FCI. Interestingly, the policy 
response to inflation is found to be stronger when the FCI is included in the reaction 
function, indicating that any deviation in financial conditions from ftindamental may 
also create a threat to inflation. We also find that that the interest rate is more 
responsive to asset prices (i. e. the FCI) if the policy targets domestic inflation. 
We, then, estimate the benchmark model for the USA. As shown in Table 2.8, the 
Panel A reports the estimates for Greenspan period while Panel B provides a full 
sample estimate. Interestingly, we find that the Fed has been more aggressive to 
control inflation during the Greenspan period as we find that the coefficient of 
deviations of inflation from the target is higher than the coefficient of the output gap. 
However, a weak evidence of orthogonality is alarmed in the benchmark estimate. 
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Table 2.8: US Taylor rule: GMM estimates 
[Model: R, = aRI-I + (I - a) * [C + a, (7r, +, - 7r 
T)+a 
, 
(y, 
- yl*) + aAFCI, ]+v, I 
Estimated Parameters a C ay aA J-P S. E 
N 
Panel A: Greenspan period (1987. Q3-2003Q4) 
Benchmark 0.847 1.196 2.806 1.466 - 0.06 0.98 
Model (0.134)* (0.497)* (0.551)* (0.521)* 0.53 
Adding: FCl-l 0.793 1.368 2.165 1.268 0.770 0.39 0.50 
(0.046)* (0.327)* (0.781)* (0.482)* (0.256)* 0.23 
FCI-2 0.746 2.087 2.574 1.035 0.763 0.38 0.51 
(0.055)* (0.421)* (0.92 1)* (0.425)* (0.212)* 0.24 
FCI-3 0.730 2.187 2.489 0.914 0.650 0.36 0.48 
(0.064)* (0.320)* (0.911)* (0.335)* (0.184)* 0.19 
Panel B: Greenspan d Volcker period (1979Q3-2003Q4) 
Benchmark 0.918 1.290 2.056 2.063 - 0.07 1.12 
Model (0.122)* (0.452)* (0.381)* (0.862)* 0.13 
Adding: FCl-l 0.913 1.819 2.206 1.495 0.546 0.27 0.73 
(0.224)* (0.462)* (0.425)* (0.490)* (0.102)* 0.17 
FCI-2 0.896 1.983 2.278 1.327 0.622 0.26 0.82 
(0.110)* (0.335)* (0.491)* (0.282)* (0.242)* 0.11 
FCl-3 0.880 1.632 2.848 1.601 0.861 0.29 0.81 
(0.123)* (0.343)* (0.691)* (0.582)* (0.324)* 0.12 
Note: refer Table 2.7forfootnotes. 
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The problem of misspecification could be solved using the second order partial 
adjustment reaction function as given by Clarida et al. (1998) or using nonlinear 
specifications (see Dolado et al., 2002). But we argue that the misspecification in the 
benchmark specification is due to the omitted variable as our FCI augmented reaction 
functions are robust. This implies that the FCI contains important information to 
predict interest rate. The effect of the FCI is even higher in US than the UK as the 
estimated parameter ranged from 0.16 to 0.92 in US compared to a range of 0.26 to 
0.42 in UK. 
An effort was made to estimate the reaction function using up to 4 th lags of FCIs but 
found similar estimates. Similarly, we also tested forward, backward and 
contemporariness specifications of inflation and the output gap but the for-ward 
looking specifications as given by Eq. (2.35) and (2.37) outperformed to other 
specifications. 
To sum up, our empirical evidence from the UK and the US reveals that FCI 
augmented reaction ftinctions outperform the benchmark model in a number of ways. 
First, the standard error is sharply reduced in all augmented models compared to the 
benchmark estimate. Second, weak evidence of normality is detected in the benchmark 
model for the US but there was no sign of misspecification in the FCI augmented 
model. Third, we support the findings of Kristen (2004) that a high degree of 
smoothing parameter is due to unobserved variable. It is because smoothing 
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coefficient is decreases sharply in our FCI augmented reaction function compared to 
the benchmark estimate 14 
2.6 Concluding remarks 
A large bulk of literature argues that monetary policy should respond to asset prices as 
these variables contain important information for predicting inflation and the output 
gap (Goodhart, 2001). Although the issue of how and to what extent should monetary 
policy respond to asset prices is debatable, there is an argument that policy may 
respond to them collectively by responding to the FCI (Goodhart and Hofmann, 2001). 
In this chapter, we address this issue extensively on both theoretical and empirical 
grounds. By contrast of using the IS curve alone in the conventional literature, we 
employ a macroeconomic structural model, which combines both the demand and 
supply side of the economy, to obtain the FCI. We explore two alternative FCl models, 
one for CPI inflation and another for domestic inflation targeting frameworks 
respectively. Although both of them are obtained from a macroeconomic structural 
model, the main difference between them is the treatment of the real exchange rate. 
14 There is a debate whether a high degree of smoothing parameter is policy inertia or the effect of 
unobserved variable. Rudebusch (2002) argues that smoothing can arise spuriously if variables are 
excluded incorrectly. Kristen (1999) finds that policy inertia with a high degree of smoothing is less 
important for the policy purpose. He suggests that smoothing coefficient could be reduced by the 
inclusion of financial variable in the reaction function. 
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The CPI model assumes that the real exchange rate has a direct impact on inflation via 
import prices and indirect effects via pressure on the aggregate demand while the latter 
case considers the indirect impact alone. 
On the empirical side, we construct FCls for the UK and the USA using our new as 
well as conventional methodologies. We, then, test the usefulness of indices by 
estimating the FCI augmented Taylor rule. The empirical results overwhelmingly 
suggest that the FCI contains important information in the conduct of monetary policy. 
Moreover, monetary authority can respond to asset prices by responding to the FCI as 
we find that the FCI augmented Taylor rules outperform the simple rule in both 
countries irrespective to the type of FCls and sub-sample periods. 
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Chapter 3 
Modelling UK Monetary Policy: 
A Nonlinear Perspective" 
3.1 Introduction 
Although a growing number of central banks around the globe have started inflation 
targeting since the early 1990s and the short-term nominal interest rate was 
considered to be the only effective instrument, the analytical framework of monetary 
policy was largely unclear until the seminal work of John Taylor (Taylor, 1993). He 
explored a simple linear monetary policy reaction function, in which policyrnakers set 
the interest rate in response to deviations of inflation from the target and the output 
gap. 
15 1 am grateftil to Professor Costas Milas, Keele University, UK, for his helpful comments on the 
earlier version of this chapter. 
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More recent work has extended the Taylor rule. The work can be classified into three 
broad groups. First, Clarida et al. (1998,2000), among others, explore a 'smoothing 
reaction function' which allows a gradual adjustment in the interest rate towards 
equilibrium, an alternative to the 'immediate reactive' type of reaction function. This 
framework of monetary policy is assumed to be more transparent and predictable than 
the conventional Taylor rule (See also Goodfriend, 1991; Woodford, 2001; 
Orphanides, 1998, Judd and Rudebusch, 1998). 
Second, Gerlach (2004), Mehra (1999), Clarida et al. (1998), Smets (1997), Chadha et 
A (2004), among others, argue that policyrnakers not only respond to deviations of 
inflation from the target and the output gap but also to the foreign interest rates and 
the real exchange rate. Moreover, Goodhart and Hofmann (2000) and Goodhart 
(2001) argue that policy responds to property and equity prices together with inflation 
and the output gap. 
Third, a number of recent studies argue that the monetary policy is nonlinear and the 
policy response is asymmetric. This is due to either a nonlinear loss function (Clark et 
al., 1997 and Mayes and Viren, 2001) and/or the existence of nonlinearities in the 
economic structure (see Schaling, 1999, Dolado et al., 2000,2003,2004, Stiglitz, 
1997, Martin and Milas 2004). 
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In this backdrop, this chapter models the UK monetary policy for the post-1992 
period, the explicit inflation-targeting regime. The motivation of this chapter is two- 
fold. First, although a number of recent studies have argued that UK monetary policy 
is nonlinear, this conclusion is based on a narrow framework, the Taylor rule, which 
does not account for asset prices or open economy effects. We argue that detection of 
the nonlinearity may be due to misspecification of the Taylor rule. Second, expanded 
reaction functions have also been explored in the literature but they do not attempt to 
analyze nonlinear and asymmetric aspects of monetary policy (for instance see 
Gerlach, 2004; Clarida et al., 1998; and Smets, 1997). 
This chapter combines these two aspects of the literature. We use asset prices in an 
augmented Taylor rule as a benchmark linear model and then use various nonlinear 
models including smooth transition autoregressive (STAR) model to estimate reaction 
functions (van Dijk et al., 2002 and Martin and Milas, 2004). 
Our main findings are as follows. First, the Bank of England responds to deviations of 
inflation from the target and the output gap as well as asset prices misalignments, as 
we find that the asset price augmented Taylor rule outperforms the simple rule. 
Among various asset prices under consideration, however, the policy response to the 
exchange rate misalignment is more prominent. 
Second, we find that the aim of monetary policy is to keep inflation within a narrow 
range rather than pursuing a point target of 2.5% in practice. Policy only responded to 
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inflation when expected inflation is in the outer regime. This implies that monetary 
policy is nonlinear and the policy response is asymmetric. 
Third, the policy response to the output gap and the exchange rate misalignment is 
more acute when economy is in the inner inflation regime compared to a response to 
them when the economy is in the outer inflation regime. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section discusses the 
contemporary literature and identifies the research gap. Section 3.3 presents the 
methodology followed by empirical findings in Section 3.4. Finally, section 3.5 
concludes the chapter. 
3.2 Evolution of monetary policy reaction function 
John Taylor advanced the following monetary policy reaction function based on US 
quarterly data for the period of 1984. Ql to 1992. Q3. Under this rule, short term 
interest rates are set in response to the deviation of inflation from the targeted rate and 
the output gap (Taylor, 1993). 
il = +; T + a, (ir, - )r 
T)+a 
yy, 
(3.0) 
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where, i, is the Federal funds rate, ; r, is the annualized quarterly inflation rate, ; T' is 
the targeted rate of inflation, y, is the output gap defined as (Y-Y*) I Y* *100, where 
Y is the real GDP and Y* is the potential GDP. In his original model, the average 
Federal fund rate, r, and the long run inflation rate, ir, are set at 2 percent each to 
meet the steady state economic growth of 2.2 percent. The targeted rate of inflation, 
7r', is assumed to be the sample average, i. e. 2 percent, and the feedback parameters, 
a,, and t9y . set at 0.5 each. 
The underlying model has three basic assumptions: first, the central bank uses short- 
term interest rates as the policy instrument. Second, the central bank can 
systematically use the interest rate to stabilize inflation and output. And lastly, the 
interest rate responds with fixed weights to the deviation of inflation from the target 
and the output gap (see also Taylor, 1999a and 1999b). 
Although it is widely accepted that the Taylor rule captures the basic characteristics of 
monetary policy, at least for the inflation targeting countries, the scope of the use of 
the conventional rule is limited in practice for two reasons. First, monetary policy 
might be nonlinear and policy response could be asymmetric. Secondly, policy may 
not always respond to inflation and the output gap but also to other variables. The 
recent contributions, therefore, have addressed these two issues extensively which can 
be categorized under the linear and nonlinear monetary policy reaction functions as 
follows. 
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3.2.1 Linear reaction function 
The experiment and extension of the conventional rule under the linear framework 
may be summarized as follows: 
First, although the conventional Taylor rule provides a contemporary relationship 
among the short term interest rates inflation and the output gap, recent empirical 
studies suggest that either a backward looking or forward looking specifications better 
explains the behavior of monetary policy. Ball (1999), Svensson (1999), Rudebusch 
and Svensson (1999) are examples of backward looking models while Clarida et al. 
(1999), Domenech et al (2001) and Mehra (1999), among others, favor a forward 
looking policy reaction function. The literature, however, presents a consistent result 
that monetary policy across countries has been more responsive to inflation than any 
other policy variables since early 1990s. 
Second, efforts have been made to simulate the liner policy rule using different time 
horizons and various structural macroeconomic models. Overall, the results show that 
the Taylor rule stabilizes inflation and output in a way close to optimal policy rules in 
many macroeconomic models (Ball 1999, Taylor, 1999a and Lansing and Trehan, 
2001). 
68 
Third, as the conventional Taylor rule has been expanded by including asset prices 
and open economy variables like the foreign interest rates and the exchange rate. For 
instance, Gerlach (2004) expands the Taylor rule by including financial market 
conditions, proxied by the spread between the short-term Treasury bill rate and a long 
term risky bond for the US (see also Mehra 16 , 1999). Gerlach and Schnabel (2000) 
and Clarida et al. (1998) include monetary growth and the exchange rate (see also 
Chadha et al. 2004). Smets (1997) uses the nominal trade-weighed exchange rate, a 
ten-year nominal bond yield and the stock market index in the Taylor rule for Canada 
and Australia. Adam et al. (2004), on the other hand, include foreign interest rates in a 
Taylor rule estimated for the UK. 
Fourth, a survey of empirical studies show that policyrnakers give more weight to 
inflation than to the output gap in the inflation targeting regime compared to the 
previous era (see Domenech et. al, 200 1, and Gerlach and Schnabel, 2000 for the Euro 
area; Nelson, 2000 and Martin and Milas, 2004 for UK and Judd and Rudebusch, 
1998, Perez, 2001 and Orphanides, 2001 for the US). 
Fifth, the literature argues that the smoothing Taylor rule, which considers a gradual 
adjustment of interest rates towards equilibrium, is more appropriate than the 
'immediate reactive' policy rule, which does not consider the lag dependent in the 
reaction function, for the following reasons. Firstly, interest rate inertia allows the 
central bank to communicate its policy more clearly so that financial instability due 
16 He includes the long-term bond rate in the reaction function for the US. 
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arising from uncertainty in the monetary policy is minimized (see also Goodfriend 
1987,1991). Secondly, as discussed in Woodford (2001) and Clarida et al. (1998), a 
smoothing reaction function makes the future path of interest rates more predictable. 
Thirdly, it is argued that uncertainty about the future state of the economy might 
encourage the central bank to change short-term interest rates gradually (see 
Orphanides, 1998, Judd and Rudebusch 1998). Finally, it is also argued that interest 
rate smoothing enable policyrnakers to avoid frequent policy reversals. This would 
make policy more credible as frequent policy reversals may jeopardize the financial 
stability (Goodhart, 1999). Therefore, interest rate smoothing is also viewed as an 
attempt by policyrnakers to safeguard their reputation (see also Kontonikas, 2004). 
3.2.2 Nonlinear reaction functions 
Although linear Taylor-type reaction functions give a basic framework for monetary 
policy analysis, they potentially neglect asymmetries and nonlinearities that may be 
important in practice. As discussed in Clark et al. (1997), if the economy itself is 
asymmetric then policy should also have an offsetting asymmetry. Mayes and Viren 
(2001) further argue that as long as the hypothesis of asymmetry cannot be 
convincingly rejected, policy should assume asymmetry because the cost of wrongly 
assuming symmetry when the economy is asymmetric are greater than from assuming 
it is asymmetric when actual policy is symmetric. 
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The literature finds at least two sources of nonlinearity in monetary policy. First, it is 
often argued that policyrnaker's preferences are asymmetric as they have to face a 
nonlinear loss function instead of the linear quadratic. This implies that the 
policyrnakers show different temptation for controlling positive and negative 
deviations of inflation from the target (see Gerlach 2000, Cukierman, 2000, Nobay 
and Peel, 1998, and Dolado et al. 2004 among others). 
Secondly, it has been recognized that either the supply (Philips) and/or demand (IS) 
curve may be nonlinear which implies economic policy follows a nonlinear path. For 
instance Schaling (1999), and Dolado et al. (2003) argue that the Philips curve is 
convex to the origin. On the other hand, Stiglitz (1997) is in favor of concave Philips 
curve. 
Huang et al. (2001), on the other hand, argue that the nonlinearity arises from 
uncertainty in the productivity. They find that an optimal updating rule for the 
NAIRU leads to nonlinear interest-rate policy in Finland. This implies that 
policyrnakers are more cautious about adjusting interest rates in response to a small 
output gaps than in a standard linear Taylor rule but more aggressive when they reach 
a certain threshold. 
In this context, Orphanides and Wieland (2000) develop an optimal monetary policy 
reaction function based on nonlinear preferences. Ruge-Murcia (2002), Surico (2002) 
and Cukien-nan and Muscatelli (2002) also follow the same tradition, assuming 
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asymmetric preferences with respect to inflation and/or the output gap. Employing an 
asymmetric loss function, Cukierman and Gerlach (2003) show that even if 
policyrnakers target the natural level of employment, there will be an inflation bias if 
the central bank is more sensitive to policy failures that drive employment below the 
normal level than to policy failures that raise employment above it. This suggests that 
policy measure is clearly nonlinear. 
Nobay and Peel (1998) assume that the central bank has an asymmetric loss function 
with regards to both inflation and the output gap. They argue that the asymmetric loss 
in inflation results in an inflation bias, which can take either sign whilst the 
asymmetric preferences over output gap implies that reducing the target level of 
output to the natural rate does not eliminate the inflationary bias. 
Dolado et al. (2003,2004) derive optimal monetary policy rules accounting for 
uncertainty on the output gap. Using US quarterly data, they find that both sign and 
size asymmetries of uncertainty matter in the conduct of monetary policy. Gerlach 
(2002) includes the output gap volatility to the Taylor rule and finds that responding 
more strongly to recessions than to expansions creates an inflation bias. Moreover, he 
argues that output volatility keeps a positive relation to both inflation and recessions, 
implying a higher volatility invites a higher rate of inflation and recessions. 
Bec et al. (2002) extended theoretical models proposed by Svensson (1997) and 
Clarida et al. (1998,2000) by including positive and negative deviations of output 
72 
from trend. They find that changes in short term interest rates are influenced by the 
state of the current and or expected state of the business cycle in the US, Germany 
and France. 
Martin and Milas (2004) use a quadratic logistic smooth transition autoregressive 
(QL-STAR) model to analyze the nonlinearity and asymmetric behavior of UK 
monetary policy. Using quarterly data from 1972QI-2000QI, they argue that 
monetary policy is more responsive to inflation and correspondingly less to the output 
gap in the inflation targeting period as compared to the previous era. The response of 
policy to inflation is nonlinear as interest rates respond more to positive deviations of 
inflation form the target compare to negative deviations. Furthermore, they argue that 
the BoE has attempting to keep inflation within a range rather than pursuing a point 
target of 2.5%. 
In conclusion, nonlinear monetary policy rules have been popular in recent years, not 
only because data supports the nonlinear framework but also because the behavior of 
policyrnakers itself is nonlinear. In this context Meyer (2000) 17 says: 
17 Remarks by Governor Laurence H. Meyer on "Structural Change and Monetary Policy" at a Joint 
Conference of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco and the Stanford Institute for Economic 
Policy Research, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, San Francisco, California, March 3,2000. 
The speech can be found at http: //www. federalreserve. gov/boarddocs/speeches/2000/20000303. htm 
73 
I believe that a nonlinear rule may dominate a linear 
specification..... such a nonlinear rule could be justified either by 
nonlinearities in the economy or by a non-normal distribution of 
policyrnakers' prior beliefs about the NAIRU. It is certainly easy to 
believe that there are nonlinearities in the economy in general and with 
respect to the Phillips curve in particular... " 
3.3 Methodology 
3.3.1 General strategy and modelling framework 
This chapter models the UK monetary policy for the ongoing explicit inflation 
targeting regime, post- 1992. Therefore, the analytical framework we consider in this 
chapter assumes that the aim of monetary policy is to target inflation using short-term 
interest rates as the main operating instrument. Moreover, the central bank is assumed 
to be autonomous, at least at the operational level, so it can set monetary instruments 
freely in order to achieve the objective. 
We begin our analysis by estimating a simple linear reaction function that combines 
the interest rate, deviations of inflation from the target and the output gap. We, then, 
augment the ftinction by including a set of financial variables such as real exchange 
rate, house prices, and share prices. 
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Using an augmented Taylor rule as a benchmark linear specification, we then estimate 
nonlinear reaction function using various nonlinear econometric models. We begin 
with the Escribano and Granger (1998), Escribano and Aparicio (1999) and Granger 
and Lee (1989) models to test whether there is any sign and/or size asymmetries of 
deviations of inflation from the target. Although these models provide an indication of 
nonlinearity, they are too simple to describe distinct regimes for inflation. Therefore, 
in order to analyze nonlinear and asymmetric policy behavior together, we employ the 
Smooth Transition Autoregressive (STAR) family of models 18 . 
3.3.2 Benchmark specification 
3.3. Z 1. Taylor rule 
To begin with, we assume that the central bank sets the short-term interest rate in 
response to the future deviation of inflation from the target and the output gap, albeit 
gradually. Following Clarida et al., (1998,2000) the monetary policy reaction 
function that we consider is: 
it = bit-, + (I - b)i (3.1) 
(3.2) i, =)6+bE, -1(7r,,,, -7r*)+byEt-I 
(Yt+n - Yt+n) 
's Chapter 5 describes the model in detail. 
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Where, i, is the observed nominal interest rate, i is the desired interest rate, 8 is 
the equilibrium interest rate, E, _1 
is the expectation formed at t given the information 
of t-1,7r, +, 
is the expected inflation at time t+n, 7r* is the targeted rate of inflation, 
Yt+n is actual GDP at time t+n, y, *+, is the potential GDP at time t+n, and v, is white 
nose error term. b, and by are parameters to be estimated. 
Eq. (3.1) is the first order partial adjustment function where the observed interest rate, 
ij , is defined as a weighted average of the previous period rate and the desired interest 
rate. We employ the first order partial adjustment model but it can be extended up to 
n th order depending on the nature of data. For instance, Clarida et al. (198 8) employ a 
second order partial adjustment model for the US reaction function while they use the 
first order partial adjustment model for the European countries including UK. 
Combining Eq. (3.1) and (3.2), we obtain 
i+ bi il-I + (I - b, ) [b,, Et-I 7r + by El-I (Yt+n - Yt+n A +'61 (3.3) 
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where =(I - b, ), 8 is the equilibrium interest rate, b, is the degree of interest rate 
smoothening and assumed to be O< b, <1 19 and c, is a stochastic error term which 
combines the forecast errors of inflation and output and the random error, vt. 
3.3.2.2. Augmented Taylor rule 
Although, Eq. (3.3) is considered to be an improvement over the conventional Taylor 
rule, it has also some limitations. First, as pointed out by Kerr and King (1995), 
Bernanke and Woodford (1997) and Clarida et al. (1998), the policy rule may be a 
source of instability if b, is below unity. Second, the policy rule may not work well 
in practice if relevant variables are omitted from the reaction functions. This implies 
that the Eq. (3.3) may be mis-specified. 
In the context of UK, a number of variables like the real exchange rate, the real house 
prices and the real share prices have been considered to be relevant in the conduct of 
19 When b, =1, the Taylor rule collapses, implies that policyrnakers do not respond to inflation and the 
output gap. In the other extreme when b, =0, the resulting function becomes a forward looking Taylor 
rule without lag dependent. In this case, the reaction function does not allow us to smooth changes in 
interest rate, indicating that the central bank has a perfect control over the short tenn interest rate. It 
also implies that the interest rate can be adjusted immediately to its target level as and when required. 
This situation, however, is less likely to happen in practice (see Clarida et al. 1998, and 2000, 
Castelnuovo, 2003, Svensson, 1997, Orphanides, 2002 among others for the detailed analysis). 
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monetary policy 20 (Goodhart and Hofmann 2001,2003; Batini and Tumbull, 2000). 
We, therefore, include all these asset prices in the linear specification but select only 
the real exchange rate (RER) augmented Taylor rule for the nonlinear specifications 
for two reasons. First, the preliminary experiments suggest that the policy response to 
RER misalignment is higher than to any other asset prices 21 . Second, our sample size 
is not big enough to include all possible asset prices in nonlinear models. 
Therefore, we consider the following augmented Taylor rule as a benchmark model 
for nonlinear estimates: 
i +bji, Y: -1 + 
(I - bj) * [b,, E, -, 
(ir, +,, - ir + 
byEt-I (Yt+n 1+ 
beE, 
-, 
(e, - e, *)] + c, (3.4) 
where e, is the real effective exchange rate, e* is the equilibrium real exchange rate as 
approximated by the HP filter method. b, is the feedback parameter of e, - e* and is 
expected to be positive because an increase in e, indicates the depreciation of national 
currency vis-d-vis foreign currencies. 
20 The previous chapter provides evidence about this. 
1 The next section provides empirical evidence on this 
78 
Notice that c, is a linear combination of forecast errors of deviations of inflation from 
the target, the output gap and the exogenous disturbances. Therefore, it has to be 
orthogonal to variables included in the information set (say, Q, ). A failure to reject 
orthogonality implies that lagged variables enter in the reaction function only to the 
extent that they forecast future inflation or output (Clarida et al., 1998 and 2000 and 
Chadha et al., 2004). Formally, the orthogonality condition can be written as 
fil -i- bi il-I - (I - b, ) lb,, (; r,,,, - 7r + by (Yt+n - yt * +,, + 
b, (e, - e, )))IQ, 0 (3.5) 
Eq. (3.5) is the orthogonality condition implied by Eq. (3.4) where Q, is the vector of 
all variables that are taken into consideration by the central bank when taking the 
monetary policy decision. 
3.3.3 Nonlinear modelling 
3.3.3.1. Size and sign asymmetries 
After estimating the linear benchmark reaction function, that is Eq. (3.4), we then 
proceed to analyze various aspects of nonlinearities in the reaction function that are 
generated from deviations of inflation from the target, ; T,,, -; r* - 
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We first use the Granger and Lee (1989) model to test for sign asymmetries. This 
model includes positive and negative deviations of inflation from the target separately 
(Dolado et al., 2000), it can be written as: 
it =a+ bil-I + (I - b, )[b,,, (; r, +,, - 7r*)+ + 
b,,,, (7r,.,,, - 7r*)- + by (Yt+n - Yl"+n) 
b, (e, - e, + u, (3.6) 
Where, - 7r *)'=- 7r *) if -; 7*) ý! 0 and is zero otherwise, 
(7rt+n -; r*)- =(7rt+n -7r*) if (; rl+n -ir*)<0 and is zero otherwise. b; r, p and 
b,,,, are 
the key parameters in this model. We test the null hypothesis HO : b,,, p = 
b,,,, against 
H, : b,, P : P, - 
b,,,,, to identify the sign asymmetry. Rejecting the null implies that 
policyrnakers respond to positive and the negative deviations of inflation from the 
target differently. This model, however, simplifies to the linear model in Eq. (3.4) if 
we do not reject the null hypothesis. 
We then estimate the Escribano and Granger (1998) and Escribano and Aparicio 
(1999) model to test whether there is any size effects of 7r, -,,, -; r* 
in the conduct of 
monetary policy. This type of model recently used by Arghyrou et al. (2005) to 
analyze inflationary dynamics for UK, Martin and Milas (2004) to examine monetary 
policy reaction function for UK; and Dolado et al. (2000) to test the output gap 
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asymmetry for the US monetary policy reaction function. The model can be written 
as: 
il =+b, il-I + (I - b, )[b,,, - 7r*) + 
b,, 
2 
GTI+n 
_ ý71)2 
yl*+, ) + be (e, - e, *)] + u, (3.7) 
Eq. (3.7) compares to (3.4) except for the term b, 2 (7rt+n _ Ir* )2 where, 
bir, 
2 measures 
the size asymmetry of deviations of inflation from the target. In this model, we test a 
null hypothesis, HO : b,,, 2= 0 against the alternative H, : b,, 2 ;, - 0. Rejecting the null 
implies that policy responds differently for large and small deviations of inflation 
from the target, i. e. the size matters in the interest rate setting. The model simplifies to 
the linear benchmark reaction function in Eq. (3.4) if we do not reject the null 
hypothesis. 
3.3.3.2. Smooth transition autoregressive models 
The sign and size hypotheses as given by Eq. (3.6) and (3.7) are simple extensions of 
the linear reaction function. One of the limitations of them is that they do not describe 
the adjustment process even when the sign or the size of deviations of inflation from 
the target matters. Therefore, we next employ smooth transition autoregressive 
(STAR) family models to analyze whether monetary policy is nonlinear and policy 
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response is asymmetric. This class of nonlinear models is flexible in nature and 
provides a number of alternative specifications (see Chapter 5 for more discussion). 
As discussed in Granger and Terasvirta (1993), Terasvirta and Anderson (1992) and 
Terasvirta (1994), there are three steps to be followed to arrive at the final estimable 
STAR model. The first step is to test linearity. If it is not rejected then nonlinear 
model, especially STAR models, does not provide any better result over linear ones. 
Therefore, we only estimate the nonlinear reaction function using STAR models if 
linearity is rejected. The second step is to select a transition variable. This variable is 
the sources of nonlinearity in the model as we obtain regimes for this variable. The 
third step is to choose an appropriate transition function if there is a lack of economic 
theory to be used. 
Formal linearity test 
As discussed, a formal linearity test is required before employing any nonlinear 
models. In this context, we use the testing approach proposed by Saikonnen and 
Luukkonen (1988), Luukkonen et al. (1988), Granger and Terasvirta (1993), 
Terasvirta and Anderson (1992) and Terasvirta (1994). This test is based on the 
following artificial regression. 
(1) 
il =A+ßoo, +2ý[ßl0, -j(Z, -d -'7*)+ß2, j0, -j('7t-d _7r*)2 
+ ß3, 
i 
Ot-i (7r(-d _ ý7)3 + 171 (3.8) 
]=o 
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Where, A is the constant tenn, 0, is a vector of 
{'r-lJ'rt+n -7r*), (Y,,,, -y, 
*+,, ), (e, -e, *) 1,77, is a white nose error term and 8j (for j= I 
to k) are parameters to be estimated for different values of the delay parameter, d. The 
linearity test implies the testing of null hypothesis, Ho: )61,, =": )62, j ==0 against 
alternative that at least one of them is non-zero. This can be done with a standard 
Lagrange Multiplier (LM) type test. 
Selection of a transition variable 22 
As discussed earlier, the purpose of this chapter is to model the UK monetary policy 
for the explicit inflation targeting regime. Therefore, the main objective of estimating 
nonlinear reaction function using STAR model is to examine whether the size and/or 
sign of deviations of inflation from the target matters for the policy purpose and also 
to test whether there exists any asymmetric adjustment of this variable. In this light, 
we only consider ýT, -d-7r* as 
transition variable where d is the 'delay parameter'. 
We estimate Eq. (3.8) using a series of d such that -n:! ý d :! ý n and report the linearity 
test for all values of d (van Dijk et al, 2002). The maximum number of d is set using 
the AIC and the partial autocorrelation of ; r, - 7r* (Iregui et al., 2002). 
22 We consider the single transition variable in this chapter. The use of multiple transition variables can 
be found in Chapter5. 
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Finally, the decision rule is to choose the value of d that rejects linearity most 
decisively (van Dijk et al., 2002). If the linearity is rejected for more than one value of 
d, then we select the one which gives the lowest p-values (see Terasvirta and 
Anderson, 1992 for more discussion). 
Selection of transition functions 
The literature provides mainly two alternative transition functions for the STAR 
model. They are the logistic smooth transition function (LSTAR) and the quadratic 
logistic smooth transition function (QL-STAR). The former describes the sign 
asymmetry while the latter gives a size asymmetry of the transition variable 23 . There 
is a fon-nal procedure for selecting one against another but we use both of them to 
estimate the nonlinear reaction function, as our sample is relatively small to rely on 
the test statistics. 
The literature also provides an exponential smooth transition function to describe the size 
asymmetry. However, as discussed in Iregui et al. (2002), van Dijk et al. (2002) and Martin and Milas 
(2004), the ESTAR model simplifies to the linear model if either )/ -ý 0 or )/ --+ 00 . For this reason, 
we do not estimate the nonlinear reaction function using exponential transition ftinction. 
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Nonlinear reaction function 
In the light of above discussion, we estimate the nonlinear reaction function using 
logistic ftinction as given below (van-Dijik et al., 2002 and Martin and Milas, 2004): 
Pt-I + (1 - P)IOIMLI + (1 - Ot)MUI + ýt iid(O, 
Where, 
MLI ,,,: k, I (7r, -; r +k ,)+k 12 
(Yt+n - Y: 13(e, -e, 
) 
Mul = 
k2l 071+n 
-; r*) + 
k22 (Yl+n - Y, 
*+n) 
+ k23 (e, - e, *), and 
Ot = Pr{ rý 
(ZI-d 
- 7r 
*»=1- 
(3.9) 
I 
+ e-' 
Orl-d - 7r rD1 Sx 
>0 
Eq. (3.9) is a nonlinear reaction function in which i, is a weighted average of a "lower 
regime", "L, and an "upper regime", Mu, where ML, and Mu, are augmented 
Taylor rules similar to Eq. (3-4). 0, is the relative weights assigned to ML, and is 
bounded between 0 and 1. In this model, 0, is the probability that" ýý 07, -d-; r) and 
consequently (I - 0, ) is the probability that "< 
(7rt-d - 7r * ). Therefore, the model 
describes the sign asymmetry of transition function, 'T' I-d 
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The transition function, 0, is determined by the combination of the transition variable, 
7r 
i-d - /T and nuisance parameters (r and The first nuisance parameter, r, is 
frequently referred to as the 'threshold parameter', while the latter one is the 'slope 
parameter'. 
The slope parameter, a, which determines the smoothness of the changes of transition 
from one regime to another, has important implication in this model. When 
u -> 00 , 0, becomes a heaviside ftinction. In this case, 0, 
ýO if (Tl 
-d 
- 'T 
*) 
:5T 
and 0, =l Secondly, when a --> 0 the logistic function becomes 
constant and the model simplifies to be the basic linear model in Eq. (3.4). We make 
a dimension free by dividing it by the standard deviation, s, , of 7r, (van Dijk et al., 
2002; and Iregui et al., 2002 for more discussion). 
The LSTAR model simplifies to the benchmark linear model in Eq. (3.4) if 
k1j = k2j (for all j=1 to 3). There is a sign asymmetry in the reaction function if 
k1l # k2l *In practice, we expect k, I< 
k2l 
ý 
k2l > k22and k2, > 
k23 
as policyrnakers 
give more attention to inflation and less to output gap and RER if > 7r*. This 
model, however, does not describe the size asymmetry. 
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We next estimate the nonlinear reaction ftinction using the QL-STAR model as an 
alternative to the LSTAR model. This model also provides two regimes for inflation 
but the main difference between the LSTAR and QLSTAR is that the former provides 
the lower and upper regime while the latter gives the inner and outer regime. In the 
latter case, we consider the economy is in the inner inflation regime when expected 
inflation is close to the target or remains within two inflation boundaries. On the other 
hand, the economy remains in the outer inflation regime when expected inflation is 
below the lower boundary or exceeds the upper boundary. 
The QL-STAR reaction function can be written as: 
+ Pit-I +0- P) 10, MI, +0-0, )Mo, I+ 
Where, 
MI, : -- kll(, 7 -ir*)+kI2(YI+n -yn)+k]3(e, - e, ) 
Mol = 
k2l (7r,.,,, 
- 7r 
*)+ k22 (Yl+n - yl*+n )+ k23(e, - e, ) and 
(3.10) 
Pr(-r L<(, 7 1-d - 7r* 
): 5 -rU )=1-*1L >o 
1+ e-' 
(Ti-d-ff -r )(7ri-d-yr 
Eq. (3.10) describes i, as a weighted average of the inner regime, M1, , and outer 
L 
regime, MO,. There are two thresholds in this model, the lower threshold ) and 
the upper threshold ( r" ), which determines two distinct regimes. The model gives the 
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inner inflation regime when rL <- 
071-d 
- 7r* 
) ý5 'r 
U 
and the outer regime otherwise. 
When economy is in the inner regime, the interest rate is determined by MI, * 
Similarly, the interest rate is determined by MO, when the economy is in the outer 
inflation regime. 
In this model, the transition function 0, has two important properties. First, 0, 
becomes constant and hence model simplifies to the benchmark model in Eq. (3.4) 
when a -). 0. Second, when a --> -o, 0, =0 if 
(rl 
-d 
- 7r 
*) 
ýý T or (7r, 
-d - 
7r*)> T 
and 0, =1 when TL -<(7r, -d r". Following Granger and Tersvirta (1993) and 
Terasvirta (1994) we make the slope parameter dimension free by dividing it by the 
variance of inflation ( s, ) 
As in the LSTAR, The QL-STAR function simplifies to the linear benchmark model 
in Eq. (3.4) if k1j = k2j (for all j=1 to 3). The size of deviations of inflation from the 
target matter if k, 1# k2l Monetary policy is asymmetric 
if we reject the null 
hypothesis HO : [(7r* _ rL )+ (7r* +u )] /2=2.5% against an alternative hypothesis, 
H, : [(lr* _. rL)+(lr* + u)] /2#2.5%. 
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3.4 Empirical estimates and discussion 
3.4.1 The data 
We model UK monetary policy for the ongoing inflation targeting regime, that is, 
1992Q4 - 2004Q2. We use the three-month Treasury bill rate as the nominal interest 
rate, i, and the four-quarter change in the retail price index (RPI) as the inflation 
rate, 7r, . Similarly, real GDP is used as output, y, and the trade weighted real 
effective exchange rate index (RER) as the exchange rate variable, e, where an 
increase indicates depreciation of home currency vis-a-vis foreign currencies. All 
data are obtained from the International Monetary Fund provided by DataStream. 
Although the official inflation target (7r*) varies over time in UK 24 , we set it to 
2.5%, a periodic average, throughout the period to make comparable with other 
studies (Martin and Milas, 2004, Clarida et al., 1998, and Nelson, 2000). In order to 
obtain the potential output and the equilibrium RER, we use the Hodrick-Prescott 
filter. The output gap (y, - y, .) and the deviation of RER from the equilibrium 
( e, -e*) are, therefore, defined as the difference between the actual variable and the 
corresponding Hodrick-Prescott trend. The plots of variables are given in Figure 3.1, 
below. 
24 It was set to a range of I% to 4% for October 1992 to April 1997 and 2.5% thereafter (Bernake et al. 
1999). 
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We employ augmented Dickey-Fuller (1979) and Phillips-Perron (1988) tests to 
assess the stationary of the variables. As discussed in the previous chapter, while the 
former test makes a parametric correction for higher-order serial correlation by 
assuming that the series follows an autoregressive process with order AR(P) and 
adjusts the test methodology by adding lags of independent variables, the latter tests 
a unit root through a non-parametric correction procedure (Benerjee et al., 1993). 
Table 3.1 presents the test results. The order of integration of i, is found to be more 
ambiguous but following Clarida et al. (1998), Martin and Milas (2004) and Fuhrer 
(1997), among others, we consider this variable as stationary. Other three variables 
( 7r, - 7r *, yt - y, * and e, -e*) are found to be stationary at I %. 
Moreover, the literature argues that the linear unit root tests (ADF and PP tests) are 
less powerful to detect the stationarity if variables take a nonlinear adjustment process 
(Gregoriou and Kontonikas, 2006). In this context, the recent theory and the empirical 
literature related to the purchasing power parity, real exchange rates and monetary 
policy rule (eg. Sarantis, 1999, Chortareas et al. 2002 and Martin and Milas, 2004) 
suggest that inflation and the real exchange rates follow a non-linear mean reverting 
process in which case the linear unit root tests may be insufficient to test the 
stationarity. Therefore, following Kapetanious et al. (2003), we employ an 
exponential smooth transition autoregressive unit root test to evaluate stationarity 
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process for 7r, - 7r* and e, - e*. The detail methodology is given in Appendix 2.2. 
The empirical estimates firml y suggest that there is no need to doubt about the 
sationarity of both variables as we obtain sufficiently a high t-ratio 25 . 
Table 3.1: Unit root tests (1992Q4 - 2004Q2) 
Variable Description ADF PP Test 
Name Test 
it 3 Month Treasury Bill Rate -2.58*** -2.19 
17t -; r* 4 quarter change in retail price index (RPI) less the -3.77* -2.96** 
target (2.5%) 
1Y -Y* I 
Output gap -3.99* -3.99* 
e, - e, * RER misalignment -7.09* -6.98 
Note: 
(a) Y, . and e, * are Hodrick- Prescott trends with smoothing parameter set at 1600. 
(b) Critical values for the ADF and PP-Test are -3.5 7, -2.92 and -2.60 at 1%, 5% 
and 10% significance level respectively. 
The superscripts t ** and *** in column (iii) and column (iv) indicate 
significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
25 The computed t-ratio for the coefficients of the cubic ; T, - 7r 
* and e, -e* are 5.98 and 7.87 
respectively. 
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Figure 3.1: Plots of variables 
a. Three-month Treasury bill rate, i, b. RPI Inflation, 7r, 
93 94 95 96 97 9B 99 00 01 02 03 
c. Output gap, y, - y, * d. RER misalignment, e, - e, 
* 
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3.4.2 Linear estimates 
We begin our empirical analysis by estimating Eq. (3.3) by GMM and OLS. We 
experiment various time horizons for the explanatory variables ranging from the 4 th 
quarter lag to 4 th quarter lead (-4:! ý n :! ý 4 ). Empirical estimates 26 , however, reveal 
that the one period ahead forward looking smoothing Taylor rule outperforms other 
specification irrespective of the estimation method. Therefore, unless otherwise 
stated, we use n=l for inflation and the output gap and n=O for the RER as time 
horizon of variables for all reported estimates. This is consistent with many empirical 
studies (eg. Clarida et al., 1998, Chadha et al. 2004 and Adam et al. 2005). 
Estimates of Taylor rule (Eq. 3.3) are presented in columns (i) and (ii) of Table 3.2 
where the Column (i) presents OLS estimates and column (ii) provides GMM 
estimate. Consistent with the empirical literature (Martin and Milas, 2004, Clarida et. 
al., 1998 and Nelson, 2000) our GMM and OLS estimates satisfy the dynamic 
stability criterion since b, is found to be greater than 1, parameters are significant at 
I% with expected positive sign and the condition b,, >by is satisfied. Also z, is 
found to be highly persistent as b, is close to 0.9. This all implies that the Bank of 
England has given more weight on the price stability and correspondingly less weight 
on the output stability during the ongoing inflation targeting era. 
26 Not all of them are reported to save space but are available on request. 
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Table 3.2: Estimates of linear reaction functions (1992Q4-2004Q2) 
Variables Estimate of Eq. (3.3) Estimate of Eq. (3.4) 
OLS 
G) 
GMM 
(ii) 
OLS 
(iii) 
GMM 
(iv) 
0.62 (0.220)* 0.83 (0.085)* 0.576 (0.202)* 0.768 (0.109)* 
b, 0.87 (0.040)* 0.84 (0.015)* 0.879 (0.036)* 0.841 (0.020)* 
b, 2.50 (0.799)* 2.35 (0.223)* 2.233 (0.713)* 1.447 (0.246)* 
by 1.76 (0.837)** 1.16 (0.42 1)* 1.606 (0.781)* 1.127 (0.378)* 
b, 0.139 (0.058)* 0.124 (0.009) * 
-2 
R 0.87 0.86 0.89 0.88 
s. e. 0.36 0.37 0.34 0.35 
LM4 1.38 [0.25] 1.21 [0.32] 
ARCH4 1.96 [0.11] 1.26 [0.30] 
F-H 1.54 [0.18] 0.63 [0.74] 
F-xH 2.01 [0.06] 0.54 [0.88] 
Normality 2.04 [0.351 1.85 [0.39] 1.03 [0.59] 0.38 [0.42] 
J-P statistics 0.18 0.20 
p-value 0.89 0.92 
Notes: 
a. Figures in parenthesis are standard error. t ** and *** indicate level of 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Numbers in square brackets are p 
value of the test statistics. The interest rate, deviations of inflationftom the target 
and the output gap are considered to be endogenous variables. 
b. s. e. is the standard error of the regression. LM4 is the fourth order Breusch- 
Godfrey's Lagrange Multiplier F-testfor the residual serial correlation. ARCH4 
is the fourth order auto regression conditional heteroscadasticity F-test. F-H is 
the White's heteroscadasticity F-test of residual while F-xH is the test of cross 
heteroscadasticity. Finally, RESET is specification error test of the regression 
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due to Ramsey (1969). P-value is the probability that the over identified 
restriction is satisfied under null. 
c. As in Clarida et aL (1998) instruments used for GMM estimates are a constant 
and up to five lags of all variables used in the reaction function. 
Our GMM estimate is robust as we do not reject the null hypothesis that the 
overidentifying restriction is satisfied. The OLS estimates has heteroscadasticity 
effects, albeit, marginally. 
We next estimate the RER augmented Taylor rule as given by Eq. (3.4). The estimates 
are presented in columns (iii) and (iv) of Table 3.2. We estimate b, =0.12 by GMM in 
Column (iv) and 0.14 by OLS in Column (iii), both are significant at I%, both imply 
that policyrnakers not only respond to deviations of inflation from the target and the 
output gap but also to deviations of RER misalignment. Also, these estimates do not 
alter the main findings of the simple Taylor rule as discussed earlier. 
The augmented Taylor rule outperforms the simple rule for two reasons. First, 
standard error has improved significantly in the augmented model. Second, there is no 
misspecification in the estimates. Therefore, a RER misalignment augmented Taylor 
rule is our preferred estimate over the simple Taylor rule. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, share prices and house prices are also 
considered to be important variables for UK monetary policy. Therefore, we estimate 
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Eq. (3.4) by including deviations of house price from the trend ( h, - h, .) and 
deviations of share prices from the trend (s, - s, .) as an alternative specification to Eq. 
(3.3) and (3.4). The specification of more expanded Taylor rule is as follows: 
il =+b, il-I + (I - b) * [b, 
(7r, 
+, - 7r) + b, (y, +, - yl*+, 
) + b, (e, - e, .) 
bh(h, - h, *) + b, (s, - s, *)] + c, (3.4a) 
Where, h, 4 and s, * are obtained using the Hodrick-Prescott trend as usua, 27. 
Table 3.3 presents the empirical estimates of (3.4a). We observe that deviations of 
house prices from the trend, h, - h, ., and deviations of share prices from the 
fundamental, s, - s, , significantly and positively enter in the reaction function 
without altering the previous findings. The estimates, both by GMM and OLS, 
confirm that the response to deviations of inflation from the target is more vigorous 
followed by the output gap, RER misalignment, deviation of house prices from the 
trend and the deviation of share prices from ftindamentals 28 . This result 
is consistent 
with the previous chapter and ftirther justifies the use of asset prices in the conduct of 
monetary policy 
29 
27 The sources and further definitions of variables are given in Chapter 2. 
28 This finding is fairly consistent with Goodhart and Hofmann (2001). 
29 The expanded Taylor rule may be considered as an alternative to the FCI augmented Taylor rule as 
discussed in the previous chapter. It is because the FCI includes all asset prices that are considered in 
the expanded Taylor rule. The FCI augmented Taylor rule was superior over the simple rule in the 
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Table 3.3: The estimates of expanded Taylor rule# (1992Q4-2004Q2) 
OLS Estimate GMM Estimate 
0.444 (0.201)* 0.321 (0.059)* 
b, 0.905 (0.036)* 0.908 (0.011)* 
b, 2.550 (0.872)* 2.152 (0.305)* 
by 1.632 (0.836)* 1.394 (0.180)* 
bý 0.132 (0.159)* 0.116 (0.059)* 
bh 0.031 (0.012** 0.052 (0.028)** 
b, 0.044 (0.020)** 0.059 (0.022)** 
Diagnostic tests 
-2 
R 0.88 0.88 
s. e. 0.33 0.35 
LM4 1.50 [0.21] 
ARCH4 1.75 [0.15] 
F-H 0.75 [0.68] 
Normality 0.15 [0.92] 2.44 [0.29] 
J-P 0.19 
p-value 0.989 
Notes: # Estimate of Eq. 3.4a. See Table 3.2 for the footnotes. 
previous chapter while expanded Taylor rule outperformed the simple rule in this chapter, both justified 
the role of asset prices in the conduct of monetary policy in UK. 
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Despite this fact, we, however, do not include house prices and share prices in the 
nonlinear estimates for three reasons. First, the estimate of the extended Taylor rule 
does not provide a remarkable improvement over the RER augmented reaction 
function as the standard error of the estimate has decreased only marginally. Second, 
the response of interest rate to asset prices is almost negligible although the 
coefficients are significant. Third, our sample size is relatively small to include all 
possible asset prices in a nonlinear reaction function. We, however, address the issues 
of asset prices in the following chapters. 
3.4.3 Nonlinear estimates 
3.4.3.1 Accounting for sign and size asymmetries 
The benchmark linear Taylor rule suggests that the deviation of expected inflation 
from the target, E, 
-1(7r,,, -7r*), 
is the most influential variable followed by the 
expected output gap, E, _, 
(y, 
+, - y, +, 
), and the RER misalignment (e, - e, ). We now 
proceed to analyze whether the sign and/or size of the deviation of inflation from the 
target matter in the conduct of monetary policy by estimating Eq. (3.6) and (3.7). 
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Table 3A Tests of size and sign effects (OLS Estimates: 1992Q4-2004Q2) 
Coefficients Sign effect 
(Estimate of Eq. 3.6) 
Size effect 
(Estimate of Eq. 3.7) 
0.532 (0.180)* 0.565 (0.186)* 
b, 0.854 (0.033)* 0.861 (0.034)* 
b,,, 
p 
3.847 (0.957)* 
b,,,, 0.552 (0.6548) 
b,,,, 2.327 (0.586)* 
b,,, 2 1.017 (0.488)** 
by 2.128 (0.667)* 2.128 (0.415)* 
b, 0.113 (0.042)* 0.115 (0.056)* 
Diagnostic tests 
-2 
R 0.92 0.92 
s. e. 0.27 0.28 
LM4 1.79 [0.15] 0.82 [0.53] 
ARCH4 1.61 [0.18] 1.46 [0.22] 
F-H 1.17 [0.33] 0.82 [0.59] 
F-Xh 1.16 [0.35] 0.85 [0.63] 
Normality 1.81 [0.40] 0.76 [0.62] 
RESET 1.07 [0.30] 1.26 [0.26] 
No asymmetry (Ho: b,, p 
b,,,,, ) 6.02 [0.00] 
No Size effects (HO: 
b,, 
2 ý0) 4.34 [0.04] 
Notes: Please refer to Table 3.2for thefootnotes. 
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Columns (i) of Table 3.4 presents the estimate of Eq. (3.6). We estimate b,, P = 
3.85 
and b,,,, =0.55. As b,,, P 
is significant at 1% but b,,,, is insignificant, it is obvious 
that we reject the null hypothesis HO : b,, P = 
b,,,, in favor of 
alternative H, : b,, P : P, - 
b,,,, . This suggests that monetary policy is nonlinear and 
policy only responds to inflation when expected inflation exceeds the target. The 
policy response to the output gap and the RER misalignment is found to be similar 
with the linear estimates. 
We next estimate the Escribano-Granger (1998) and the Escribano and Aparicio 
(1999) model, given by Eq. (3.7), which allows size asymmetries. The estimate of 
this model is presented in the last column of Table 3.4. In this case, we estimate 
b,, 
2 ý 1.02 and reject the null hypothesis that HO : b,, 2=0 against the 
altemative H, : b,,, 2 #0 at I%. The estimates of other parameters are also 
fairly 
consistent with the previous estimates. 
3.4.3.2 Formal nonlinearity tests 
The estimate of Granger and Lee (1989) and Escribano-Granger (1998) models 
suggest that monetary policy in UK may be nonlinear but as discussed earlier they do 
not provide a decisive level of nonlinearity. We now proceed to test the (non)linearity 
formally by estimating Eq. (3.8). 
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Figure 3.2: Plots of partial autocorrelation 
A. Dependent variable, i, 
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There are two crucial parameters in this model, (ý and It is suggested that the 
partial autocorrelation or alternatively Akaike information criterion can be used to 
determine the maximum possible number of 4) (Iregui et al., 2002 and van Dijik et 
al., 2002 for the detail discussion). We choose (ý=l not least because the partial 
autocorrelation of i, almost dies after the first lag (see Figure 3.2A) but also because 
the first order smoothing function provides a better estimate of reaction function 
compared to any higher order (Clarida et al. 1988). 
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Regarding the delay parameter of the transition variable, ; T, -d . we conducted a grid 
search ranging from d=4 to -4 for two reasons 
30 
. First, as shown in Figure 3.2B, the 
partial autocorrelation value of 7r, seems to be negligible only after 4 th lag. Second, it 
is argued that the Bank of England targets inflation up to the four quarter a head 
(Chadha et al. 2004). 
We estimated Eq. (3.8) for - 4: 5 d :54 and (ý = 1. We do not report the detailed 
estimates to save space but report only the probability of linearity tests. Column (i) of 
Table 3.5 reports the probability value of the null hypothesis, HO: 
A, j == 182, j = 
83, 
j =0 against the alternative 
H, : 6,, j #0 
for i= I to 3. Out of 9 
different experiments [for -4: 5d: 54 and (ý =11 in Eq. (3.8), we reject the null 
hypothesis, HO, for d={I, O, -I). The experiment was also repeated for the Taylor rule 
by excluding exchange rate misalignments from Eq. (3.8). In this case we reject the 
null hypothesis for d=f 2,1,0-1 ). However, the linearity is rejected most strongly using 
d=- I for both the Taylor rule and the augmented Taylor rule. 
30 As in Sarantis (1999), we could use an AIC and/or Schwartz criterion to select the candidate of delay 
parameter if we have relatively a large sample size and if we do not consider a forward looking 
transition variable. 
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These formal hypothesis tests confirm that monetary policy in the UK is nonlinear 
and the 7r, +, 
is the most appropriate transition variable to be used in the LSTAR and 
QLSTAR models as we reject linearity most strongly using d=- 1. 
Table 3.5: Formal linearity test* (1992Q4-2004Q2) 
(Null hypothesis Flo: )61, j = 8,,, = 83, j =0 against alternative of nonzero) 
Transition 
variable 
a) Augmented Taylor Rule 
(i) 
Taylor Rule 
(ii) 
271+1 1 0.006 0.011 
Irt 1 0.035 0.018 
0.009 0.019 
0.128 0.061 
Notes: * Based on the estimate of Eq. (3.8). Numbers in the last two columns are the 
value of LM test. 
3.4.3.3 Estimates of nonlinear reaction functions using STAR models 
After confirming nonlinearity and selecting an appropriate transition variable we 
finally proceed to estimate nonlinear monetary policy reaction functions using L- 
STAR and QL-STAR models. 
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Table 3.6: Estimates of nonlinear monetary policy reaction function 
(1992Q4-2004Q2) 
L-STAR 
(Eq. 3.9) 
QL-STAR 
(Eq. 3.10) 
0.448 (0.174)* 0.350 (0.179)** 
p 0.885 (0.031)* 0.907 (0.032)* 
ML ml 
k1l 0.834 (0.606) 1.207 (0.939) 
k12 2.326 (0.990)* 2.726 (1.323)* 
k13 0.148 (0.063)* 0.128 (0.010)* 
mu mo 
k2l 4.200 (1.206)* 5.538 (2.088)* 
k22 2.430 (1.040)* 2.552 (1.323)** 
k23 0.044 (0.022)" 0.092 (0.032)" 
r -0.310 (0.009)* 
TL -1.074 (0.218)* 
0.370 (0.031)* 
144.7 (203.4) 89.2 (921.6) 
Diagnostic Tests 
-2 
R 0.93 0.94 
n_s. e. 0.23 0.22 
SE Ratio 0.65 0.62 
AIC 0.09 0.10 
D-W Statistics 1.97 2.06 
LM4 1.01 [0.42] 1.44 [0.24] 
ARCH4 1.40 [0.24] 0.09 [0.98] 
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Heteroskedasticity 0.54 [0.84] 1.17 [0.34] 
Normality 1.57 [0.45] 1.07 [0.58] 
Hypothesis Testing 
a. Test against Linear model: k,, = 
k2i 10.01 [0.00] 13.00 [0.001 
b. Inflation Persistence: k, I : -- 
k2l 6.94 [0.01] 8.16 [0.00] 
c. Policy symmetric: ir* = (7r* -, r 
L+ 
7r* +rU )/2 
27.0 [0.00] 
d. No effective lower band: rL =0 
32.3 [0.001 
e. No effective upper band: 7- 
U 
=0 
24.0 [0.00] 
Notes: 
(a) n s. e. is the standard error of the estimate 
(b) SE Ratio = n_s. e. 1s. e where s. e. is the standard error of the linear reaction 
function which is obtainedfrom Column 3, Table 3.3. 
Please see section 3.3.2 andfootnotes of Table 3.2for the remainingfootnotes. 
Column 2 of Table 3.6 presents the L-STAR estimate, that is the estimate of Eq. 
(3.9). In this model, the interest rate, i, is jointly determined by the upper regime 
(Mu, ) and the lower regime (MLJ We estimate, -r= -0.31% which provides 
inflation threshold ( ir *-r) to be 2.19%. This implies that the economy is in the 
upper inflation regime when 7r,.,, >2.19% and consequently in the lower regime 
otherwise. 
We find that policy does not respond to inflation when the economy is in the inner 
inflation regime as we find k,, is insignificant. Instead, policy responds to the output 
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gap and RER misalignment. On the other hand, policy response to deviations of 
inflation from the target becomes vigorous followed by the output gap and the real 
exchange rate misalignment when economy is in the upper inflation regime. Notice 
that response to the output gap and the RER misalignment becomes more strong in 
the lower inflation regime compared to the response in the upper regime as we find 
k12 > k22 and k, 3 > k23 ' 
The diagnostic tests suggest that there is no sign of misspecification though a is 
found to be insignificant 31 . The DW statistics rejects the null of a unit root whilst the 
Godfrey's (Godfrey, 1988) lagrange multiplier (LM) test suggests that there is no 
autocorrelation in the residual. Moreover, the non-normality of null hypotheses is 
rejected by Jarque-Bera's test and an evidence of homoscadesticiy is clearly 
established. Also, no signal of auto regressive conditional heteroscadesticity appears 
from the fourth order condition. 
Hypothesis tests suggest that the monetary policy reaction function is nonlinear 
because we reject the null of linearity, HO : kI, = k2, for i=l to3 against the alternative 
31 Terasvirta (1994) and Van Dijik et al. (2002) argue that it should not be interpreted as an evidence of 
weak estimate because an accurate estimation of u is quite difficult in practice which requires many 
observations in the immediate neighborhood of the threshold parameter. Also, a large change in a 
have only small effect on the shape of the transition function implying that high accuracy in estimating 
a is not necessary (see also Iregui et al. 2002) 
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HI : k1l # k2, at 1% significance level. Similarly, the persistence of inflation is found 
to be different between regimes as we reject the null hypothesis HO : k, I : -- k2, against 
the altemative of H, : k, I# k2l ; k, , is not found to be significant 
32 
Panel A of Figure 3.3 shows the plot of inflation and threshold against the time. There 
are three main episodes (1993,1999 and 2003) when expected inflation was below the 
threshold. Expected inflation was above the threshold in other period but it was 
remarkably noticed in early 1995,1998 and 2000. 
We next estimate the QL-STAR model, that is, Eq. (3.10) and the empirical results are 
presented in the last column of Table 3.6. We estimate rL = -1.074%, ru = 0.37% 
and reject the null hypothesis of policy symmetry, 
HO : 7r* =(7r* -r' +,, 
* +, u)/2=2.5%, against the alternative 
H, : 7r* # (7r* _ TL + 7r* +ru)12 at 1%. We also reject the null of no effective 
lower 
boundary, HO :, rL =0, and the null of no effective upper boundary, HO :u= 
both at 1% significance level. This all imply that the policy response is clearly 
asymmetric and the BoE is trying to keep inflation within a range of 1.4% (=2.5- 
1.074) to 2.87% (=2.5+0.37) rather than hitting the target of 2.5% preciously. 
32 These tests, however, need to be treated with care because the test statistics do not follow standard 
distribution under the null hypothesis (Gregoriou and Kontonikas, 2006) - 
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Further, we find that k2, > k, II where k, , is insignificant, but k, 2 > 
k22 
and k, 3 > 
k23 
ý 
implies monetary policy is aggressive to inflation when expected inflation remains in 
the outer regime (see Martin and Milas, 2004). On the other hand, the policy response 
to y,,, - y, *+, and e, - e, * is stronger when expected inflation is in the inner inflation 
regime. Also, this model does not simplify to the benchmark model in Eq. (3.4) as 
we reject the null hypothesis Ho: klj =k21 (for all j=1 to 3) at 1% 
against H, : klj : P, - 
k2j 
* 
The QL-STAR estimate is robust and it is our preferred estimate among nonlinear 
estimates because it has the lowest standard error than any other estimates in this 
chapter. 
Panel B of Figure 3.3 plots the thresholds and inflation against time. It can be 
observed that inflation remained close to the target, i. e. within the regime boundaries, 
for most of the period except for 6 small departures from the boundaries during this 
period. 
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Figure 3.3: Plots of inflation against thresholds 
A. Plots of inflation and threshold (Based on the LSTAR estimate) 
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To sum up, the estimate of the LSTAR and QL-STAR reaction functions suggest that 
the monetary policy in UK is nonlinear and that the policy response is asymmetric. It 
also highlights the fact that the RER misalignment comes positively and significantly 
in the monetary policy reaction function but the priority of monetary policy for 
controlling the real exchange rate comes only after the stabilizing inflation and the 
output gap. 
Alternative specification 
The LSTAR and QL-STAR models as given by Eq. (3.9) and (3.10) assume that the 
lag dependent is unaffected by the inflation regime. And, the estimates, so far, show 
that interest rate is highly persistence (p =- 0.9). The main aim of these alternative 
estimates is, therefore, to test whether interest rate persistence is same in both 
regimes and whether this specification alters our main findings. 
We now relax the assumption of a single smoothing parameter and allow the lag 
dependent variable, i, -1 , 
to both regimes in Eq. (3.9) and (3.10). Therefore, we have 
two smoothing parameters (klo and k20 )in the alternative specification in both 
LSTAR and QL-STAR models as an alternative of single smoothing parameter (p) 
earlier. The detailed specification of the model is given in Appendix 3.1. 
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'rhe estimates of the alternative specification are presented in Appendix 3.2 where 
the second column gives the estimate of the LSTAR model whereas the last column 
presents the estimate of the QL-STAR model. We estimate the threshold parameter 
r= -0.370% (implies inflation threshold to be 2.13%) using the alternative LSTAR 
model which is slightly lower than that of the main estimate. Similarly, we 
estimate, rL = -1.089% and r" = 0.728% employing the alternative QL-STAR 
model where the lower threshold is almost same to the main estimate but the upper 
threshold is slightly higher. 
Most importantly, we do not reject the null hypothesis that HO : k1o = k2o against 
H, : kjo # k20 in both models. This implies that the interest rate persistence is not 
affected by the inflation regime. 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter models the monetary policy for UK for the ongoing inflation targeting 
era using both the linear and variety of nonlinear monetary policy reaction functions. 
The main contributions of this chapter are the empirical findings that 
(a) Monetary policy in UK responds to asset prices together with deviations of 
inflation from the target and the output gap. 
III 
(b) The monetary policy rule is nonlinear and policy response is asymmetric. 
Moreover, the policy response to inflation is more vigorous when expected 
inflation is not close to the target. On the other hand policy does not respond to 
inflation when expected inflation is close to the target, 
(c) The policy response to the output gap and RER misalignment also depends on the 
inflation regime. The response to the output gap and the RER misalignment 
becomes relatively stronger when the economy is in the inner inflation regime 
compared to a sluggish response when the economy is in the outer inflation 
regime, 
(d) Interest rate persistence is found to be high, around 0.9. This is not affected by 
the inflation regime, and finally, 
(e) Policyrnakers are attempting to keep the inflation within a band of 1.42% - 2.87% 
rather than attempting to hit a target of 2.5%. 
Our work could be extended in different ways. First, it would be interesting to include 
house prices and share prices in nonlinear estimates as these variables are found to be 
significant in the linear estimates. 
Second, our model assumes that inflation is the only source of nonlinearity. In 
practice, however, nonlinearity may arise due to the output gap and RER 
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misalignment. Therefore, it would be interesting to estimate nonlinear models 
allowing regimes for the output gap and the RER misalignment. 
Third, although this chapter does not acknowledge the role of the foreign interest rates 
in the conduct of monetary policy, this variable might be important in practice, 
especially, in an open economy. 
Fourth, we assumed that policy response to inflation is same between a high inflation 
and a low inflation period as the outer regime combines both of them. This 
assumption may not be true in practice. We address these issues in the following 
chapters. 
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Chapter 4 
Nonlinear and Asymmetric Monetary policy in UK: 
Evidence from the open economy Taylor rule 
4.1 Introduction 
The Bank of England (BoE) has been targeting inflation since October 1992. The 
objective was to keep inflation within a range of 1%-4% over the period of Oct 1992 
to April 1997 though a medium term target of 2.5% was also announced in June 1995. 
The target range was abolished in May 1997 and introduced an explicit point target of 
2.5%. Since then, the bank is required to give a formal explanation to the government 
in case if inflation deviates for more than 1% in either direction from the target 
(Bernanke et al., 1999). It implies that a high inflation and a low inflation are 
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equally bad for monetary policy. But does the BoE consider a low and a high inflation 
equally bad in practice? 
In the previous chapter we found that policy does not respond to inflation when 
expected inflation is close to the target. We also found that the BoE has been 
attempting to keep inflation within a range rather than hitting a point target in 
practice. But it does not describe the issue we raised. This chapter, therefore, extends 
the previous chapter in two different ways. 
First, although we estimated various nonlinear models in chapter 3, the conclusion 
was mainly based on the estimate of the quadratic logistic smooth transition 
autoregressive (QL-STAR) model. One of the limitations of this model is that it 
provides only two regimes, the inner and outer, where the outer regime combines the 
lower and the upper regime. This chapter, therefore, seeks to analyze whether policy 
response to large negative deviations and large positive deviations of inflation from 
the target is the same. To do so, we use a three-regime smooth transition 
autoregressive (STAR) model which provides lower, inner and upper inflation 
regimes. 
Second, the previous chapter addressed the issue of the open economy by estimating 
an exchange rate augmented Taylor rule. The literature, however, argues that 
monetary policy also responds to the foreign interest rate. There are at least two 
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strands of literature that finds an active role of the foreign interest rate in the conduct 
of domestic monetary policy. 
Firstly, many empirical studies assess the relevance of the foreign interest rates by 
including them in a Taylor rule. For instance, Adam et al. (2005), Angeloni and 
Dedola (1999), among others, find that UK monetary policy responds to the US and 
German interest rates together with the output gap and inflation. They argue that the 
BoE is more concerned with the foreign interest rates than with the real exchange rate. 
Secondly, there is a vast amount of literature related to purchasing power parity, 
interest rates convergence and the interest rate volatility, which overwhelmingly 
suggest that the interest rates across the countries converge in the long run. More 
specifically, the literature argues that the US world-wide dominance hypothesis in 
general and the German lead hypothesis in particular for the case of European 
countries hold, meaning other countries around the globe just follow the interest rate 
movements of these two countries. The contribution of Caporale et al. 1996, Awad et 
al. 1998; Barassi et al., 2003; Homes and Marghrebi, 2005, among others; show that 
the UK is not the exception of this tradition 33 . The convergence of the 
domestic short 
term interest rates to the foreign interest rates implies that monetary policy responds 
to the foreign interest rate. 
33 A detailed discussion of this class of literature is beyond the scope of this chapter. 
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Therefore, taking these two issues into account, this chapter mainly estimates the 
foreign interest rate augmented Taylor rule using a three regime smooth transition 
autoregressive model for the ongoing inflation targeting regime in UK. The empirical 
estimates provide ample evidences that the aim of monetary policy is to keep inflation 
within a range rather than pursuing a point target of 2.5%. We find that the monetary 
policy in UK has a deflationary bias as it does not respond to inflation when the 
expected inflation is below the lower band, respond mildly when it is within the bands 
and reacts more vigorously when it exceeds the upper band. By contrast, the policy 
response to the output gap is stronger when economy is in the lower inflation regime 
compared to a sluggish response when it is in the inner or upper regimes. We also find 
that the policy reaction to the foreign interest rate is not affected by the inflation 
regime. 
The structure of the rest of this chapter is as follows. Section 4.2 presents the 
methodology followed by the description of data in section 4.3. Section 4.4 delivers 
the empirical results. Section 4.5 provides classification of observations over inflation 
regimes followed by impact analysis in section 4.6. Section 4.7 provides some 
robustness analysis. Finally, section 4.8 concludes the chapter. 
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4.2 Methodology 
4.2.1 Linear reaction function 
Following Clarida et al. (1998,2000) and Adam et al. (2005), among others, we first 
consider the foreign interest rate augmented linear Taylor rule. 
I*+c,, (E, -, /Tl+j + cy 
[E, p if -1 
(yt+k 
- Yt+k 
ot I+ Cif 
t 
Where, i *is the desired nominal interest rate when both inflation and output are at 
their target levels; Q, is the information set available to policyrnakers while setting 
interest rates at time t; E, -, 
is the expectation formed at t given the information of t-1. 
El-, 7rt+j I Q, is the expected inflation at time t for t+j, 'T 
T is the targeted rate of 
1, inflation; E, 
-l 
(Y,,, - Yt+k) 
10, is the expected output gap at time t for t+k; and if is 
the foreign interest rate at time t. 
Eq. (4.1) is a forward looking open economy Taylor rule in which the desired short 
term nominal interest rate, i, * , 
is determined by the combination of expected 
deviations of inflation from the target, E, -, 
7r, 
+j 
I Q, - ir 
T, the expected output gap, 
Pf Et 
-I 
(Y,,, - Yi+k ) IQ, , and the 
foreign interest rate, i, . 
The interpretation of the model 
is straightforward. The central bank aims to stabilize inflation if the parameter c,, >I 
while a destabilizing policy takes place otherwise. A similar logic applies to the 
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output gap and to the foreign interest rates. We expect cy >0 if the policy stabilizes the 
output gap. We expect cf >0 if policy responds to the foreign interest rates (Clarida et 
al., 2000 and Chadha et. al., 2004). 
Eq. (4.1) provides a policy framework where the authority attempts to attain the desire 
rate all the time, which may be needed a frequent policy reversal in response to 
deviations of inflation from the target and the output gap. This approach to monetary 
policy is not desirable in practice. It is argued that a good monetary policy should not 
be reversed frequently in order to assure the private sector confidence in the economy 
and also to minimize any adverse effects of policy changes in the capital market 34 . For 
this reasons, we assume that the central bank operates smoothing changes in the 
interest rates rather than adopting an immediate reactive type of policy measures 
(Clarida et al. 2000). This type of policy behavior can be summarized as 35 : 
i, = pi, -, + 
(I - P)il + vi v, - iid(O, u') (4.2) 
Eq. (4.2) states that the observed interest rate, i, is the weighted average of a desired 
rate, i, ., and the previous period rate, where pE (0, I) is the smoothing parameter 
34 Detailed discussions can be found in Goodfriend (1987) and Clarida et al. (1998 and 2000), among 
others. 
35 We assumed the first order partial autocorrelation function but a higher order is also possible 
(Calrida et al. 1998) 
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which determines the degree of policy change. A higher value of p implies that 
policy response takes place more gradually. 
When combining Eq. (4.1) and Eq. (4.2) yields 
-)T 
T)+C Ep (4.3) y 1-1 
(Yt+k - Yt+k) + Cf, 
f + 6, 
Eq. (4.3) is the final estimable linear reaction function where 1- the equilibrium interest 
rate and e, is the sum of a linear combination of a pure stochastic errors and forecast 
errors of inflation and the output gap, conditional on their information set, Q, , at time 
t where c, is assumed to be orthogonal to Q, (see Clarida et al., 2000 and Chadha et 
al. 2004 for the detail discussion). 
There is a consensus in the literature that policyrnakers consider at least up to four 
quarter lags of interest rates, inflation, and the output gap as information set, Q, ý 
while taking monetary policy decision. Therefore, testing the orthogonality condition 
in Eq. (4.3) surely implies a test of over identifying restriction as the total number of 
instruments exceed the total number parameters to be estimated (Newey and West, 
1987 and Davidson and Mackinnon, 1993). The null hypothesis may be defined as the 
over identifying restriction is satisfied in which case accepting the null implies that 
central banks adjust interest rates in each period so that Eq. (4.3) holds; the model is 
mis-specified otherwise. 
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4.2.2 Nonlinear reaction function 
Based on the benchmark linear reaction function as given by Eq. (4.3), we now 
formulate a nonlinear monetary policy reaction function using the three regime 
smooth transition autoregressive model 36 (van Dijk et. al., 2002). 
i, =i*+pi, -, +(I-p)[M,, 
O,,, +M,, O, +M,, (I-OL, -01, )]+E, 
Where, 
TrL+ exp{-7(T, 
+d _7rT 
+. rL)/07, 
r 
) ]-I OLI = 
Pr(OT, 
+d - 'T (4.5) 
01, = Pr 
fr L 
-< 
07t+d 
- 'r 
T):! ý -r" ) 
[I + exp(-15(/7, +d _ ; TT + rL 
)(/71+d _ ; rT -TU U2 
)1-1 (4.6) 
Tt+j _ 7rT) 
1, f 
MLI "": CIIEI-I(, (4.7) + C12EI-I 
(Yi+k - Yl+k) + CIA 
m it 
= _, TT) 
p (4.8) C, jE, -1 
(7rl+j + C22Et-I (Yl+k - Yt+k) + C23'lf 
=c E 
(; rl +j _ 
7r T)E, -Yý+,, )+c if (4.9) mul 31 1-1 + C32 -1 
(Yl+k 
t+ 33 
L 
, Y>O, t5>0 and 1. ,: ý,. 
U 
Eq. (4.4) states that i, is a weighted average of the "lower regime", ML, the "inner 
regime", M,,, and the "upper regime" Mu, where 0,0, and (I-OL, -O,, ) are 
36 See Chapter 5 for the detailed discussion. 
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corresponding regime weights. In this model, inflation regimes are classified by the 
LU 
lower threshold, r, and the upper threshold, 7- 
More specifically, 0,., is the probability that expected inflation is less than the lower 
threshold K ý71+d - 7r T )< -C ] whilst 0,, is another probability that it is between two 
thresholds [rL : ýý (ýrf+d - 'r 
T ),,,, 
ru ]. This implies (I - OL, - Oj, ) is the probability that 
U 
expected inflation exceeds the upper threshold [(7r,, d - ir )> r] where d is the time 
horizon of the transition variable, often known as the "delay parameter". 
Eq. (4.7), (4.8) and (4.9) are augmented Taylor rules as similar to Eq. (4.1). The 
interest rate is solely determined by Eq. (4.7), that is MLI . when 
07, 
+d - 
ýT 
7) 
<TL 
while it determines by Eq. (4.9), that is Mu, when (1r, +d _ 7r 
T) ýý. T 11. Policymakers 
set interest rate based on Eq. (4.8), i. e. M,,, when rL<(; Tt+d _ IrT rU 
Equation (4.5) is a logistic function that allows for symmetric adjustments to positive 
L 
and negative deviations of transition variable, ý7, +d _7rT , relative to 'r where 0,,, 
changes monotonically from 0 to I as 'T, +d _ 'TT increases. The slope parameter, Y, 
determines the smoothness of changes in the value of OL, . When r -> 
0, OL, becomes a 
constant and when Y -> +110 , the transition 
from OL, =O to OL, =l becomes 
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L 
instantaneous at 7r, +d - 7r 
7. 
= 7- . Following Granger and Terasvirta (1993) and 
Terasvirta (1994) we make Y dimension free by dividing it by the standard deviation 
of 171. 
Equation (4.6) is a quadratic logistic function, which gives the probability 
that, r L -< 
(7rl 
+d - 7r 
"):! ý .u. This function has two important properties: (a) 
0,, becomes constant as (5 -> 0 and (b) as 5 --> x, 01, =1 if 
-r 
L<(; 
rt+d - /T 
T):! 
ý -, u and 01, =0 if (7rl+d _ ; rT) < rL or (; T, +d - /T 
T)ý,. 
ru. Following 
Granger and Terasvirta (1993), J is made dimension free by dividing it by the 
variance of 7r, . 
The nonlinear reaction function, Eq. (4.4) simplifies to the linear reaction function in 
(4.3) if Hol: cli ::::::: C2i :- C3i for all i=(l to 3) (Luukkonen et al., 1988, Terasvirta, 
1994 and van Dijk et. al., 2002). Similarly, the model simplifies to the two regime 
quadratic logistic smooth transition autoregressive model in Eq. (3.10) of Chapter 3 if 
H02: CI I :- C12 -= C13 :::: 
0 or if H 02 :Y=0. Finally, the model simplifies to the two 
regime logistic smooth transition autoregressive model in Eq. (3.9) of Chapter 3 if 
H03: C21 C22 = C23 
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In this model, we assess whether the policy response to inflation is symmetric by 
testing a null hypothesis H04 : [(7rT _ rL )+(; rT +ru)]/2=2.5`/` against an 
alternative hypothesis H, 4 
: [(, T 
7' 
_. r 
L)+ (7r T +-ru)]12: #2.5%. Rejecting the null 
implies that the policy is asymmetric. 
4.3 The data 
Similar to chapter 3 and 5 but with a more expanded sample, we use quarterly data for 
UK over the period of 1992Q4 to 2005Q4. The three month Treasury Bill rate is used 
as a measure of the short term interest rate, i, and the year-on-year change in the 
retail price index (RPI) as a measure of inflation, ir, . The targeted rate of inflation, 
T 
7r , is assumed to be 2.5%. 
We use real GDP as a measure of output, y, and obtain potential output, y, p, using 
the Hodrick-Prescott (1997) de-trending technique. The output gap is then computed 
as the difference between the actual and potential output, y, - yP. Finally, the US 
Federal fund rate is employed as a measure of the foreign nominal interest rate, if . 
The data is obtained from the IFS collected by DataStream. The statistical properties 
of variables are available in Chapter 3 and 5. Figure 4.1 and 4.2 provide the plots of 
variables. 
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Figure 4.1: Domestic and foreign nominal interest rates (1992Q4-2005Q4) 
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Figure 4.2: Inflation and the output gap (1992Q4 - 2005Q4) 
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Note: the left vertical axis measures the inflation and the right axis measure 
the output gap. 
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4.4. Empirical results and discussion 
Our initial experiments suggest that a one-period-ahead forward looking augmented 
Taylor rule provides the best estimate of Eq. 4.3. This is consistent with the literature 
(Adam et al. 2005, Nelson, 2000, Martin and Milas, 2004). Therefore, unless 
otherwise stated, we use j=k=l and 1=0 as the time horizons of variables for all 
reported estimates. 
Column (i) of Table 4.1 provides estimates of the linear reaction function, i. e. Eq. 
(4.3). A constant and up to five lags of interest rates, inflation and the output gap are 
used as instrument set for the estimate. In this estimate, the parameters are correctly 
signed and are significant at 1% and the overidentifying restriction is also satisfied. 
Moreover, the dynamic stability criterion is fulfilled as we find p,, >l (Martin and 
Milas, 2004, Clarida et. al., 1998 and Adam et. al. 2005) obtaining the size of 
parameters as 0, > pj, > Oif , suggesting that policy reaction to 
inflation is more 
vigorous followed by the output gap and then the foreign interest rate. 
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Table 4.1: Linear and nonlinear GMM estimates (1992Q4 - 2005Q4) 
Parameters\models Linear Estimate"P 
(i) 
Unrestricted 
Nonlinear 
estimate' 
(ii) 
Restricted 
nonlinear estimate' 
0.635 (0.187)* 0.783 (0.090)* 0.679 (0.089)* 
P 0.758 (0.057)* 0.740 (0.025)* 0.799 (0.024)* 
C, or c, 1.609 (0.413)* 0.951 (0.613) 
CY or C12 1.074 (0.449)** 1.714 (0.405)* 2.111 (0.382)* 
C if or C, 3 0.426 (0.045)* 0.295 (0.085)* 0.221 (0.057)* 
C21 1.150 (0.216)* 1.512 (0.282)* 
C22 1.852 (0.337)* 1.447 (0.344)* 
C23 0.318 (0.046)* 0.221 (0.057)* 
C31 2.257 (0.188)* 2.203 (0.306)* 
C32 1.786 (0.228)* 1.447 (0.344)* 
C33 0.270 (0.028)* 0.221 (0.057)* 
33.978 (43.53) 33.978 (43.53) 
366-019 (243.43) 366.019(243.43) 
TL -0.859 (0.150)* -0.859 (0.150)* 
Tu 0.314 (0.025)* 0.314 (0.025)* 
-2 
R 0.872 0.895 0.923 
Standard error 0.367 0.332 
- 
0.281 
Normality 0.082 [0.959] [O. Ill] 4.881 3.022 [0.221] 
J-statistics jp_value) 0.534 (0.971) 0.215 fO. 875) 0.243 (0.891) 
Hypothesis Tests 
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Hol Cli «= C2i C31 = 1,2,3) 13.763 [0.000] 
H02 Cl 1= C12 C13 
0 15.943 [0.000] 
H03 C21 = C22 C23 0 43.353 [0.000] 
H04 [(2rT 
_ 7. 
L )+ 
(ir T+ u)] /2=2.5% 
17.509 [0.000] 
HO5 /7 
T 
_iL 1.5% 2.154 [0.161] 
H06 7r 
T+ iu 3.5% 54.106 [0.00] 
H07 C21 = C31 10.533 [0.000] 
HO8 C22 = C32 0.453 [0.5931 
Hog C13 = C23 C33 13.763 [0.200] 
Note: 
(a) Superscripts I and I indicate the estimate of Eq. (4.3) and Eq. (4.4) respectively. 
(b) The interest rate, deviations of inflation ftom the target and the output gap are 
considered to be endogenous variables. 
(c) j=k= I and 1=0 is used as time horizon of variablesfor all estimates. 
() are standard errors, [] are probability values of the test statistics and () are 
probability values of the test that the over identified restriction is satisfied under 
null. 
Normality is the F-test for normality. J-statistics is the value of the GMM 
objective function. 
(fi A constant and up to 5 lags of all variables are used as instrument set for 
estimates. 
1(g) 
* and indicate significant at I% and 5% respectively. , tL/ 
(h) Three restrictions are imposed in column (iii): c, I=0, 
C-1-1 = C32 
, and 
--ý C C13 C23 " 33 
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As discussed, the linear estimate does not offer all the issues raised in the beginning 
of this chapter even though the estimate is robust. We, therefore, estimate the 
nonlinear reaction function, Eq. (4.4). The estimation procedure closely follows the 
work of van-Dijk and Franses (1999), Madsen and Milas (2005) and Arghyrou et al. 
(2005). To start with, we use the estimated parameters of the linear reaction function 
as the initial values for all augmented Taylor rules in Eq. (4.4); fix the time horizon of 
variables similar to the linear estimate O=k=l and 1=0); and conduct a grid-search for 
thresholds, slope and the delay parameter to arrive at the best possible estimate. 
Column (ii) of Table 4.1 reports the estimate of Eq. (4.4) using one period ahead 
expected deviations of inflation from the target as transition variable 
37 
, 7r, +, - 7r 
T, 
which produces relatively a better result than any other specification. We do not reject 
the overidentifying restriction, suggesting that the instrument set is orthogonal to the 
error term. Clearly, the nonlinear estimate outperforms the linear estimate in various 
ways 38 . The standard error 
has reduced significantly in the nonlinear model compared 
to the linear one. The linearity test rejects the linear model as HO, is rejected. Also, 
37 We experiment various leads and lags as a candidate of the delay parameter but find a better result 
using d=1. Chapter 3 provides more discussion about this. 
Although the slope parameters (y and 15 ) are found to be insignificant, it is not an evidence of 
weak nonlinearity. It is because an accurate estimate of these parameters is not possible if the sample 
size is relatively small like we have (see Terasvirta 1994, Van Dijk et al., 2002, and Lekkos et al., 
2006 for more discussion). 
IN 
the three regime model can not be simplified either to the QLSTAR model in Eq. 
(3.10) or LSTAR model in Eq. (3.9) because we decisively reject H 02 and H03 * 
We obtain a number of interesting findings from this estimate. First, we estimate 
regime boundaries to be r= -0.859% and rU=0.314% and find both of them to be 
significant at 1%. This implies that the UK monetary policyrnakers consider three 
distinct inflation regimes for the policy purpose in practice. The economy is in the 
lower inflation regime when ; r, +, -; r 
T< -0.859% (i. e. ir, +, < 
1.64 1% as we have 
Ir T =2.5%) and in the upper inflation regime when ir, +, - 7r 
T>0.314% (i. e. 
7r, +, > 
2.8 1%). The economy is in the inner inflation regime 
when 1.64%:! ý ; rt+l :52.81 
Second, we reject the null hypothesis, H 04 : [(; r 
T-TL)+ (7rT + u)] /2=2.5% at I%, 
suggesting that monetary policy in UK is asymmetric. As the BoE has to give a 
formal explanation to the government if inflation exceeds 3.5% or falls below 1.5%, 
we test whether the estimated lower boundary is equivalent to 1.5%, i. e. 
H05 : 7r 
T_ iL 
= 1.5%, and the upper boundary is equivalent to 3.5%, i. e., 
H06 : ýT 
T+iu=3.5 %. Interestingly, we do not rej ect H05 but strongly rej ect H06 . The 
estimates of thresholds and their symmetric tests, therefore, indicate that policyrnakers 
are more conscious with positive deviations of expected inflation from the target 
compared to the negative ones. 
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Third, we find that c, l is insignificant but 
C21 and C3, are significant at I% with 
C31 > c, ,. Further we strongly reject the null hypothesis that 
H07 : C21 :- C31 . This all 
implies that monetary policy has a deflationary bias because it does not respond to 
inflation when expected inflation is less than the lower threshold 39 ( 7r 1+1 < 
1.64). But 
it responds to inflation vigorously when expected inflation exceeds the upper 
threshold (ir, +, > 
2.81 ). The reaction to inflation is mild when expected inflation 
remains in the inner regime (1.64:! ý :! ý 2.81 ). 
Fourth, we observe that policy reaction to the output gap depends on the inflation 
regime. The response to the output gap is stronger in the lower inflation regime 
compared to responses in other two regimes. Further, we find that policy response to 
the output gap between the inner and upper inflation regime does not vary because we 
estimateC22 == 1.85, C32 = 1.77 and do not reject a null hypothesis that they are equal, 
i. e. H08 : C22 '" 32 '-ý C 
Finally, we find that policy response to the foreign interest rate is mild but is 
unaffected by the inflation regimes. We estimate C, 3 = 0.30, C23 = 0.32, and 
39 The finding however should be taken cautiously because there are only 9 observations in the lower 
regime. 
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C33 : -- 0.27 but do not reject the null hypothesis that they are equal, i. e. 
Hog : C13 :- C23 = C33 * 
Based on hypotheses tests, we estimate a more restrictive version of Eq. 4.4 by 
imposing three restrictions on the parameter estimates. They are c, , =0, 
C22 = C32 and 
C -= C23 = C33 Column (iii) of Table 4.1 presents the empirical results, which are our 13 ' 
preferred estimates because this estimate provides the smallest standard error than any 
other estimates and the parameters are correctly signed and significant. 
4.5. Classification of observations 
Figure 4.3 provides a plot of two thresholds, expected inflation, targeted rate of 
TL 
inflation and the "target zone" together. The estimated two thresholds ( 7r -r 
1.64% and 7r 
T 
+T 
U=2.81%) 
provide three regimes: the lower, inner and the upper 
T 
regimes. The target rate ( 7r = 2.5%) is obviously plotted between the upper and the 
lower inflation thresholds. Finally, the shaded area in between 1.5% and 3.5% is 
defined as the "target zone" because the BoE does not have to give any explanation to 
the government if inflation remains within this area. 
There are 9 quarters out of total 53 in our sample period (late 1993,99Q2-Q4 and 
01 Q4-02Q3) when expected inflation was below the lower threshold (1.64%). There 
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are five episodes (1995,97Q3-98Q4,2000,2003,04Q3-05Q3) when inflation 
exceeded the upper threshold and expected inflation was maintained within our 
estimated bands of 1.64% to 2.81% in other periods. 
When observing the "target zone", we find that inflation never crossed the upper 
boundary of 3.5% except for three quick jumps in the 1990s when the exchange rate 
was appreciated. On the other hand, there are three small episodes in early inflation 
targeting period, in 1999 and 2001 when inflation fell below 1.5% for which the 
movement of asset prices in general and the fall in house prices in particular is 
blamed. 
Figure 4.3: Inflation and thresholds (1992Q4 - 2005Q4) 
4. 
3. 
3. 
2. 
2. 
I. 
1. 
zT+ rU = 2.81 
zT=2.5 
7r _TL = 1.64 
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4.6. Impact analysis 
The linear model as given by Eq. (4.3) has a constant impact on the interest rate 
irrespective to the positive/negative or big/small deviations of inflation from the 
target. The estimate shows that I% increase in the deviation of inflation from the 
target increases the interest rates by 1.6%. 
The impact analysis in nonlinear reaction function is not straightforward. We obtain 
nonlinear impacts using the formula given below (Martin and Milas, 2004 and 
Arghyrou et al., 2005) 
; r, 
mpact 
: -- Cl I 
OD + C21 Oft + C31 (1 - 
OLI 
- 
Oft ) (4.10) 
Figure 4.4 plots the nonlinear impact of deviations of inflation from the target on the 
interest rate. We clearly observe that the interest rate has decreased in a period when 
expected inflation was below the lower threshold while it increased when expected 
inflation exceeded the upper band in most of the period. We, therefore, argue that our 
nonlinear model has been able to describe the behavior of UK monetary policy more 
accurately. 
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Figure 4.4: The nonlinear impact of inflation on interest rate (1992Q4-2005Q4) 
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b. The left vertical axis measures irj. p,, c, and the right vertical axis measure 
i, 
4.7. Robustness analysis 
Although the linear and nonlinear estimates discussed above are the best among 
various experiments, we report some of the alternative nonlinear specifications to give 
more insights of the policy behaviour. 
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Table 4.2: Alternative nonlinear specifications: GMM estimates 
(1992Q4 - 2005Q4) 
Estimates (i) (ii) (iii) 
i* 0.349 (0.053)* 0.750 (0.068)* 0.683 (0.150)* 
p 0.880 (0.010)* 0.827 (0.021)* 0.822 (0.052)* 
C12 3.726 (0.707)* 3.916 (1.118)* 2.171 (1.097)* 
C13 0.299 (0.054)* 0.185 (0.061)* 0.285 (0.118)* 
C21 2.045 (0.311)* 1.293 (0.202)* 1.464 (0.869)* 
C22 2.659 (0.252)* 1.472 (0.396)* 1.141 (0.636)* 
C23 0.299 (0.054)* 0.185 (0.061)* 0.285 (0-118)* 
C31 2 . 854 (0.327)* 2.735 (0-573)* 
2.620 (0.394)* 
C32 2.659 (0.252)* 1.472 (0.396)* 1.141 (0-636)* 
C33 0.299 (0.054)* 0.185 (0.061)* 0.285 (0-118)* 
33.978 (43.533) 33.978 (43.533) 120.450(80.432) 
366.019(243.434) 366.019(243.434) 79.819 (220.32) 
TL -0.859 (0.150)* -0.859 (0.150)* -0.739 (0.150)* 
T 11 0.314 (0.025)* 0.314 (0.025)* 0.200 (0.059)* 
-2 
R 0.896 0.909 0.920 
Standard error 0.330 0.308 0.289 
Normality 3.871 [0.183] 0.634 [0.598] 2.673 [0.291] 
J-statistics 0.223 0.246 0.415 
p-value 0.984 0.921 0.977 
Note: 
(a) column (i) uses the European money market rate as an alternative to the Federal 
fund rate. Column (ii) uses j=k=2 as time horizon of inflation and output gap 
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instead ofj=k=l earlier. Column (iii) employ ; r, -, - 7r 
T as transition variable as 
an alternative to z,., -z 
(b) Column (i) and (ii) imposes the same thresholds and slope parameters which are 
presented in column (ii) of Table 4.1 
(c) See the footnotes of Table 4. . 
1for other explanations. 
First, we use the European money market rate as an alternative to the US interest rate 
in Eq. (4.4). The estimate is reported in column (i) of Table 4.2 where we imposed the 
same threshold and slope parameters as before. Using this variable does not alter our 
main findings. 
Second, the literature also argues that the BoE has a target horizon up to one year 
ahead (Chadha et al., 2004 and Adam et al., 2005 for example). We, therefore, 
attempt to estimate Eq. (4.4) using the same thresholds and slope parameters but 
altering the time horizon of expected inflation and the output gap up to four quarter 
ahead. As we find more or less similar results from all experiments, we report the 
estimate of two period ahead target horizons of inflation and output gap O=k=2 and 
1=0) as an alternative to one period ahead in Column (ii) of Table 4.2. Notice that this 
estimate also carries the same thresholds and slope parameters as estimated before. 
We also experiment various delay parameter in the transition function. Column (iii) of 
Table 4.2 reports the alternative estimate using 7r, _l _ 7r 
T as transition variable in both 
transition functions, an alternative to ; r, +, - 7r 
T earlier. In this case, we estimate r=- 
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u 0.739% and r=0.200% and find both of them to be significant at 1%. This confirms 
the reliability of our main estimate. 
4.8 Conclusion 
This chapter models the UK monetary policy for the post 1992 period accounting for 
open economy effects. There are two specific objectives of this chapter. First, we 
assessed whether or not monetary authorities consider a large negative and a large 
positive deviation of inflation from the target equally bad? And second, whether or 
not monetary policy responds to the open economic effects by responding to the 
foreign interest rates. And if yes, whether the degree of responsiveness affects by the 
inflation regime? 
We estimate a foreign interest rate augmented Taylor rule using the three regime 
smooth transition autoregressive model and find a number of new findings for the UK 
monetary policy. First, we observe that monetary policy is forward looking and 
nonlinear; and policy response is asymmetric. Second, we find that monetary policy 
in UK has a deflationary bias because it does not respond to inflation when the 
expected inflation is below the lower band, respond mildly when it is within the bands 
and respond more rigorously when it exceeds the upper band. On the other hand, 
policy reaction to the output gap becomes more vigorous when economy is in the 
lower inflation regime compared to a sluggish respond when it is in the inner or upper 
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regimes. Third, we find that policy always addresses to the effects of open economy 
by responding to the foreign interest rate irrespective to the inflation regime although 
the response is mild. 
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Chapter 5 
The complex response of Monetary Policy 
40 
5.1 Introduction 
It is obvious that inflation is the central focus of monetary policy in UK as the Bank 
of England targets it explicitly. However, that does not imply that policy always only 
responds to inflation. Recent literature suggests that the UK policyrnakers respond to 
inflation together with asset prices and the output gap though the way that the policy 
responds to inflation may be different than the response to asset prices and the output 
gap (Clarida et al. 1998, Chadha et. al 2004, Bec et al. 2002, Martin and Milas, 2004). 
40 An earlier version of this chapter was presented in a staff seminar in Brunei University on March 8, 
2006.1 am grateful to participants for their helpful comments. 
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We attempted to address a part of this issue in the previous chapter and found that the 
UK monetary policy is nonlinear and policy only responds to asset prices together 
with inflation when expected inflation is far from the target4 1. This finding is vague 
and raises several questions. Does policy still respond to asset prices when asset price 
misalignment is small but inflation is far from the target? What is the policy response 
of the Bank of England when asset price misalignment is high but inflation is close to 
the target? Does the exchange rate adequately capture the open economy effect or 
does policy respond to the foreign interest rate as well as the exchange rate? The 
empirical literature, to our knowledge, is unclear on this point. 
This chapter, therefore, aims to answer these questions systematically. In order to 
analyze these complex response of monetary policy, we begin by analyzing whether 
policyrnakers consider a separate asset price regime together with as inflation regime 
in the conduct of monetary policy, such that policy response on asset prices and 
inflation varies with large and small asset price misalignments and/or large and small 
deviations of inflation from the target. To do this, we employ multiple regime smooth 
transition autoregressive (MRSTAR) model (van Dijk and Franses, 1999). This model 
is flexible in nature and allows us to define multiple regimes using different types of 
asymmetries. In this chapter, we use two regimes for asset price misalignments and 
two regimes for inflation, making a total of four regimes, which we believe is 
sufficient to address the issues raised above. 
41 See chapter 3 and 4 for other findings. 
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The major contributions of this chapter are as follows. First, monetary policy in UK 
has regimes for both the exchange rate and inflation. We find that the Bank of 
England responds to inflation and exchange rate only when they are in their outer 
regimes. More precisely, the Bank responds to the exchange rate only if domestic 
currency undervaluation is more than 4.4% or overvaluation exceeds 5.1 %. Similarly, 
policy only responds to inflation when expected inflation is less than 2% or greater 
than 2.75%. 
Second, the policy response to exchange rate misaligmnent does not depend on the 
inflation regime but the response to inflation depends on the exchange rate regime. 
Third, policyrnakers only respond to output gap when they do not respond to asset 
prices and inflation, that is, when inflation and/or the exchange rate are in their inner 
regimes. 
Fourth, exchange rate misalignment does not capture the full effect of the open 
economy as the Bank of England also responds to the foreign interest rate together 
with the REER misalignment. More specifically, we find that the behaviour of UK 
monetary policy is better described by a model which also includes the foreign 
interest rate. The response to the foreign interest rate, however, is not affected by the 
inflation and exchange rate regimes or by any other variables. 
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The plan of this chapter is as follows. Section 5.2 presents a brief literature review. 
Section 5.3 describes the methodology followed by the empirical estimates in section 
5.4. Finally, section 5.5 concludes the chapter. 
5.2. Multiple-regime STAR models in economics 
5.2.1. Statistical model 
5.2.1.1. Two regime model 
MRSTAR model is a simple extension of the two regime smooth transition 
autoregressive (STAR) family models. We, therefore, begin with two regime models 
and then consider the multiple-regime case. As discussed in Luukkonen et al. (1988), 
Terasvirta and Anderson (1992), and Terasvirta (1994), the two regime STAR model 
can be written as: 
Y, =0, X, G(S,;; Vlr)+02X, (1-G(s,; y, r»+u, u, - iid(0, U2) 
where, x, = (1,5ý) , 
5ý, = (y .......... Y, -, 
)', Oi =(Oi, oý0, 0, )', 
(5.1) 
and i=1,2; and 
G(s,; y, r) is a continuous transition ftinction bounded between zero and one. 
Following Terasvirta and Anderson (1992) and Terasvirta(1994), we consider two 
alternative definitions of the transition ftinction, G(s,; y, -r). First, the logistic ftinction 
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7-) =I- [I +e 
I-Y(Sl-d -")10' 
21 
1-1; 7>0 (5.2) 
and second, the exponential function 
G(s,; y, -r) =I-e 
I-Y(Sl-d 
_,. )2 IaI; 
v>0 (5.3) 
In both equations, s, is the transition variable with d as the delay parameter or the 
time horizon of the transition variable. The literature offers at least four different ways 
of defining s, (van Dijk et al., 2002). It can be a lag dependent variable, an exogenous 
variable, a time trend or any functional form. y is the slope variable which 
determines the smoothness of the change in the value of G(s,; y, r) and thus the speed 
of transition from one regime to another; -r is the threshold between two regimes. a 
is the standard deviation and a' is the varianceofS, -d ý which makes y scale-free and 
yields easier interpretation (Granger and Terasvirta, 1993). 
The logistic function (5.2) depicts a S-shape around -r. It monotonically increases 
along with S, -d and yields an asymmetric adjustment 
toward equilibrium for both 
Sl-d >r and St-d <r -In this case G (s, ; y, -r) -> 0 when 
S, 
-d-)ý -oo and G(s,; y, r) -> I 
whenS, -d -+ +oo ; 
thus G(s,; y, r) is bounded between 0 and I where G(s,;, v, r) =0.5 
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'fSl-d ýr -In the extreme case, when y -> 0, G(s,; y, r) becomes a constant 
if y -> oo , there is a sharp transition at S, -d = 'r where 
G(s,;, v, -r) jumps from 0 and I 
discontinuously. In the latter case, (5.1) becomes the threshold transition function 
along the line of Tong's (1983) TAR models. 
The ESTAR function (5.3), on the other hand, takes a U-shape, which implies that 
there is a symmetric adjustment for both S, -d>r and S, -d 
<r. A possible drawback 
of this equation is that the model becomes linear if either y --> 0 or y -> oo. To avoid 
this drawback, Jansen and Terasvirta (1996) suggest alternative specification as: 
G(s,; )I,, r) =I- [I + e-' 
(St-d-r L )(Sl-d -lU ) 16 ] -1 
(5.4) 
Equation (5.4) is the quadratic logistic function, which provides the probability 
that. rL < SI-I ! ý, u. This function has two important properties: (a) 01, becomes 
- -1 :: 
ýru constant as 7-40 and (b) as Y -4 00 , G(s,; y, r)=l 
if rL < S, and 
G(s,; y, -r)=0 if S, _l < TL or s, 
>u 
Eq. (5.1) combined with (5.2) yields the logistic smooth transition autoregressive 
(LSTAR) model while the combination of (5.1) accompanied by (5.4) defines 
quadratic logistic smooth transition autoregressive (QLSTAR) model. The selection 
procedure between LSTAR and QLSTAR is explained in the previous chapter. The 
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structure of these models itself show that they describe distinct asymmetries. While 
the LSTAR model describes with signs asymmetries of the transition variable, the 
ESTAR or QLSTAR model describes size asymmetries. 
5.2.1.2. Multiple regime models 
The main limitation of two regime models is that they do not provide sign and size 
asymmetries together. Therefore, Eq (5.1) needs to be expanded to obtain a model that 
allows more than two distinct regimes. The number of regimes and type of 
asymmetries, however, depends on whether the economic modelling requires multiple 
regimes of the same transition variable or a combination of several transition 
variables. 
For obtaining multiple regime STAR models using the same transition variable, the 
literature offers the following three regime STAR model (Madsen and Milas, 2005). 
r» + ut (5.5) - y"r) + 
03X1 (1- G, (s,; y, r) -G 0, x, G, (s,; y, r)+02x, G2 (S, ,2 
(St; Yl 
The family of STAR models is flexible enough to provide asymmetries of more than 
one transition variable at a time. For instance, when obtaining a multiple-regime by 
the combination of two transition variables at a time, we get the following four- 
regime model (van Dijk and Franses, 1999). 
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x, G, (s; y rl)+ 
02X1 (1- G, (s; y rl»]G2 (S2( ; /V2 9 "2 ) 
+103x, G, (S,,; 7, JI) + 04XI (1 - GI(s,,; 7,, -rl))I[l - 
G2(S2t; 72J2)1 + Ut (5.6) 
where G, (s,,;, Y,, r, ) provides two regime for si, and G2 (S2t ; 72 1 r2) describes another 
two regime for S2, ' 
There are four regimes in this model: 
G, (s,,; y,, r, ) G2(S2,; Y2 I r2) provides a probability that s,, :5r, and S2, !ý r2l 
which can be denoted as regime 1; 
(b) [1-G, (s,,; )I,, -rl)]G2(S2,; Y2, r2)'S the probability that s,, >r, but S2, ýý12ý 
'S 
denoted by regime 2, 
(C) G, (s,,;, v,, r, ) [I- 
G2 (S2, ; 72 1 T2 
)I is another probability that sj, :! ý z-, but S2, > 'r2 I 
say regime 3, and 
(d) [1-G, (s,,;; v,, r, )][1-G2 
(S21 ; Y2 J2 )I is the probability that s,, > i-, and S2, > "2 * 
This can be denoted as regime 4. 
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5.2.2. The importance of STAR models 
Although the STAR family model is a recently introduced econometric technique to 
analyze nonlinear and asymmetric behaviour of time series data, its use in economics 
and finance has increased significantly, for the following reasons. Firstly, economists 
are interested with the implication of a positive/negative and/or large/small deviations 
of many macroeconomic and financial variables. The STAR family model allows us 
to model these asymmetries. Secondly, this family models estimate the threshold 
parameter(s) endogenously which may be very useful for the economic analysis (see 
next section). Thirdly, it provides a smooth transition between two extreme regimes, 
compared to an abrupt jump in threshold or TAR models (Tong, 1983). 
This model, however, should be used cautiously for the following reasons. First, it is 
very hard to estimate the slope parameter(s) precisely as it requires a large sample 
size. It is well known in the literature that the small sample bias is more acute in 
nonlinear models than the linear one (van Dijk et al. 2003). Second, this family 
model considers only stationary variable(s). So, the choice of this model may be 
inappropriate if variables contain unit roots. 
Third, if the slope of transition function tends to infinity the transition between two 
regimes takes rather abrupt and the model translates to TAR or it makes almost no 
difference with Markov-switching model. In this case, the transition between regimes 
becomes abrupt rather than a smooth transition. Finally, as discussed earlier, a small 
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sample may produce a bias result while testing linearity or nesting transition 
functions. 
5.2.3 The use of multiple regime STAR models in economics 
One of the areas in economics that provides ample evidence of nonlinearity is the 
business cycle. Although economic theories identify at least four different stages in a 
cycle, empirical works were confined only to two regimes tills early 1990s due to 
unavailability of a suitable model. A large number of empirical works, therefore, used 
linear regression models, two regime Markov switching models, and threshold 
autoregressive models to analyze the business cycle (see Hamilton, 1989 and Tiao and 
Tsay, 1994 and references there in). Against this tradition, Bodlin (1996) uses a three 
regime Markov switching model and Tiao, and Tsay (1994) use a four regime SETAR 
model to analyze the US business cycle. 
Granger and Terasvirta (1993), Terasvirta (1994) and van Dijk and Franses (1999) 
introduce multiple regime nonlinear models. Van Dijk and Franses (1999) analyze the 
US business cycle over 1947QI-1995Q2 using a four regime smooth transition 
autoregressive model. They use two LSTAR functions, one for GNP growth and 
another for "depth of recession", to obtain four regimes. 
Using a four regime STAR model, Dufrenot et al. (2003) analyze the role of the US 
monetary policy in business cycle for the period of 1975QI to 1998Q4. They define 
149 
two regimes for the output gap and two regimes for the term structure of interest rate 
and find that the impact of monetary policy on business cycle is asymmetric. 
Bec et al. (2004) use a three regime STAR model using ESTAR and SETAR 
functions to analyze the dynamic behavior of the real exchange rate. They find that 
the real exchange rate is nonlinear mean reverting due to the transaction costs. 
Madsen and Milas (2005) employ a three regime STAR model to analyze the price- 
dividend relationship in UK and USA for the period of 1871 to 2002. Using a 
cointegrating vector as the transition variable they find that the high inflation and 
deflation regimes matter in the convergence process. 
Arghyrou et al. (2005) use a three regime STAR model to analyze the dynamic 
behavior of inflation in UK for the period of 1965 to 2001. They find that the 
persistence of inflation is nonlinear, as inflation adjusts rapidly when prices are 
further from the steady state and when prices are above the steady state. For this 
reason, they argue that monetary policy that considers a uniform price adjustment 
would be unreliable. 
Regarding the research on monetary policy, a number of recent theoretical and 
empirical studies suggest that the policy is nonlinear. Most empirical works, however, 
are based on two-regime models (Schaling, 1999; Dolado, Maria-Dolores and 
Naveria, 2004, Martin and Milas, 2004). Kesriyeli et al. (2004) is the only paper, to 
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our knowledge, that uses the multiple-regime STAR model to analyze monetary 
policy reaction ftinctions for UK, USA and Germany. They define two regimes for 
time trend and two regimes for the interest rate, making a total of four regimes. They 
find that monetary policy is nonlinear and the four-regime STAR model provides a 
better fit of the reaction function over the linear model for these three countries. 
5.3 Methodology 
5.3.1 Linear monetary policy reaction function 
The previous chapter clearly showed that the asset price augmented Taylor rule 
outperforms the simple Taylor rule. This conclusion is consistent with other empirical 
analysis (Chadha et al., 2004, Adam et al. 2005 and Clarida et al. 1998 and references 
therein). We therefore do not repeat the same experiment in this chapter but start with 
an asset price augmented Taylor rule as the basic linear model. The typical monetary 
policy reaction function we consider takes a form: 
i, * =TT+p I +, of E, -, 
iý,, + p,, E, p, E, -, 
(Y, 
+,, -y,,, 
) + pe E, 1+ -1 
(lrt+n - 7r 1+ -1 
(e, 
+n - 
eE + u, 
(5.7) 
where pf , o,, py and p, are parameters to 
be estimated and are expected to be 
positive. 
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Equation (5.7) states that the desired nominal interest rate (i, .) depends on the 
equilibrium nominal interest rate (i ), the foreign interest rate (iý ) expected for t+n, t+n 
expected rate of inflation relative to the inflation target ( 7rT ), the actual output 
relative to the potential output (yp.,, ) expected for time t+n, and deviation of 
the real exchange rate ( e,,,, ) from the equilibrium ( e, E) expected for t+n where e, -,,, 
is defined as the real price of domestic currency in terms of foreign currencies. 
Finally, E, 
_1 
is the expectation formed for t+n based on the lag information and 
U1 -iid(O, cr2). 
As in Clarida et al. (1998) and Woodford (2003), we define the observed nominal 
interest rate as the weighted average of the lagged interest rate and the desired rate: 
it 7- A it-I +(I - pi A.; O<P, <1 (5.8) 
Combining (5.7) and (5.8), we obtain 
7, r E Yt+n) + p, E, - eE)) + e, p, ) + pf Eji, ý,, +, o,, E, -, 
(,, 
J+n 'TT)+ Py i-I 
(Yt+n (e, 
+,, 
p 
Re-arranging the terms yields, 
-, 
if 
ý+p,, 
E, (, Tl+n - 7r i, =i*+p, i, _, 
+(I-p, )(p, fE, + 
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+, oyE, 1+ -1 
(el+n 
-, 
(y, 
+, -yý, 
j+p, E, - eE)) + e, (5.9) 
where, j* = (I - p, )T and e, is the combined error generated from (5.7) and (5.8). 
Equation (5.9) is the linear model to be estimated. It combines the effect of REER and 
the foreign interest rate in the Taylor rule. 
5.3.2 Multiple regimes monetary policy reaction function 
Having defined a baseline linear reaction function, we now proceed to introduce a 
multiple regime nonlinear reaction function to asses the complex response of 
monetary policy. Since our sample size is relatively small as we model UK monetary 
policy for the inflation targeting period, we follow the following selective strategies in 
nonlinear modelling. 
First, as the UK is a relatively open and liberal economy, we assume that the Bank of 
England responds to the foreign interest rate all the time to minimize foreign adverse 
effects in the economy. For this reason, we formulate a nonlinear model where the 
42 foreign interest rate is assumed to be regime free . Other variables such as deviations 
of inflation from the target, the output gap and the REER gap are made regime 
dependent on the assumptions that central bank's policies may vary for large and 
42 This assumption is based on the findings of chapter 4 
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small deviations of these variables from their targets or equilibrium levels. This 
assumption is made based on the preliminary analysis of our data. 
Second, although statistical theory provides a rigorous method of selecting an 
appropriate transition function (mainly between LSTAR and QLSTAR), we select the 
quadratic logistic function without using statistical criteria for three reasons. First, our 
sample size is relatively small. Second, monetary theory prefer QLSTAR function 
over LSTAR as policyrnakers keep more concerned with size asymmetries than sign 
(see Martin and Milas, 2004 for the discussion of this point). Third, our conclusion in 
the previous chapters shows that QLSTAR model outperforms the LSTAR model. 
Third, we use ; r,, -)T 
T and e,,,, - e, E as transition variables. which provides two 
(inner and outer) regimes for inflation and two (inner and outer) regime for the 
exchange rate, making a total of 4 regimes 43 . 
After considering these assumptions, we now formulate the following four regime 
monetary policy reaction function which combines the inflation and the exchange rate 
regime together (van Dijk and Franses, 1999). 
43 We are also interested to have regimes for the output gap but is computationally unfeasible for a 
sample size we have. 
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and, c, - iid(O, a') 
Eq (5.10) states that the observed nominal interest rate (i, ) depends on the 
equilibrium nominal interest rate (i ), the lag dependent variable the foreign 
interest rate (if,,, ) and four augmented linear Taylor rules (M,,, for 1=1 to 4). There 
are two transition functions (0,, and 02, ) in this model which determine the four 
regimes. 
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As shown in Eq (5.11), the first transition function, 0,, gives the probability that the 
RISER is close to equilibrium or lies between the lower threshold (OL) and the upper 
threshold (Ou). Therefore, (1-0,, ) is the probability that the REER is far from the 
Fp)< OL E 
equilibrium level, i. e (e,, p - e, + or 
(e, 
+p - e, +p 
)> 0" . In other words, it is the 
probability that REER misaligment is large. 
Likewise, the second transition function, 02, is the probability that deviations of 
inflation from the target (7r,,, - 7r 
T) lie between the lower threshold (. rL) and the 
upper threshold This implies that (1-02, ) is the probability that either 
( 7r,, 
q - 
7r' )< T' or ( ; r,, 
q - -7r 
T )> ru holds. 
Notice that 71 >0 and IV2 >0 are slope parameters which are made dimension-free 
2 
E 
p +P) and 
by the variance by dividing them by the variance of (e,, - e, +P), that 
is '(e,, 
PiE 
2 
of ( 7rl+q - 7r 
T ), that is a(,,, +q -, T T) , respectively. The subscripts p and q are the time 
horizon of the transition variables. The properties of these functions are discussed in 
section 5.2.1. 
Eq. 5.10 simplifies to the linear augmented Taylor rule in Eq (5.9) if 
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HO: ki, ,: = 
k2i 
: -- 
k3i 
: -- 
k4i for i=l to 3 (5.17) 
Alternatively, if 71 ý 72 =0, Eq. (5.10) also collapses to the linear model in Eq. 
(5.9). Further, if one of the slope parameters ( Yj or Y2 ) is zero, the four regime 
STAR model translates to the two regime quadratic logistic model. In this case Eq. 
(5.10) will be able to describe the size asymmetry of only one transition variable at a 
time. 
5.3.2.1. Interpretation of the model 
The main attraction of Eq (5.10) has two folds - the estimate of thresholds (0', 0', 
TL and ru) and the estimate of augmented Taylor rules (MI, , 
for i=1 to 4). Notice 
that the thresholds are endogenously detennined and they can be interpreted as the 
44policy alter lines". This is because the central banks' response to the exchange rate 
and inflation varies between the inner and outer regimes. For instance, policyrnakers 
consider that the exchange rate misaligrunent is high if it is less than 0' or greater 
than Ou. Similarly policymakers think that inflation is far from the target if it is less 
than rL or greater than ru. 
Taylor rules, MI, to M41 , describe policy responsiveness 
in each regime. The 
behavior of policyrnaker in regime I is described by M,,. This is the regime where 
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exchange rate misalignment is small and inflation is close to the target, i. e 
OL L, 7rT )< rU <- (e, e,, ' p) :50" and 
rL < (7r, 
+q 
The behavior of policymaker in regime 2 is given by M2, where the exchange rate 
E )<OL misalignment is large but inflation is close to the target, that is (e, +p - e, +p or 
(e, 
+p -eEp)>Ouand 
TL 
- 
T) < rU 1+ 
< GTf+q - ýT 
In regime 3, REER misalignment is low but inflation is not close to the target 
[OL E T) < TL 
T) U 
< (e,, p - e, +p 
Ou and (; T,, q - 7r or 
(7r, 
+q - 
7r >T 
Finally, in regime 4, REER misalignment is large and inflation is also not close to the 
Ep)<OL E T) < TL target, that is, [ (e,, p - e, + or 
(e, 
+p - e, +p 
)> Ou and(7r, +q - /T or 
(7r, 
+q - 
'r 
T) ýý. rU]. The behaviour of policyrnaker in this regime is given byM4, * 
5.3. ZZ Features of nonlinearpolicy rules 
Table 5.1 summaries the analytical framework of our nonlinear model. We assume 
that the regime I as the "normal" period where asset prices and inflation both remains 
in their inner regimes. In this situation, it is rational to expect that policymakers 
respond to the output gap because they may not respond to asset prices and inflation. 
Therefore, we expect at least 
k12 : 9" 0 in M,, . 
158 
In regime 2, exchange rate misalignment is large but the inflation remains close to the 
target. As a result, monetary policy responds to the asset price misalignment. 
Therefore, we expect k23 #- 0 inM2, . Regime 3 is just the reverse of regime 2 where 
exchange rate misalignment is small but inflation is far from the target. In this 
situation, it is rational to expect that policy response to inflation is vigorous. We 
expect k3, : 7'- 0 in M3,. This implies that monetary policy is influenced by asset prices 
in regime 2 and by inflation in regime 3. 
Table 5.1: Synthesis of nonlinear monetary policy# 
Regime Reaction Asset price regime Inflation regime Effects on 
function monetary 
policy 
M11 OL E OU <- (e, +p - e, +P 
rL < (7r, 
+ 
T) 
: ýý rU 
q -/ -T 
Normal period 
M21 (e, e 
EP)<OL 
or 
P 1+ 
rL _IrT):: ý T11 -< 
071+q Asset price 
(e, 
+P -eE P)>OU 1+ 
effect 
M31 OL 
-<(e, + -eý+ P I+p): 
5 OU 7rT) <. rL or 
(lrt+q Inflation effect 
('T, 
+q - 
7r 
T)> 
11 
U 
IV M41 (e, 
+p -e 
EP)<OL 
or 
1+ 
OT, 
+q 
7rT) <, rL or Both effects 
(e, -eE P I+P)>Ou 7r 
T)>TU (; r, 
+q 
abstracted from Equation 5.10 
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In regime 4, actual inflation is far from the target and the exchange rate misalignment 
is also large. We might expect k, #0 and 
k43 : ý'- 0 inM4,, implies both (asset price 
and inflation) effect in monetary policy. 
It is important to consider a standard macroeconomic principle in this context. Theory 
provides ample evidences that the exchange rate over valuation creates a downward 
pressure on inflation. On the contrary, if there is a large undervaluation then it creates 
additional upward pressure on inflation. In this context, we expect k3, <k4l if 
policyrnakers target inflation explicitly. 
5.4 Empirical estimates 
5.4.1 The data 
We employ UK quarterly data for the period of 1992Q4 to 2005Q2. Following usual 
practice, the three month Treasury Bill rate is used as a measure of the short term 
interest rate, i,. The US Federal fund rate is employed as the foreign nominal interest 
rate, i, f . The 
four-quarter change in the retail price index (RPI) is used as a measure 
of inflation, 7r,. Likewise, real GDP is used to measure output, y,, and the trade 
weighted real effective exchange rate index (REER) is used to measure the real 
exchange rate, e, , where an 
increase indicates a real depreciation of sterling against 
foreign currencies. All data, except for REER, are obtained from the IFS and REER 
from the OECD-Historical statistics, both collected by DataStream. 
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Figure 5.1: Plots of variables (Sample period: 1992Q4 - 2005Q2) 
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Following the Bank of England's decade-long practice, we set 7rT =2.5% which gives 
7r, - 7r 7' as deviations of inflation from the target. On the other hand, the potential 
output and the equilibrium REER are not readily available. The literature offers a 
variety of de-trending techniques to obtain these variables from the actual series. 
Following a popular choice, we use the Hordirc-Prescott de-trending method to 
obtain potential output (yP) and the equilibrium REER (e, "'). The output gap is then 
obtained as y, - y1p and the REER misalignment as e, - eE - Figure 5.1 shows the 
plots of variables. 
As in the previous chapter, we employ augmented Dickey-Fuller (1979) and Phillips- 
Perron (1988) tests to test the stationary properties of the variableS44 . Table 5.2 shows 
the test results. We find that the order of integration of i, and if is ambiguous but 
following Clarida et al. (1998) and Martin and Milas (2004), among others, we treat 
them as 1(0). Other variables (; T, , y, - yp and e, - e, 
E) are found to be l(0) at 5%. 
44 See chapter 3 for the nonlinear unit root tests for deviations of inflation from the target and the real 
exchange rate gap. 
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Table 5.2: Unit root tests (Sample period: 1992Q4 - 2005Q2 ) 
Variable Description ADF PP Test 
Name Test 
it 3-months Treasury Bill Rate -3.15 -3.82 
7ri (log RPIX, - log RPLV, -4) 
* 100 
-3.42 -3.45 
Yt - YP Output gap -3.88 -3.07 
e, - eE Real Effective Exchange Rate Index gap 
[an -2.83 -2.91 
increase indicates a real depreciation of sterling 
against foreign currencies ) 
f US 3-months Federal Fund Rate -2.39 -2.42 
Note: (a) ADF and PP tests include constant and time trendfbr i, and only constant 
to otherfour variables. 
(b) Critical values (excluding trend in the test) for the ADF and PP tests are - 
3.56, -2.91 and -2.59 at at IYo, 5% and 10% respectively. Critical values 
which consider the time trend and constant term in the tests are -4.15, -3.50 
and -3.18 at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Data sources: OECD Historical series and IFS, both collected by Datastream 
5.4.2 Linear estimates 
We employ the generalized method of moments (GMM) to estimate all linear and 
nonlinear reaction functions in this chapter. We use a constant and up to five lags of 
all variables as instrument set (Clarida et al., 1998 and Martin and Milas, 2004). As 
the number of instruments is greater than the number of parameters to be estimated, 
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we test the over identifying restrictions to make sure that instruments are orthogonal 
to the error term 
45 
. 
We experiment various combination of lead/lag relationships ranging from the 4th lag 
to 4 th period ahead in Eq. (5.9) but find a best results when using n=1 for output and 
inflation and n=O for the foreign interest rate and the exchange rate. Column I of 
Table 5.3 presents estimates of this model. 
As in the previous chapters and other empirical literature (for instance Kharel et al. 
2006, Martin and Milas, 2004, Clarida et. al., 1998 and Nelson, 2000), our linear 
model satisfies the dynamic stability criterion, as we find p, >I. We also find that 
policyrnakers attach more weights to inflation followed by the output gap. The 
coefficients of exchange rate misalignment and the foreign interest rates are also 
significant at 1%. This implies that the Bank of England responds to the foreign 
interest rates and the exchange rate misalignment together with inflation and output. 
There is no sign of misspecification in the estimate. The null of normality is not 
rejected. Also, the estimate does not reject the null hypothesis that the overidentifying 
restrictions are satisfied, which implies that the instruments are orthogonal to the error 
term. 
45 See Chadha et al. (2004) and also chapter 3 and 4 for more discussion of orthogonal conditions. 
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Table 5.3: Linear reaction functions: GMM estimates (1992Q4-2005Q2) 
Parameters (i) (ii) (iii) 
i* 0.444 (0.141)* 0.554 (0.247)* 0.698 (0.072)* 
p 0.815 (0.047)* 0.825 (0.014)* 0.826 (0.023)* 
pf 0.447 (0.062)* 0.529 (0.036)* 0.265 (0.061)* 
p" 1.272 (0.317)* 1.837 (0.166)* 1.568 (0.214)* 
py 0.925 (0.500)** 1.508(0.304)* 0.495 (0.220)** 
A 0.084(0.037)* 0.160 (0.310) 0.048 (0.021)** 
-2 R 0.922 0.920 0.913 
Standard error 0.295 0.305 0.335 
Normality 1.257 [0.533] 2.523 [0.128] 1.011 [0.592] 
J-statistics 0.204 0.239 0.212 
p-value 0.757 0.893 0.835 
Note: Numbers in () and f] are standard errors and the probability values of'the test 
statistics respectively. P-value is the probability value of the test that the over 
identified restriction is satisfied under null. A constant and up to five lags of all 
variables are used as instruments. * and ** indicate significant at 1% and 5% 
respectively. The interest rate, deviations of inflation ftom the target and the output 
gap are considered to be endogenous variables. 
To check robustness, we estimate Eq. (5.9) using two alternative specifications. First, 
we use the REER itself as an alternative to the REER misalignment. As shown in 
column (ii) of Table 5.2, p, is found to be insignificant in this case. This implies that 
the authorities respond to the REER misalignment rather than REER index. Secondly, 
we use the EU money market rate as an alternative to the US Federal fund rate. The 
estimate, column (iii) of Table 5.1, does not alter our main findings. 
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5.4.3. Nonlinear estimates 
5.4.3.1 General strategy 
Considering our sample size, we adopt the following strategies for nonlinear 
estimates. First, the specification of Taylor rules in nonlinear estimate is made 
consistent to the linear Taylor rule. This implies that we set n=l for the inflation and 
output and n=O for the REER and the foreign interest rate for all regimes. 
Second, as discussed in the literature review section earlier, finding an appropriate 
delay parameter is vital in the STAR model. Following the standard practice (Martin 
and Milas 2004 and Madsen and Milas 2005), we conduct a grid-search of different 
combination of p and q ranging from -4 to 4 in Eq 5.10 and choose the one which 
provides the best estimate. 
Notice that there is a fijrther grid-search of slope and thresholds for each combination 
of p and q. After a numerous experiments, we confirm that the combination of p=O 
and q=1 provides the best results, with the lowest standard error and significant 
thresholds. Therefore, we use et - e, 
E 
and 7rt+l _ 7rT as transition variables. 
Third, estimating a full phased STAR model by GMM is almost impossible in a small 
size we have. Considering this constraint, we first estimate Eq. (5.10) by OLS and 
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then again re-estimate the same model by GMM imposing nuisance (slope and 
threshold) parameters that were obtained from the OLS estimate. Therefore, the 
estimates of the nuisance parameters and their standard errors reported in Table 5.4 
are estimated by the OLS and other parameters and tests are obtained by the GMM. 
Fourth, we do not use any statistical criterion to select the number of regimes and the 
transition variable in our nonlinear reaction functions due to the fact of small sample 
size. Rather we estimate all possible nonlinear models and report the best result in 
Table 5.4. 
Firth, we follow a general to specific approach while estimating the nonlinear model. 
In the process, we exclude insignificant parameters and allow some parameter 
restrictions in the final estimate reported in Table 5.4. 
5.4.3.2 The estimates and discussion 
Column I of Table 5.4 presents the GMM estimate of our nonlinear model, Eq. 
(5.10). The estimate is free from any misspecification as overidentifying restriction is 
satisfied and there is no sign of non-normality. Further, we find a lower standard error 
in this estimate than any other linear and nonlinear models reported in this chapter. 
The issue of linearity tests, that is Eq. (5.17), does not arise in this estimate as the 
structure of the Taylor rule in each regime is completely different. Therefore, the 
nonlinear estimate can not be collapsed to the linear model in Eq. 5.9. This implies 
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that the four-regime reaction function better describes the UK monetary policy than 
the linear one. 
As discussed earlier, there are two key estimates in this model - the thresholds and 
four augmented Taylor rules. Regarding thresholds, we estimate 0L= -5.11 %and 0U= 
LU 
4.37% using e, -e, 'ý as a transition variable and reject the null that 0=0. This 
implies that the economy is in the inner exchange rate regime when 
- 5.1 1:! ý (e, - e, E):! ý 4.37. Consequently, the economy is in the outer exchange rate 
regime when (e, -e JE 
)< -5.11 or (e, - eE) > 4.37. Similarly, we estimate rL=- 
0.52% and ru= 0.260% for the second transition variable, ;r 1+1 - 7r 
T, 
which implies 
that the lower inflation boundary ( 7rT _ I. L ) and the upper inflation boundary 
(; rT +, rU ) to be 1.98% and 2.76% respectively. Therefore, the economy remains in 
the inner inflation regime when 1.98:! ý ; r,,, :! ý 2.76 and in the outer inflation regime 
when ; r, +, < 
1.98 or ; 7, +, > 
2.76. Further, we reject the probability that rL=rU and 
('7 T _r 
L+ 
7r 
T+ u)12 = 2.5% under the null hypothesis, which supports the finding 
of previous chapters that the BoE keep inflation within a range rather than pursuing a 
point target of 2.5% (see also Martin and Milas, 2004). 
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Table 5.4: Nonlinear reaction functions: GMM estimates (1992Q4-2005Q2) 
Main estimate Alternative estimates 
Parameters G) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
i* 0.511 (0.013)* 0.801 (0.038)* 0.551 (0.034)* 0.546 (0.023)* 
p 0.854 (0.004)* 0.750 (0.010)* 0.811 (0.007)* 0.815 (0.006)* 
pf 0.361 (0.009)* 0.436 (0.010)* 0.528 (0.025)* 0.514 (0.011)* 
k12 2.829 (0.204)* 1.073 (0.114)* 1.281 (0.230)* 3.273 (0.114)* 
k23 
0.062 (0.01)* 0.037 (0.007)* 0.041 (0.008)* 0.044 (0.005)* 
k3l 
2.611 (0.100)* 1.501 (0.056)* 1.655 (0.006)* 1.824 (0.061)* 
k4l 2.845 (0.080)* 2.022 (0.119)* 1.709 (0.087)* 1.500 (0.068)* 
k43 
0.062 (0.001)* 0.037 (0.007)* 0.041 (0.008)* 0.044 (0.005)* 
I't TV e, - e, * e, - e, * e, - e, * e, - e, * 
Y2 1.78 1.78 1.78 1.78 
0L -5.112 (0.107)* -5.112 (0.107)* -5.112 
(0.107)* 
-5.112 
(0.107)* 
ou 4.368 (0.248)* 4.368 (0.248)* 4.368 (0.248)* 4.368 (0.248)* 
2 nd TV /Tt+2 - /Tl+l -T ITI+l 
Yl 358 4.95 4.95 4.95 
TL -0.522 (0.038)* -0.522 (0.038)* -0.522 (0.038)* -0.522 (0.038)* 
Tu 0.268 (0.071)* 0.268 (0.071)* 0.268 (0.071)* 0.268 (0.071)* 
-2 R 0.954 0.953 0.936 
0.952 
s. e 0.233 0.237 0.277 0.241 
Norm. 1.189 [0.515] 0.957 [0.619] 1.257 [0.533] 0.837 
J-stat 0.258 0.261 0.274 0.657 
p-value 0.997 0.997 0.988 0.994 
4: kl=k4l 17.758 [0.001] 17.83 [0.000] 2.508 [0.081] 17.017 [0.00] 
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Note: 
(a) Column (i) is the estimate of Eq (5.10). Column (ii) use three year moving 
average to proxy the equilibrium level of REER as an alternative to the HP filter 
trend Column (iii) use the EU money market rate as an alternative to the US 
rate. Column (iv) uses RPI instead of RPIX as a measure of inflation. 
(b) The interest rate, deviations of inflation ftom the target and the output gap are 
considered to be endogenous variables. 
is the standard error and [] is the probability value of the test statistics. TV is 
the transition variable. s. e. is the standard error. Norm is the F-test for 
normality. J-stat is the value of the GMM objective function. P-value is the 
probability value of the test that the over identified restriction is satisfied under 
null 
(d) A constant and up to 4h lags of all variables are used as instruments for the 
estimates. 
*and * *indicate significant at I% and 5% respectively. 
The behaviour of policyrnakers in each regime can be described as follows: First, 
policyrnakers respond to the output gap only in regime 1, when the expected inflation 
is close to the target and the exchange rate misalignment is low. When inflation 
and/or exchange rates are in their outer regimes monetary policy does not respond to 
the output gap as we find k22 : -- 
k32 k42 0 
Second, policy does not respond to the exchange rate when the exchange rate 
misalignment is small as we find k, 3 
=k33 =0 in regimes I and 3. Policy only 
responds to the exchange rate when the economy is in the outer exchange rate regime, 
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that is, when exchange rate misalignment is large. Further the response on exchange 
rate does not depend on the inflation regimes as we find k 23 ,,,: 
k43 
Third, policy does not respond to inflation when the economy is in the inner inflation 
regime (1.978: 5 7r,,, :! ý 2.768 ) as we find k, I : -- 
k2l :-0 in regime I and 2. Policy, 
however, responds to inflation vigorously when it is less than the lower threshold or 
greater than the upper thresholds. 
Further, we find that policy response to inflation in regime 4 is greater than regime 3 
( k3l < 
k4l ). This implies that the response to inflation is more muted when there is 
significant exchange rate misalignment. For instance, the increase in interest rates in 
response to excessive inflation is moderated when the real exchange rate is 
significantly overvalued. This is plausible since the overvaluation also creates 
downward pressure on inflation. 
To sum up, the estimates of augmented Taylor rule in each regime are consistent to 
the analytical framework presented in Table 5.1. There is an asset price effect in 
regime 2 and inflation effect in regime 3. Regime 4 comprises both inflation and asset 
price effects. 
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5.4.3.3 Classification of observations by regime 
Figure 5.2 shows the distribution of observations over four distinct regimes. The 
horizontal axis measures inflation and the vertical axis measure the exchange rate 
misalignment. Out of total 51 observations in the sample, we have II observations in 
regime 1. These are the periods when policy responded only to the output gap as the 
economy was characterized by a low inflation and small exchange rate misalignment. 
There are 6 observations in regime 2 when policyrnakers responded only to the 
exchange rate and 21 observations in regime 3 when policy responded only to the 
inflation. There are 13 observations in regime 4 when policy responded to both the 
exchange rate and inflation together. 
Figure 5.3 further classifies the observation into different regimes over the years. The 
detailed classification is presented in Annex 5.1. We find that the economy was in 
regime 4 during late 1992 to mid 1993 due to high inflation and a large under 
valuation of sterling against foreign currencies. However, the problem was quickly 
corrected as the economy returned in regime I in early 1994. 
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Figure 5.2: Distribution of asset prices (transition variables) over regimes 
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Figure 5.3: Classification of interest rate in different regimes 
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During mid 1995 the economy again went back to the regime 4 as inflation was high 
and the Sterling Pound was under valued during this period. Notice that the 
undervaluation of currency during this period was the highest in UK since 1992. The 
BoE adopted an aggressive monetary policy during this period to correct these 
anomalies. As a result, the currency was over-valued between 1997 and 1998 and the 
inflation was controlled. 
Interestingly, the economy never moved in regime 4 except for two short episodes 
(1997Q4-1998Q3 and 2003Q2-Q3) since the Bank of England enjoys with operational 
independence in 1997. Our conclusion, therefore, supports to the recent finding that 
the degree of central bank's autonomy has a positive impact on the performance of the 
explicit inflation targeting (Bernake et al 1999). 
5.4.4 Sensitivity analysis 
To check robustness of our nonlinear estimates, we experiment some alternative 
specifications. To start with, we use a three-year moving average to proxy the 
equilibrium REER as an alternative to the Hodrick-Prescott trend. The REER gap is 
then obtained by deducting moving average trend from the actual series. The 
empirical estimate employing this new definition of REER gap is presented in column 
(ii) of Table 5.3. 
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Column (iii) of Table 5.3 uses the Euro area money market rate as an alternative to 
the US rate. In column (iv) we use the retail price index, which excludes mortgage 
interest rate (RPIX) as an alternative to RPI. Interestingly, none of them altered our 
major findings. 
5.5 Concluding remarks 
This chapter has examined the complex response of monetary policy in UK using a 
multiple regime smooth transition autoregressive model over 1992Q4 to 2005Q2. The 
major contributions of this chapter are as follows: 
First, monetary policy in UK is sensitive to the exchange rate and inflation regimes. 
We find that the Bank of England responds to inflation and the exchange rate only 
when they are in their outer regimes. More precisely, the Bank responds to the 
exchange rate if domestic currency under valuation is greater than 4% or over 
valuation exceeds 5%. Similarly, policy responds to inflation only when expected 
inflation is less than 1.98% or greater than 2.76%. 
Second, the policy response to the exchange rate misalignment does not depend on 
inflation regimes but the response to inflation does depend on the exchange rate 
regime. Third, policyrnakers only respond to output gap when they do not have to 
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respond to asset prices or inflation, that is, when inflation and/or the exchange rate are 
in their inner regimes. 
Fourth, the exchange rate misalignment alone can not capture the effect of open 
economy to full extent as the Bank of England responds to the foreign interest rate 
together with the REER misalignment. The response to the foreign interest rate, 
however, is not affected by the inflation and exchange rate regimes or by any other 
variables. 
Although this chapter provides some new and noble insights of UK monetary policy, 
there is scope of further research. First, our nonlinear model in this chapter assumed 
that policy response in the lower and the upper regime is same as the outer regime 
combines both of them. This may not happen in practice as policy response may be 
different for the lower and upper regimes. For instance, policy response on higher 
inflation accompanied by a sharp exchange rate undervaluation might be different 
than the policy response on a higher inflation accompanied by a sharp overvaluation 
of Pounds. Therefore it would be interesting to estimate a model which provides three 
regimes for inflation and three regimes for exchange rate misalignment, making a 
total of 9 regimes. In this case we would be able to analyze the policy response on a 
large overvaluation/undervaluation of sterling pound with expected inflation 
less/greater than the regime boundaries separately. 
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Secondly, it would also be interesting to include other asset prices specially, house 
prices and share prices in the nonlinear reaction function. Third we can consider a 
separate regime for output gap to get ftirther insights of UK monetary policy. We 
intend to carry on this work in future. 
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Chapter 6 
Summary and Conclusion 
Many central banks have adopted inflation targeting since early 1990s because of the 
failure in stabilizing economy through the exchange rate anchor and monetary 
aggregates. Now, there is a consensus among policyrnakers, economists and general 
public that low and predictable inflation helps to promote economic efficiency and 
growth in the long run. But it is also argued that the macroeconomic stability in 
general and price level stability in particular are important preconditions for economic 
growth (Fisher, 1993). 
Inflation targeting regime has been able to control inflation. However, the asset prices 
in the financial markets have been more volatile during this period. On the other hand 
the international financial market has been integrating rapidly. As a consequence, the 
literature debates whether monetary policy responds to asset prices and international 
market in practice to keep inflation under control in the long run. Similarly, the 
literature also debate whether policy responds to inflation precisely in practice. 
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In this context, the objective of this research has a three-fold. The first objective is to 
investigate if and/or to what extend does monetary policy respond to asset prices. The 
second objective is to assess whether or not monetary policy targets inflation precisely 
in a way it is announced. And finally, to analyze whether monetary policy responds to 
foreign interest rates and the real exchange rate misalignments; and whether the 
policy reaction to them depends on the state of inflation and vice-a-versa. 
The empirical analysis is carried out using quarterly data of UK throughout this 
research while the US data is also used in Chapter 2. There are similarities between 
these two countries in the conduct of monetary policy. The BoE has been targeting 
inflation since October 1992 after the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) 
during October 1990 to September 1992 and monetary targeting earlier in the 1980s 
(Haldane, 1995). The Federal Reserve, however, does not target inflation explicitly 
but implicitly being closed to the way of explicit targeting, especially when Volkar 
was appointed as the chairman of the Fed in 1979 (Clarida et. al., 2000). 
We start our analysis by analyzing whether monetary policy responds to asset prices 
collectively. To do this, we first develop the FCI, which is a weighted average of the 
real interest rate, the real exchange rate, real share prices and the real house prices, 
and then estimate the FCI augmented Taylor rule. A significant FCl coefficient 
implies that monetary policy responds to asset prices collectively. 
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However, instead of using the IS curve as in the conventional literature, we explore an 
alternative methodology using an open economy macroeconomic structural model for 
obtaining the FCI weights. We provide two alternative weighting procedures, one for 
a strict CPI inflation targeting framework and another for a flexible inflation targeting 
framework. 
Using quarterly data over 1979 to 2003, we construct FCIs for the US and the UK and 
find them to be useful for describing the monetary policy stance. We, then, estimate 
the FCI augmented Taylor rule as an alternative to a simple Taylor rule. We find that 
the FCI-augmented Taylor rule is significantly better than the simple rule for both 
countries. As a result, we conclude that monetary policy responds to asset prices by 
responding to the FCL 
Chapter 3 has two objectives - to verify the findings of chapter 2 using an alternative 
specification and to test whether or not monetary policy is nonlinear. In order to 
furnish the first objective, we estimate asset price augmented Taylor rule. We argue 
that if the policy responds to asset prices collectively (chapter 2) then each asset 
prices that were included in the FCI must be significant when included in the Taylor 
rule. As expected, the estimate of asset price augmented reaction function is found to 
be better than a simple reaction function with obtaining significant coefficients of 
asset prices. Chapter 2 and 3, therefore, suggest that monetary policy responds to asset 
prices together with inflation and the output gap in practice. 
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As discussed, the second objective of chapter 3 is to investigate whether monetary 
policy is nonlinear and whether or not it responds to exchange rate misalignments. To 
do so, this chapter employs varieties of nonlinear models such as Granger and Lee 
(1989), Escribano and Granger (1998), Escribano and Aparicio (1999) and van Dijk et 
al. (2002). Estimates of these models suggest that monetary policy is nonlinear, the 
policy response to inflation is asymmetric. Monetary policy in UK aims to keep 
inflation within a rage rather than pursuing a point target. Further, we find that the 
policy response to exchange rate misaligrunents is strongest when inflation is close to 
the target compared to a weaker response when it is far from the target. 
The nonlinear analysis in Chapter 3, however, is based on the RER misalignment 
augmented-Taylor rule with two-regime STAR model. This model does not address 
the second and the third objectives of this research. Chapter 4, therefore, estimates the 
foreign interest rate augmented Taylor rule using a three-regime STAR he model. 
Further, the main objective of this chapter is to investigate whether policy response to 
high inflation and a low inflation is same. 
Chapter 3 and 4 both find that the UK monetary policy is nonlinear and policy 
response to inflation is asymmetric although they use different models. While the 
former chapter estimates an exchange rate augmented Taylor rule, the latter chapter 
uses a foreign interest rate augmented Taylor rule. Chapter 5, therefore, combines 
these two variables together using a four regime STAR model to assess whether 
foreign interest rates and exchange rate misalignments are to substitute each other. 
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This chapter also aims to investigate whether monetary authority considers a separate 
asset price regime together with inflation regime and whether asset price regime has 
any impact in response to inflation and vice-a-versa. 
Our main empirical findings can be summarised as follows. First, we find that 
monetary policy is forward looking, as one quarter ahead forward looking Taylor rule 
outperforms any other specification. 
Second, the policy reaction to inflation is strongest followed by the response to the 
output gap, the foreign interest rate, the exchange rate, house prices and share prices. 
Third, monetary policy does not respond to inflation when expected inflation is less 
than the lower threshold but it's response to inflation is vigorous when expected 
inflation exceeds the upper threshold. Moreover, we find that the upper inflation 
threshold is just slightly higher than the target of 2.5% but the lower threshold is far 
below the target though the BoE has to give a fonnal clarification to the government 
if inflation deviates for more than 1% in either direction from the target. These all 
suggest that monetary policy is deflationary bias and policy aim to keep inflation 
within a range rather than pursing a point target. 
Fourth, monetary policy in UK considers a separate exchange rate regime together 
with inflation regime. The BoE responds to inflation and exchange rates only when 
they are in their outer regime. More precisely, the Bank responds to the exchange rate 
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only if domestic currency under-valuation is greater than 4% or over-valuation 
exceeds 5%. Similarly, policy responds to inflation only when expected inflation is 
less than 2% or greater than 2.75%. 
Fifth, the monetary policy response to exchange rate misalignments does not depend 
on inflation regime but the response to inflation does depend on the exchange rate 
regime. 
Sixth, policymakers respond to the output gap only when they do not respond to asset 
prices or inflation, that is, when inflation and the exchange rates are in their inner 
regimes. 
Finally, we find that neither the exchange rate misalignment nor the foreign interest 
rate alone can capture the open economy effects; monetary policy responds to both 
variables. Unlike the policy response to exchange rate misalignments, we find that 
policy reaction to the foreign interest rate is unaffected by the inflation or the 
exchange rate regimes. 
Further research scope 
There are several interesting issues on the topic, which we could not address in this 
research. It is because our sample size is relatively small to model those issues as the 
inflation targeting regime in UK starts from 1992. 
184 
First, we defined two regimes for the exchange rate and two regimes for inflation, 
making a total of four regimes in Chapter 5. This framework assumes that policy 
response to a large undervaluation and a large overvaluation as same. This assumption 
may not be true in practice as policy response may vary between a large 
undervaluation and a large overvaluation of the domestic currency vis-a-vis foreign 
currencies. Therefore, it would to interesting to have a model with three regimes for 
the exchange rate and three regimes for inflation, making a total of nine regimes. 
Second, although we found that policy response to the output gap is stronger after 
inflation, we did not consider regimes for this variable. It would be interesting to 
analyze whether monetary policy is affected by business cycle by defining regimes for 
the output gap appropriately. 
Third, although linear estimates in chapter 2 and 3 provide ample evidence that 
monetary policy responds to equity prices and property prices, they are not included 
in nonlinear models. Therefore, it would be interesting to assess the behaviour of 
monetary policy by including all asset prices in the nonlinear framework. We intend 
to carry on all these issues in future when there are sufficient time series data within 
the inflation targeting regime. 
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Appendix 2.1: Definition and sources of variables 
Variable UK USA 
CPI CPI excluding mortgage 
interest 
CPI all times 
Output Real GDP Real GDP 
Nominal interest 
rate (R) 
3 month treasury bill rate Effective federal fund rate 
Exchange rate (e) REER REER 
House price index 
(hp) 
Nationwide House Price 
Index* 
Average sale price of one family 
houses" 
Share price index 
(sp) 
FUTSE All (share price 
index)* 
Dow Jones Index (Industrial 
Share Price)* 
OP Oil price Oil price 
Source: Unless otherwise stated, variables are abstracted from International Financial 
Statistics CD-ROM, January 2004. 
* Source: Datastrearn 
"source: National Association of Rotators. 
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Appendix 2.2: Unit Root Tests 
Z21 Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test 
We employ the following augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test to investigate the 
stationary process of variables, x, , 
listed in Table 2.3. 
Ax, --.,: ), 0 + 7xt-, + 2ý, v, Ax, -i + cl i=I 
(A2.1) 
Where, v and )/, are parameters to be estimated and c, is a random disturbance term 
defined as: ct - iid(O, a'). The null and alternative hypotheses are defined as: 6 
Ho:? =0 
HI: 7<0. 
We evaluate the null hypotheses using the following t-ratio, t. . 
for)/ and compare it to 
the critical values, t""", available at MacKinnon (1991). 
tv 
se(ý) 
(A2.2) 
where j is the estimate of y and se(ý) is the standard error. In this case, if 
tt Critical we reject the null hypothesis, implies that the variable, x, is stationary. 
Accepting the null implies x, contains a unit root (see among others Harris, 1995). 
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Z22 Phillips Perron (pp) test 
Phillips and Perron (1988) provide a nonparametric method of controlling for serial 
correlation when testing for a unit root, an alternative to the ADF test. This method 
k 
estimates the non-augmented Dickey-Fuller test equation, i. e. by excluding 
from Eq. (A2.1), and modifies the t-ratio of the coefficient, 7, as follows so that 
serial correlation does not affect the asymptotic distribution of the test statistic. 
pp = (a 1,6)"' [j / se(ý)] - T(, 6 - a)se(j) / 2,6' 12S (A2.3) 
Where S is the standard error of the test regression, a= (T - k)S' / T, 8 is an 
estimator of the residual spectrum at frequency zero, and tPP is the modified t- 
statistics. The remaining parameters, hypothesis and the decision rule are same as in 
the ADF test. 
2.2.3 Non-linear unit root test 
It is argued that the linear unit root tests such as ADF and PP tests are less powerful if 
the data adjustment process is non-linear (Gregoriou and Kontonikas, 2006). 
Therefore, a potential failure of rejecting non-stationarity in many time series data 
may be the result of the linear unit root tests. In this context, following Kapetanious, 
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Shin and Snell (2003) we verify the ADF and PP test results employing a non-linear 
unit root test as shown below. 
OX, 
-, 
+ (, OX, - 
ox 
12 -1 u, - iid(O, U2) (A2.4) _I[I -e]+ ul c 
Eq. (A2.4) is an exponential smooth transition autoregressive (ESTAR) model which 
provides a symmetric adjustment for x, towards its mean. In this model, if 0=1 and 
0 =0 then x, follows a random process. Similarly, x, is stationary if 0 >0. 
Since 0 is a nuisance parameter, an evaluation of unit root by estimating (A2.4) is 
not a feasible option. Therefore, we employ the following first-order Taylor series 
approximation to (A2.4) under the null with allowing for serial correlation in u, (see 
Gregoriou and Kontonikas, 2006). 
Ax 
Axt ---Z Yo + 7X1, -, + 2: 
(A2.5) 
Eq. (A2.5) is a representation of Eq. (A2.4) where the null hypothesis is defined as 
y=O. However, MacKinnon (1991) critical value is not applicable to test the 
significance of y because the cubic term embedded in y is a non-linear 
function. In 
this context, we could use a bootstrap technique to obtain an asymptotic t-statistics as 
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in Gregoriou and Kontonikas (2006) but, for the simplicity, we use Kapetanious, Shin 
and Snell (2003) to evaluate y- 
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Appendix 2.3: MCI weights 
Variables 
CPI Inflation 
Targeting Framework 
(MCI_I) 
Domestic Inflation 
Targeting Framework 
(MCI_2) 
Benchmark 
SPecification 
(MCI_3) 
Panel A: UK 
Real Interest Rate 0.267 0.550 0.895 
REER 0.733 0.450 0.105 
Panel B: USA 
Real Interest Rate 0.291 0.548 0.858 
REER 0.709 0.452 0.142 
Note: Calculations are based on the formula given by Table 2.2 and estimated 
parameters given by Table 2.4 and 2.5. 
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Appendix: 2.4 
UK: Monetary Conditions Indices 
6.0 
4.0 
2.0 
0.0 
-2.0 
-4.0 
-6.0 
-8.0 
Year 
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Appendix: 2.5 
USA: Monetary Conditions Indices 
6.0 
4.0 
2.0 
-Pcq 
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Appendix 3.1: Alternative specifications of nonlinear reaction functions 
A. LSTAR model 
it =' 01 MLI + (1 - 01)MU( + ýt 
where, 
(3.9a) 
MLI =kjoil-I +(1-k, ý)[k, j(7r, +j -7r*)+kl2(Yt+l -yt*+, )+k, 3(e, - e, 
*)] 
Mul =k 20'1-1 + (1 -k20)[k21 
Ü7(+I 
-z*)+ 
k22 (YI+l 
- yt*+1) + k (e, - e, )] 
Ot = Pr{ r-*»=: 1- t2ý 
(Z 
t 
B QL-STAR model 
+ 0, MI, +(I - 0, )MO, + 
Where, 
I 
I 
e-' 
()r, 
-d -, 
T 
*-T 1) / 
(3.1 Oa) 
MIt = kloil-, + (1 - klo)[kl , (, 7, - 7r*) + k12 (YI+l - yl*+1) + k, 3 (e, - 
Mot k20't-l +(I-k2O)[k2i (lrt+l -ir*)+k,, (y,,, -y* )+k23(e, - e, . 1+ 
L1 
"u ) ",: 
,-I, 
. (7 Pr < (/71-d - /7 
*):: ý 1 
I+e 
)(, 7, 
-d-7r -r 
) 
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Appendix 3.2: Alternative estimate of nonlinear reaction functions 
(1992Q4-2004Q2) 
LSTAR 
(Estiamte of eq. 3.9a) 
QLSTAR 
(estimate of Eq. 
3.1 Oa) 
0.471 (0.208)* 0.335 (0.179)** 
ML M, 
klo 0.873 (O. OýFI7) 0.919 (0.034)* 
k, 1 0.870 (0.459)*** 1.534 (0.898)*** 
k12 2.953 (1.301)"" 3.120 (1.593)** 
k13 0.169 (0.084)"* 0.101 (0.031)** 
Mu MO 
k20 0.876 (0.038)" 0.905 (0.032)* 
k2l 3.914 (1.273)* 5.504 (2.034)* 
k22 1.299 (0.978) 2.498 (1.280)** 
k23 0.026 (0.010)* 0.046 (0.015)** 
T -0.370 (0.017)* 
TL -1.089 (0.078)* 
u 0.728 (0.086)* 
a 223.9 (154.1) 81.8 (127.9) 
Diagnostic tests 
-2 
R 0.93 
0.92 
Standard Error 0.24 0.25 
AIC 0.14 0.09 
D-W Statistics 1.94 1.97 
LM4 1.26 [0.301 1.49 [0.23] 
ARCH4 1.88 [1.151 0.71 [0.58] 
213 
Heteroskedasticit 0.55 [0.83] 0.78 [0.64] 
Normality 2.10 [0.34] 1.02 [0.60] 
Hypothesis testing 
a. Test against Linear model: 
kj, -= 
k21 
3.69 [0.01] 8.50 [0.00] 
b. Inflation Persistence: kj, =k2l 5.74 [0.02] 4.37 [0.04] 
c. Policy symmetric: 
LU ir = (7r -r+ 7r +r)/2 
6.25 [0.01] 
d. No effective lower band: rL =0 
3.20 [0.08] 
e. No effective upper band: rU =0 
13.8 [0.00] 
f. Interest rate persistence: kjo = 
k20 0.01 [0.91] 0.96 [0.33] 
Notes: Please see Table 3.2 for the footnotes and Appendix 3.1 for the model 
reference. 
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Appendix 5.1: Classification of monetary policy by Regimes (1992Q4 -2005Q2) 
Period TBR Regime 
Q4 92 6.780 Regime 4 
Ql 93 5.510 Regime 4 
Q2 93 5.260 Regime 4 
Q3 93 5.130 Regime 4 
Q4 93 4.960 Regime 3 
Ql 94 4.830 Regime I 
Q2 94 4.860 Regime I 
Q3 94 5.280 Regime I 
Q4 94 5.650 Regime I 
Ql 95 6.060 Regime 3 
Q2 95 6.290 Regime 4 
Q3 95 6.570 Regime 4 
Q4 95 6.390 Regime 4 
Ql 96 5.940 Regime 2 
Q2 96 5.730 Regime 2 
Q3 96 5.520 Regime 2 
Q4 96 5.910 Regime 2 
Ql 97 5.910 Regime I 
Q2 97 6.200 Regime I 
Q3 97 6.780 Regime 3 
Q4 97 7.030 Regime 4 
Ql 98 6.890 Regime 4 
Q2 98 7.100 Regime 4 
Q3 98 7.120 Regime 4 
Q4 98 6.190 Regime 3 
Ql 99 5.080 Regime I 
Period TBR Regime 
Q2 99 4.860 Regime 3 
Q3 99 4.910 Regime 3 
Q4 99 5.300 Regime 3 
Ql 00 5.800 Regime 2 
Q2 00 5.910 Regime 3 
Q3 00 5.810 Regime 3 
Q4 00 5.680 Regime 3 
Ql 01 5.390 Regime I 
Q2 01 5.030 Regime 3 
Q3 01 4.720 Regime 3 
Q4 01 3.920 Regime 3 
Ql 02 3.890 Regime 3 
Q2 02 3.970 Regime 3 
Q3 02 3.800 Regime 3 
Q4 02 3.800 Regime I 
Ql 03 3.590 Regime 3 
Q2 03 3.450 Regime 4 
Q3 03 3.410 Regime 4 
Q4 03 3.760 Regime I 
Ql 04 3.990 Regime I 
Q2 04 4.370 Regime I 
Q3 04 4.680 Regime 3 
Q4 04 4.670 Regime 3 
Ql 05 4.710 Regime 3 
Q2 05 4.660 Regime 3 
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